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Overview 
The portfolio has three parts: 
 
Part one is a systematic literature review, in which the theoretical, conceptual and 
empirical literature relating to experiencing emotional empathy after acquired brain 
injury is explored. Studies investigating the ability to experience emotional empathy 
following acquired brain injury, using either self-report or physiological measures, are 
reviewed and critically evaluated. 
 
Part two is an empirical paper, which explores the impact of acquired brain injury 
(ABI) on social cognition, specifically empathy and theory of mind (ToM), and 
behavioural difficulties, specifically aggression. The study aimed to determine whether 
deficits in empathy and/or ToM components are able to explain heightened levels of 
aggression post-ABI. To do so, an ABI group displaying low levels of aggression 
(N=16) were compared against an ABI group with high levels of aggression (N=19) on 
measures of social cognition. Comparative analysis of the results revealed no significant 
difference between the groups on measures of the components of ToM and empathy. It 
is therefore concluded that a deficit in the components of ToM and/or empathy are 
unable to explain aggressive behaviour post-ABI. 
 
Part three comprises the appendices. 
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Part One  
 
Experiencing Emotional Empathy after 
Acquired Brain Injury: A Systematic 
Literature Review into the Nature and 
Extent of Deficits 
 
This paper is written in the format ready for submission to the journal ‗Health 
Psychology Review‘. Please see Appendix B for the author guidelines. 
Word count: 12,802 
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Abstract 
 
A reduction in appropriate social functioning has been commonly reported following 
Acquired brain injury (ABI). A post-ABI empathy deficit has been suggested as a 
possible cause of this; specifically the ability to experience emotional empathy which 
has been defined as vicariously feeling what someone else is feeling. This review 
sought to investigate the nature and extent of emotional empathy deficits post-ABI. A 
systematic search of four databases yielded 10 articles that met inclusion criteria. 
Specific data was extracted from each article and a methodological quality score was 
awarded in accordance with a quality checklist. The review revealed that studies used 
either self-report or physiological readings as measures of experienced emotional 
empathy. The overarching finding was that experienced emotional empathy deficits are 
common post-ABI, specifically the ability to experience emotional empathy from 
negative emotional expressions. The measures being used to assess the experience of 
emotional empathy were critically appraised and their limitations used to critically 
assess the studies results. The strengths and limitations of literature reviewed, measures 
used, neurological findings and the review itself are critically analysed and possible 
future research discussed. 
 
 
Key words: ‗EMOTIONAL EMPATHY‘, ‗EMOTIONAL RESPONSIVITY‘, ‗BRAIN 
INJURY‘, ‗REVIEW‘ 
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1. Introduction 
The term ‗acquired brain injury‘ (ABI) refers to a non-developmental brain injury. 
ABI‘s can be traumatic, infectious, haemorrhagic, anoxic and vascular. Due to advances 
in life saving technologies (Lux, 2007), cases of individuals living with an ABI have 
risen over the last decade (British Society of Rehabilitation Medicine, 2003; 
Neurological Alliance, 2003; Yates, Williams, Harris, Round & Jenkins, 2006). ABI is 
associated with physical, cognitive, behavioural and psychosocial problems (Fleminger, 
2005). It is estimated that 135,000 individuals in the UK are experiencing long term 
problems as a result of an ABI (Neurological Alliance, 2003). 
Over the last decade research demonstrating social cognitive deficits in individuals 
with ABI has emerged (Bibby & McDonald, 2005; Henry, Phillips, Crawford, Ietwaart 
& Summers, 2006; Stone, Baron-Cohen, Calder, Keane & Young, 2003; Wood & 
Williams, 2008; Williams & Wood, 2010). Manchester, Hodgkinson and Casey (1997) 
identified sexual disinhibition, aggression, agitation, lethargy and apathy as just some of 
the problematic behaviours associated with ABI. It has been postulated that deficits in 
social cognition result in behavioural disorders (Lezak, 1995; Stuss & Levine, 2002; 
Lee, Farrow, Spence & Woodruff, 2004; Bach & David, 2006). 
Empathy is a social cognitive process that allows humans to share and understand 
feelings (Schulte-Ruther, Markowitsch, Fink and Piefke, 2007), and plays a 
fundamental role in social functioning (Decety, 2010; Rankin, Kramer & Miller, 2005; 
Dimberg Andreasson &Thunberg, 2011). Empathy is defined as having an emotional 
and cognitive component (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Kaukiainen et al, 1999; Shamay-
Tsoory, Tomer, Goldsher, Berger & Aharon-Peretz, 2004; Davis, 1994; Beven, 
O‘Brien-Malone & Hall, 2004) alongside a compassionate component (Wood & 
Williams, 2008) encompassed by emotional empathy (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
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2004). Emotional empathy, the process of ‗feeling what another person is feeling‘ 
(Wood & Williams, 2008), has been reported to be impaired in ABI populations (Wood 
& Williams, 2008, Shamay-Tsoory, et al, 2004, de Sousa, McDonald, Rushby, Li, 
Dimoska & James, 2010a), however research is seemingly scarce. It has been proposed 
that a deficit of emotional empathy results in behavioural disturbances such as 
aggression (Wood & Williams, 2008; Kaukiainen et al 1999; Beven, O‘Brien-Malone 
& Hall, 2004; Price, Gardner & Erickson, 2004; Blair, 2001). 
To articulate whether behavioural deficits post-ABI are a consequence of emotional 
empathy is beyond the scope of this review. Through a systematic methodology the 
present review aims to investigate and critically appraise the literature assessing 
emotional empathy deficits post-ABI. This will assess the nature and extent of an 
experienced emotional empathy deficit post-ABI, the neuro-anatomical structures 
indicated in said deficit, the means of measuring emotional empathy and a comparison 
of the findings with a theoretical perspective of the emotional empathy process. 
 
1.1 The differentiation between cognitive and emotional empathy. 
Empathy is defined as having an emotional and cognitive component (Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011; Kaukiainen et al, 1999; Shamay-Tsoory, et al 2004; Davis, 1994; Beven, 
O‘Brien-Malone & Hall, 2004). Whereas cognitive empathy is the process of 
‗understanding what someone is feeling‘, emotional empathy is the process of ‗feeling 
what someone is feeling‘ (Wood & Williams, 2008). Cognitive empathy shares 
commonality with theory of mind processes, allowing us to understand what others may 
think, feel, or intend based on social context (Stone et al, 2003; Schulte-Ruther, 
Markowitsch, Fink & Pieflke, 2007; Singer, 2006). Conversely, emotional empathy can 
be described as the experience of a feeling produced from the observation of social and 
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emotionally salient stimuli (this term will be used throughout the review and refers to 
stimuli that socially communicate the emotional state of others i.e. a facial expression). 
Emotional empathy is the sum of emotional contagion and emotional recognition, 
whereas cognitive empathy involves perspective taking and mentalising (Shamay-
Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz & Perry, 2009). Emotional and cognitive empathy have been 
found to depend upon two dissociated neural pathways (Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009; 
Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), supporting the separation of the two processes. 
 
1.2 The process of emotional empathy 
Emotional empathy is the ability to perceive and experience emotions produced by 
social stimuli (Dimberg et al, 2011).  It allows humans to experience and therefore react 
to the emotional expressions of others (de Sousa et al 2010a). 
The phenomenon of experiencing emotion has developed from a primitive reflex 
system, motivating creatures to move towards desired appetitive stimuli and withdraw 
from dangerous or painful stimuli (Bradley & Lang, 2000; Nummenmaa, Hirvonen, 
Parkkola & Hietanen, 2008). In humans, this motive system has developed into a 
complex mantra of affective experiences; identifiable through behaviour, emotional 
language and physiological reactions (Bradley & Lang, 2000). 
Phillips, Drevets, Rauch and Lane (2003) propose a three part process of emotion 
perception that occurs when presented with an emotionally salient stimulus (this term 
will be used throughout the review and refers to a ‗stimulus that would motivate us 
through emotion‘ i.e. a snake). The first phase is the appraisal of the affective salience 
of the stimuli. The second phase is the production of an affective mental state. This 
occurs through the activation of specific autonomic, neuroendocrine and somatomotor 
responses as well as conscious emotional ‗feeling‘. The final phase of the process is the 
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regulation of the induced affective state and the conscious decision to act on or suppress 
it. This model is similar to Levanthal‘s (1984) perceptual motor model of emotion and 
Ohman‘s (1993) theory on levels of processing emotional information (for a review see 
Sonnby-Borgstrom, Jonssoon & Svensson, 2003) in that it suggests the experience of a 
physiological arousal state provides the base for establishment of a conscious affective 
state. It is also similar to Preston and de Waal‘s (2002) perception-action hypothesis in 
that it states humans must experience an emotion in order to consciously recognise it in 
another. 
Similar to the experience of emotional perception, individuals high in emotional 
empathy experience the emotion being presented by another. Of course, it is not always 
beneficial to respond by mirroring the emotion presented to us (Decety, 2010). This can 
be accounted for through the third phase of the Phillip et al (2003) emotion perception 
model in which a conscious decision can be made regarding the feeling. For example 
when seeing an individual in distress, this conscious action may override or suppress 
the emotion experienced in phase two (i.e. comforting the distressed individual). A 
conscious realisation may also alter the initial appraisal and encourage the suppression 
of the experienced emotion (i.e. the individual in distress is a child who does not want 
to continue shopping). Both of these scenarios would result in the alteration of our 
emotional state, but they would occur after the initial contagion of the emotion. 
Therefore the third phase in this model of emotional perception may reflect the 
cognitive elements of empathy and the way in which they shape our emotions 
dependent on social context. However, this perspective does not account for the 
necessity to understand that the experienced feelings belong to another.  
Differentiation between self and other‘s emotional state is not necessary for 
emotional perception but is a key component of social cognitive processes such as 
~ 13 ~ 
 
empathy (Schulte-Ruther, et al, 2007). Processes of theory of mind mediate the 
differentiation between self and other mental states. Furthermore, neural areas attributed 
with higher cognitive function are necessary for differentiation of self and other 
perspectives (Schulte-Ruther et al, 2007; Zaki, Bolger & Ochsner, 2009).  Considering 
the perspective taking and mentalising role of cognitive empathy (Shamay-Tsoory, 
2011), it is realistic to assume that differentiation between self and others emotional 
states is a modem of cognitive empathy. 
Taking these perspectives into consideration it is possible to predict how the separate 
processes of emotional and cognitive empathy may interact to produce empathy (see 
fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 1 A diagrammatic model of emotional and cognitive empathy 
This psychological model indicates that experiencing the emotional state of another 
aids our ability to understand and react to it. This would represent the collaborative 
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divide of emotional empathy and cognitive empathy, the former preceding and being 
revised (halted/altered) by the latter. Phylogenetically this makes sense as emotional 
empathy is an earlier system that is present in rodents and birds, than cognitive empathy 
which presents in chimpanzees (Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009; de Waal, 2008; Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011). The dissociation between these systems suggests that it would also be 
possible to reach an understanding of another‘s affective state through an in-depth 
understanding of social situations without experiencing the observed emotion. Evidence 
for this is provided in the psychopathy literature, a population known for their intact 
cognitive empathy and lack of emotional empathy (Kiehl, 2006; Tangney & Stuewig, 
2004). Such individuals are able to understand but not experience the affective state of 
others. The collaboration of both emotional and cognitive empathy would allow a rapid 
and accurate response to social, emotionally salient stimuli, which would be difficult for 
either component to achieve individually. 
This model therefore represents a bottom-up and top-down process, accounting for 
the perspectives of simulation theory; a view that proposes humans internally simulate 
the mind set of another to understand them (Davies & Stone, 1995), and ‗theory‘ theory 
which is a perspective suggesting humans understand the behaviour of others through 
sets of schematic laws and rules, equating to a framework of explanatory concepts 
(Churchland, 1990; Churchland, 1991). 
 
1.3 Emotion appraisal post-ABI 
As outlined in figure 1, emotional empathy is made up of two parts, namely the 
experience of the emotion preceded by the appraisal of the stimulus. Post-ABI, 
individuals are suggested to display a deficit in the ability to accurately recognise 
emotions in; faces (Kucharska-Pietura, Phillips, Gernand & David, 2003; Adolphs & 
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Tranel, 2003; Knox & Douglas, 2009; Adolphs, Tranel & Damasio 2001; Yip, Leung, 
Li & Lee, 2004; Braun, Traue, Frisch, Deighton & Kessler, 2005; Green, Turner & 
Thompson, 2004); music (Gosselin et al, 2005); and prosody (Pell, 1998; Pell, 2006; 
Charbonneau, Scherzer, Aspirot & Cohen, 2003). Although this seems to suggest a 
deficit in the appraisal stage of emotional empathy, studies have commonly relied upon 
participants selecting an emotional state or verbally stating the emotion observed. This 
process of labeling the observed emotion is a function of cognitive labelling (Tyson, 
1998). Therefore, the inability to accurately label the emotion observed may not suggest 
an emotional empathy deficit but rather a cognitive deficit in the ability to label 
emotions. It is possible that an inability to accurately appraise emotions would lead to 
an inability to experience the observed emotion through emotional empathy, although 
this cannot be determined from the current literature. The ability to accurately appraise 
emotions post-ABI is outside the scope of this review and therefore literature 
investigating the appraisal of emotion will not be included. 
 
1.4 Experienced emotional empathy: Neural anatomy and mirror neurons. 
In a recent review, Shamay-Tsoory (2011) outlined the neural basis of emotional 
empathy. This consists of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), inferior parietal lobule (IPL), 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the anterior insula (AI) (For a review of the neural 
basis of emotional and cognitive empathy, see Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). The former two 
regions are associated with emotional contagion whilst the latter two are associated with 
shared pain. These interlinked processes produce experienced emotion from social 
stimuli (depicted in fig. 1) through the activation of neural systems pertaining to the 
experience of the emotion observed (Carr, LIacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta & Lenzi, 
2003; Jackson, Meltzoff, Decety, 2005), i.e. the presentation of sad/happy faces 
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evoking the feeling in the viewer (Wild, Erb, Bartels, 2001). Additionally, the right 
thalamus, extrastriate body area and fusiform gyrus have also been implicated in 
emotional empathy (Nummenmaa et al, 2008). 
Emotional contagion and pain sharing are processes by which we are able to 
experience what another is feeling, and therefore vital in the process of emotional 
empathy (Nummenmaa, et al 2008; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Shamay-Tsoory et al 2009; 
Sonnby-Borgstrom et al, 2003). The rapid processing between observing the stimuli and 
experiencing the emotion (within 500ms) (Lishner, Cooter & Zald, 2008), indicate the 
importance of rapid social processing in human survival (Singer, Seymour, O‘Doherty, 
Kaube, Dolan & Frith, 2004). Sonnby-Borgstrom (2002) suggests that facial mimicry is 
an automatic response presenting as an early component of emotional empathy, as those 
high in emotional empathy display fast, accurate mimicry when compared to low 
emotional empathisers. Those high in emotional empathy displayed greater sensitivity 
to emotional content and more intense experienced emotions resulting from emotional 
contagion (Dimberg et al, 2011). 
The mirror neuron system (MNS) consists of neurons that fire when observing an 
action and performing the same action. This MNS system has been suggested to be the 
cornerstone of emotional contagion (Schulte-Ruther et al, 2007; Frith & Singer, 2008; 
Nummenmaa, et al, 2008). Sonnby-Borgstrom et al (2003) reported the observation of 
expressed emotion produced facial muscle imitation and evoked the expressed emotion 
in the viewer. The activation of premotor areas during observation of emotional 
expressions further supports this (Carr et al, 2003). Studies have demonstrated that the 
observation of pain in others activates neural regions involved in self-pain processing, 
suggesting the involvement of mirror neurons (Jackson et al, 2005; Singer et al, 2004). 
Furthermore, individuals scoring higher in emotional empathy display stronger 
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activation in the ACC and left AI when they perceive their partner as being in pain 
(Singer et al, 2004). Emotional empathy produced increased activity in areas 
responsible for emotional processing, perceiving faces and bodies and simulating others 
actions (Nummenmaa et al, 2008). All of this suggests the important role of emotional 
contagion and mirror neurons in the experience of emotional empathy. However, 
though there are strong theoretical links for the role of the MNS in empathy processing, 
there is currently insufficient evidence to clarify its role (for a review see Decety, 
2011). 
Therefore, damage to the MNS or other areas associated with emotional empathy 
may result in social and behavioural disorders, as individuals are unable to experience 
the emotions displayed by others and therefore unable to relate to them. 
 
1.5 Measuring emotional empathy 
Researchers measuring emotional empathy have predominantly relied upon self-
report questionnaires (Wood & Williams, 2008; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006; 
Mehrabian, 2000; Singer et al 2004; Macaskill, Maltby & Day, 2002; Shamay-Tsoory, 
et al 2004). Commonly used questionnaires include, the Balanced Emotional Empathy 
Scale (BEES, Mehrabian, 2000), the Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy 
(QMEE, Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, 
Davis, 1980). All of these measures have individual and shared flaws regarding their 
ability to measure emotional empathy. Jolliffe and Farrington (2006) suggest the QMEE 
and IRI rely on questions that have greater relation with sympathetic reactions rather 
than emotional empathy. Sympathy is considered separate from empathy, referring to 
the ability to reflect on how one feels about another‘s emotional state (Jolliffe & 
Farrington, 2006). Therefore if these measures are assessing sympathy, they can be 
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considered to be assessing the emotion experienced after cognitive regulation (see fig 1) 
and not before (emotional empathy). The BEES appears to do this less, with more 
questions focusing on the shared emotional experience, although this cannot be said for 
all the questions. e.g. ―I get a strong urge to help when I see someone in distress‖. A 
shared limitation of these measures is their dependence on self-report. Empathy is an 
abstract modality that cannot be easily assessed ‗on-line‘. However the prosocial nature 
of empathy may lead people to over-report their empathic nature. This proves a greater 
problem within ABI populations who are often reported to lack insight (Bach & David, 
2006). Whilst a reliable measure of emotional empathy should assess the second part of 
experienced emotion (production of a mirrored affective state (fig, 1.)) it is possible that 
measures may assess experienced emotion after cognitive regulation or receive 
inaccurate responses from participants. 
An alternative way of measuring experienced emotion is through measures assessing 
the first part of experienced emotion, physiological emotional responsivity (de Sousa, 
McDonald, Rushby, Li, Dimoska & James, 2010b). Evidence suggests individuals 
displaying high levels of emotional empathy display a greater mimicking response to 
emotional faces suggesting a greater sensitivity to emotional content, a.k.a. the ability to 
experience emotions (Dimberg et al, 2011). Whether this represents a motor response 
which in turn produces the emotional state in the observer, or is the result of feeling the 
expressed emotion, it is suggested that it is an indication of socially induced 
experienced emotion (Lishner et al, 2008). Further evidence for this process extends 
from research into the human startle response. The human startle response is dependent 
on the affective state of the recipient;a pleasant states reduces startle response, whilst 
negative states increase startle response (Bradley Cuthbert & Lang, 1990). Individuals 
with temporal lobe damage have been found to display a lack of startle response despite 
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viewing stimuli designed to induce an affective state of fear or disgust (Buchanan, 
Tranel & Adolphs, 2004). 
Although facial mimicry studies (Hess & Blairy, 2000, Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998) 
and startle response studies are common (Bradley, Cuthbert & Lang, 1990), there are 
multiple physiological responses that precede conscious affective states e.g. 
electrodermal skin conductance (Andersson & Finset, 1998), heart rate (Sanchez-
Navarro, Martinez-Selva & Roman, 2005), etc. However, whilst these measures are 
able to ascertain a physiological reaction, the ability to which they are able to identify 
the experience of a shared emotion is less obvious. 
In order to measure experienced emotional empathy, researchers rely on measures of 
somatic responsivity (assessing physiological reactions) and verbal self-reports 
(assessing induced conscious affective mental states). Both have strengths and 
weaknesses in their ability to accurately assess the emotional empathy experienced by 
participants. 
 
1.6 The present review 
The present review aims to identify whether individual‘s post-ABI are able to 
experience emotional empathy to the same degree as non-brain injured individuals. The 
measures used, and their accuracy in assessing this phenomenon of emotional empathy 
will be critically reviewed. The neuro-anatomical areas implicated within the literature 
will be extracted and compared against those currently highlighted as important in the 
experience of emotional empathy. The quality of each article reviewed will be assessed 
and all data presented in a data synthesis table. The review focuses on experienced 
emotional empathy and therefore research investigating recognition of emotion will not 
be included. 
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2. Method 
Using the model outlined in figure 1, included studies were required to have assessed 
the ability to experience emotional empathy, either the affective mental state or the 
physiological, emotional responsivity in a brain injured population. For the latter, only 
studies using social, emotionally salient stimuli (‗stimuli that socially communicate the 
emotional state of others‘) not just emotionally salient stimuli (‗stimulus that would 
motivate us through emotion‘) were used. The core difference between the two is that 
the former, whilst pertaining to the same rules as the latter, is produced from another 
person, i.e a social source. 
 
2.1 Data Sources and Search Strategy 
A systematic search of four computerised data bases, CINAHL, PsychInfo, Science 
Direct, MEDLINE, was undertaken. Due to the high hit ratio of unrelated articles the 
Science Direct search was limited to keywords, abstracts and titles only. 
The following keywords were used to obtain studies investigating experienced 
emotional empathy: 
 emotion* reactivity 
 social cogniti* 
 compassion* 
 sympathy 
 emotion* percept* 
 emotion* recogni* 
 emotion* experience* 
 emotiona*contagion 
 empath* 
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The following keywords were used to obtain studies using brain injured participants: 
 head injur* 
 brain injur* 
 brain damage* 
 stroke 
 hypoxi* 
 anoxi* 
 tumo#r 
 lesion* 
 
Using a Boolean search method all keywords encapsulating emotional empathy and 
acquired brain injury were combined via ‗AND‘. An additional search was conducted 
replacing the emotional empathy words that contained the word ‗emotion‘ with the 
word ‗affect‘ and the word ‗affective‘. This was completed using an ‗OR‘ command 
e.g. affect responsivity OR affective responsivity. To avoid hit repetition the exclusion 
criteria of ―NOT emotion*‖ was added to each of these searches. 
Titles and abstracts were reviewed online and full texts of potentially eligible articles 
were obtained. The reference sections of eligible articles were searched for potentially 
relevant articles and the titles, abstracts and full texts (when appropriate) of these 
articles were reviewed. Also, authors with an interest in the field were contacted to 
establish whether they had any relevant articles ‘in press‘. These correspondences can 
be found in appendix D. 
 
2.2 Study selection criteria 
Included studies were required to meet the following criteria: 
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 Study participants must include individuals who have sustained an acquired 
brain injury. Studies investigating neurological degenerative disorders such as 
dementia and Huntington‘s disease will not be included. 
 If using self reports the studies must be measuring the ability to experience 
emotional empathy. Studies assessing the ability of individuals to experience 
emotion generally will not be included. 
 If using physiological recordings the studies must use social emotionally salient 
stimuli. Studies using emotionally salient stimuli will not be considered for this 
review. 
 The study must use participants over 16 years of age. 
 The study must have been published or ‗in press‘ in a peer reviewed journal. 
Dissertations, posters and unpublished articles will not be considered. 
 The study must have been published within the last 10 years (post 2000) to 
ensure the use of current measures of experienced emotional empathy. 
 The study must be available in English. 
 
2.3 Study quality assessment 
 A systematic qualitative approach was undertaken to assess the quality of each 
study. This was deemed important to control for inadequacies (i.e. study design, 
conduct or analysis) which may result in biases (Centre for Reviews and Dissemination, 
CRD 2009). Checklists that had been previously used to review the quality of articles 
were examined. Khan, ter Riet, Popay, Nixon and Kleijnen (2001) recommend the use 
of a study design hierarchy (table 1) to establish the effectiveness of studies. To ensure 
the accuracy of results, only studies meeting the criteria for level one and two were 
included. 
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Table 1: Study Design Hierarchy (Khan et al, 2001) 
Level  Description 
1.  Experimental studies (e.g. RCT with concealed allocation) 
2.  Quasi-experimental studies (e.g. experimental study without randomisation) 
3a.  Controlled observational studies - Cohort studies 
3b.  Controlled observational studies - Case control studies 
4.  Observational studies without control groups 
5. Expert opinion based on pathophysiology, bench research or consensus. 
 
In addition, the theoretical and methodological orientations of each study were 
assessed using a checklist designed against the specifications of CRD (2009). The 
checklist was developed through the review of the Downs and Black (1998) quality 
assurance checklist and the Consolidation Standards of Reporting Trials (CONSORT, 
Schulz, Altman & Moher, 2010) statement. Neither was suitable for the current review 
as the former was designed to assess the quality of interventions studies and the latter 
randomised control trail studies. Appropriate questions from each were removed and 
edited to develop the 22 item, quality assurance checklist used in this study (See 
appendix F). 
Each paper was awarded a score, the maximum being 23. Scores can be found in 
appendix G. All papers were peer reviewed using the same quality checklist. Inter-rater 
agreement was measured using a Cohen‘s Kappa. It was found to be 0.62 which 
according to Landis and Koch (1997) suggests ‘substantial agreement‘. 
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2.5 Data extraction 
Figure 2 A flowchart depicting the process of article selection. 
 
The online review of 3,688 titles and abstracts revealed 62 potentially eligible 
articles (accounting for the removal of duplicates). Contact with authors interested in 
this area of study revealed one eligible article that had already been identified through 
the literature search. No other eligible articles were revealed. The full text of these 62 
articles was assessed against the inclusion criteria. 38 articles were excluded as they did 
not assess any element of experienced emotional empathy. A further 3 articles were 
removed as they were case studies. 6 articles were excluded as the stimuli used did not 
pertain to social interaction. 4 studies were removed as they asked participants to rate 
experienced emotion unrelated to social stimulation. 1 article was excluded as it was not 
in English. Finally, 1 article was excluded as it fell below the quality criteria set out by 
the study design hierarchy (Khan, et al 2001), due to it lacking a comparison group. The 
reference section of the 9 remaining articles was reviewed for relevant articles. Of these 
7 were identified. On review of the full text only 1 was relevant. 
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Included articles were reviewed using a data extraction sheet (appendix E) developed 
with reference to examples provided by the CRD (Khan, ter Riet, Glanville, Sowden & 
Kleijnen, 2001). The form was edited to make it appropriate for the current review. 
 
2.6 Data Synthesis 
Quantitive analysis of the articles was not possible due to the methodological 
variation between studies concerning measures used, sample size, etc. Because of this a 
qualitative analysis using data synthesis was undertaken. 
 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Critical Appraisal 
A systematic literature review of four electronic databases revealed 10 articles 
matching the study criteria. The methodological quality of each study ranged from 11-
20 with a mean of 17.2 (see appendix G). The scale was out of 23, suggesting each had 
flaws. 
The information extracted from the included studies can be found in the data 
synthesis tables below. Furthermore, descriptions of all the measures used can be found 
in appendix H and appendix I. 
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Table 2: Studies Investigating the Ability to Experience Emotional Empathy Post-ABI 
Reference and country 
Characteristic ABI 
group 
Characteristic 
control group Exclusion criteria Aim of Study 
Study design and 
quality Measures used 
Neurological 
areas 
implicated 
by this study 
Methodological 
procedures 
Main Findings in 
relation to  
Experienced 
Emotional Empathy 
Other 
Findings 
de Sousa et al 2010(a) 
(Australia) 
 N =21 
 ABI Type = TBI 
 Mean age (S.D.) 
=48.4(8.8) 
 Male:Female 
17:4 
 Mean PTA (S.D.) 
=80.1(70.9) 
 Mean GCS (S.D.) 
=N/A 
 Years Post Injury 
(S.D.) =11.9(7.8) 
 Age at Injury 
(S.D.)  =N/A 
 Years in 
Education (S.D.) = 
12.9(3.8) 
 Recruitment 
Setting = Brain 
Injury Unit’s 
(Sydney). 
 N =22 
 Mean age (S.D.) 
=36.1(12.6) 
 Male:Female 
14:8 
 Years in 
Education (S.D.) 
= 14(3.4) 
 Matched as 
closely to the 
demographics of 
the TBI group as 
possible on 
gender, and 
education. 
However control 
group 
significantly 
younger. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(N.B. same control 
used in de Sousa et 
al 2010b) 
ABI Group Only 
 Brain injury 
other than TBI 
 PTA<1 day 
 Years since 
injury<8 months  
 Agnosia 
 Aphasia 
 Unable to 
comprehend 
and/or adhere to 
instructions 
 Pre-TBI 
neurological 
impairments 
 
Control Group 
Only 
 A neurological 
disorder or brain 
injury. 
 
 
 
To confirm the 
lack of emotional 
empathy post-TBI. 
Examine the 
relationship 
between emotional 
empathy and 
emotional 
responsivity 
Quasi-
experimental 
 
Quality = 19 
Experienced 
Emotional Empathy 
 BEES 
 facial EMG 
 SCR 
 
Other Measures 
 DASS-21 
N/A  Viewed social, 
emotionally salient 
images (Facial 
expressions from 
Ekman & Friesen, 
1976) 
 Face’s were either 
happy or angry 
 Stimuli presented 
for 6000ms each 
with a 1500ms 
break 
 Facial EMG and 
skin conductance 
was recorded 
 The BEES was 
administered after 
physiological 
testing. 
The TBI group 
displayed 
significantly lower 
emotional empathy 
scores on the BEES. 
 
The TBI group 
displayed less 
reactivity in their 
skin conductance 
levels when angry 
faces were displayed 
 
High emotional 
empathy correlated 
with high 
responsivity. 
 
TBI participants 
showed an impaired 
mimicry response to 
angry faces 
compared against 
controls, but not 
happy faces. This 
suggests a deficit in 
the ability to 
experience the 
negative emotional 
states of others. 
 
Impaired 
responsivity to angry 
faces is only 
established amongst 
TBI participants low 
in emotional 
empathy  
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Reference and country 
Characteristic ABI 
group 
Characteristic 
control group Exclusion criteria Aim of Study 
Study design and 
quality Measures used 
Neurological 
areas 
implicated 
by this study 
Methodological 
procedures 
Main Findings in 
relation to  
Experienced 
Emotional Empathy 
Other 
Findings 
Wood & Williams 
2008 
(UK) 
 N =89 
 ABI Type = TBI 
 Mean age (S.D.) 
=42.3(11.8) 
 Male:Female 
59:30 
 Mean PTA (S.D.) 
=13.99(29) 
 Mean GCS (S.D.) 
=10.28(4.44) 
 Years Post Injury 
(S.D.) =3.72(3.81) 
 Age at Injury 
(S.D.)  
=38.7(12.05) 
 Years in 
Education (S.D.) = 
11.72(2) 
 Recruitment 
Setting = Head 
injury Clinic 
(Swansea) 
 Premorbid IQ 
(S.D.) =96.6(13.5) 
 N =84 
 Mean age (S.D.) 
=40.29(11.92) 
 Male:Female 
51:33 
 Years in 
Education (S.D.) 
= N/A 
 Premorbid IQ 
(S.D.) 
=99.6(8.9) 
 Matched to TBI 
group on gender, 
age, socio-
economic status 
and estimated 
intellectual 
level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both Groups 
 A history of 
psychiatric input, 
personality 
disorders, 
learning 
disabilities.  
 
ABI Group Only 
 Brain injury other 
than TBI 
 Age<22 
 Dysphasia 
 Capacity to 
participate in the 
study 
 Pre-TBI 
neurological 
impairments 
 Neurological 
impairments that 
would prevent 
study completion 
 
Control Group 
Only 
 A neurological 
disorder or brain 
injury. 
 
To investigate the 
frequency of low 
emotional 
empathy in a TBI 
population. 
Quasi-
experimental 
 
Quality = 20 
Experienced 
Emotional Empathy 
 BEES 
 
Other Measures 
 NART-2 
 WAIS-III 
(Vocabulary, 
Similarities, 
Comprehension, 
Block Design, 
Matrix, Letter-
Number 
Sequencing, 
Picture 
Arrangement) 
 BDI 
 BAI 
 BADS (Zoo Map) 
 Hayling and 
Brixton 
N/A  Cognitive testing 
was administered as 
part of a routine 
neuropsychology 
battery. 
 Mood measures and 
the BEES 
administered after 
neuropsychological 
battery. 
 Using z-scores from 
the BEES, both 
groups were 
separated into high, 
average and low 
aggression 
categories 
The TBI group 
displayed 
significantly lower 
emotional empathy 
scores on the BEES. 
 
Males displayed 
lower emotional 
empathy scores in 
both groups. 
 
 
No cognitive 
difference 
across 
emotional 
empathy 
groups, 
suggesting 
verbal and 
cognitive 
flexibility are 
not a factor 
in emotional 
empathy. 
 
Severity of 
injury did not 
correlate 
with 
emotional 
empathy. 
 
No 
relationship 
between 
emotional 
empathy and 
anxiety or 
depression. 
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Reference and country 
Characteristic ABI 
group 
Characteristic 
control group Exclusion criteria Aim of Study 
Study design and 
quality Measures used 
Neurological 
areas 
implicated 
by this study 
Methodological 
procedures 
Main Findings in 
relation to  
Experienced 
Emotional Empathy 
Other 
Findings 
Muller et al 2010 
(France) 
 N =15 
 ABI Type = TBI 
(CHI) 
 Mean age (S.D.) 
=37.2(12.3) 
 Male:Female 
13:2 
 Mean PTA (S.D.) 
=N/A 
 Mean GCS (S.D.) 
=4.8(1.7) 
 Months Post 
Injury (S.D.) 
=102.9(121.2) 
 Age at Injury 
(S.D.)  =N/A 
 Years in 
Education (S.D.) = 
10.4(2) 
 Recruitment 
Setting = Neuro 
rehabilitation 
Sites, Nursing 
homes and 
Hospital wards. 
 N =15 
 Mean age (S.D.) 
=37(12.5) 
 Male:Female 
13:2 
 Years in 
Education (S.D.) 
= 11(1.7) 
 Matched to TBI 
group on gender, 
age, education. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both Groups 
 A history of 
psychiatric input.  
 
ABI Group Only 
 Brain injury other 
than TBI 
 TBI other than 
closed head 
injury. 
 Pre-TBI 
neurological 
impairments 
 
Control Group 
Only 
 A neurological 
disorder or brain 
injury. 
 
Ability of TBI to 
infer the mental 
states of others 
via ToM. 
To assess the 
correlation of 
ToM and 
empathy. 
Quasi-
experimental 
 
Quality = 15 
Experienced 
Emotional Empathy 
 IRI – PD, EC 
 
Other Measures 
 IRI – PT, FS 
 WAIS-R  
 Stroop colour word 
test 
 Trail making task 
 Semantic and 
formal lexical 
evocation adapted 
 California verbal 
learning test 
 Interpretation of 
indirect speech 
 Faux pas test 
 First-order and 
second-order false 
belief task 
 Character intention 
task 
 Reading the mind 
in the eyes 
N/A  All measures were 
administered in 
random order. 
No difference in 
emotional empathy 
between groups. 
No correlation 
between EE and 
ToM 
ToM deficit 
in the TBI 
population 
apart from 
first-order 
false belief. 
 
Indirect 
speech was 
significantly 
lower than 
controls. 
 
No 
difference 
between 
groups in 
Cognitive 
empathy 
 
No 
correlation 
between  
cognitive 
empathy and 
ToM 
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Reference and country 
Characteristic ABI 
group 
Characteristic 
control group Exclusion criteria Aim of Study 
Study design and 
quality Measures used 
Neurological 
areas 
implicated 
by this study 
Methodological 
procedures 
Main Findings in 
relation to  
Experienced 
Emotional Empathy 
Other 
Findings 
McDonald et al 
2011(a) 
(Australia) 
 N =14 
 ABI Type = TBI 
 Mean age =49 
 Male:Female 
11:3 
 Mean PTA (S.D.) 
=84.3(49.1) 
 Mean GCS (S.D.) 
=N/A 
 Years Post Injury 
(S.D.) =13(7) 
 Age at Injury 
(S.D.)  =N/A 
 Years in 
Education (S.D.) = 
13.4(3.7) 
 Recruitment 
Setting = Brain 
injury units 
(Sydney) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participants also 
used in  a related 
study by de Sousa et 
al 2010a) 
 N =18 
 Mean age (S.D.) 
=N/A 
 Male:Female 
12:6 
 Years in 
Education (S.D.) 
= 13.9(3) 
 Matched to TBI 
group on gender 
and education. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both Groups 
 A history of 
developmental 
disorder, 
communication 
deficit or 
psychiatric input. 
 Severe anxiety or 
depression  
 
ABI Group Only 
 Brain injury other 
than TBI 
 Agnosia 
 Aphasia 
 Psychosis 
 Unable to 
comprehend 
and/or adhere to 
instructions 
 Pre-TBI 
neurological 
impairments 
 
Control Group 
Only 
 A neurological 
disorder or brain 
injury. 
 
To replicate and 
extend previous 
work examining 
physiological 
responses in 
people with TBI 
when viewing 
repeated 
emotional 
expressions 
Quasi-
experimental 
 
Quality = 19 
Experienced 
Emotional Empathy 
 SCR 
 SCL 
 ECD 
 
Other Measures 
 DASS-21 
N/A Passive Paradigm 
 Viewed social, 
emotionally salient 
images (Facial 
expressions from 
Ekman & Friesen, 
1976) 
 Face’s were either 
happy or angry 
 Stimuli presented 
for 6000ms each 
with a 1500ms 
break 
 ECD and skin 
conductance was 
recorded 
 
Active Paradigm 
 Same as the passive 
paradigm 
 But participants to 
select the emotion 
expressed from a list 
of 7 emotions. 
 
Severe TBI 
differentially 
impaired in 
physiological 
response. 
 
No group difference 
on skin conductance 
levels, regardless of 
emotion or 
paradigm. 
 
No group difference 
in evoked cardiac 
response regardless 
of emotion or 
paradigm, when 
groups were 
adjusted for age 
differences 
 
The TBI group 
showed lower 
longstanding arousal 
(SCL) to angry 
faces. in the passive 
paradigm. 
 
 
TBI group 
displayed 
poorer 
recognition. 
 
The TBI 
group had a 
lower 
baseline 
arousal 
 
Emotional 
responsivity 
does not 
predict 
emotional 
recognition  
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Reference 
and country Characteristic ABI groups 
Characteristic 
control group Exclusion criteria Aim of Study 
Study design 
and quality Measures used 
Neurological 
areas 
implicated by 
this study 
Methodological 
procedures 
Main Findings in 
relation to  
Experienced 
Emotional 
Empathy 
Other 
Findings 
Shamay-
Tsoory et al 
2004 
(Israel) 
 N =10 
 Area Injured = 
Prefrontal cortex 
 Hemisphere 
injured(n)  
=Left(10); 
Right(9); 
Bilateral(17). 
 ABI Type(n) = 
TBI(26), 
Meningioma 
removal (6), 
CVA(4). 
 Mean age 
=35.44(13) 
 Male:Female 
30:6 
 Mean PTA (S.D.) 
=N/A 
 Mean GCS (S.D.) 
=N/A 
 Years Post Injury 
(S.D.) =N/A 
 Age at Injury 
(S.D.)  =N/A 
 Years in 
Education (S.D.) 
= 12.52(1.7) 
 Recruitment 
Setting = 
Cognitive 
Neurology Unit 
 
 
 
 
 N =10 
 Area Injured = 
Parietal cortex 
 Hemisphere 
injured(n)  
=Left(8); 
Right(7); 
Bilateral(15). 
 ABI Type(n) = 
TBI(3); 
Meningioma 
removal (5); 
CVA(7). 
 Mean age 
=41.6(16.07) 
 Male:Female 
10:5 
 Mean PTA (S.D.) 
=N/A 
 Mean GCS (S.D.) 
=N/A 
 Years Post Injury 
(S.D.) =N/A 
 Age at Injury 
(S.D.)  =N/A 
 Years in 
Education (S.D.) 
=13.47(2.3) 
 Recruitment 
Setting = 
Cognitive 
Neurology Unit 
 
 N =19 
 Mean age 
(S.D.) 
=34.05(15.81) 
 Male:Female 
15:4 
 Years in 
Education 
(S.D.) = 
13.78(3.1) 
 Matched to TBI 
group on age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both Groups 
 Not speak fluent 
Hebrew 
 A history of 
psychiatric illness, 
developmental 
disorders, drug or 
alcohol abuse. 
 
ABI Group Only 
 Diffuse axonal 
injuries 
 Time post 
trauma/surgery <6 
months 
 Verbal, visual or 
motor deficits that 
would prevent 
completion of 
testing 
 Pre-injury/tumour 
history of head 
trauma with loss 
of consciousness 
or other 
neurological 
deficits 
 
Control Group Only 
 A neurological 
disorder or brain 
injury. 
 
 
To examine the 
effect of localised 
lesions on various 
aspects of 
empathy 
To examine the 
impact of right 
and left 
hemisphere 
lesions on 
empathy 
processes. 
To assess whether 
empathy related to 
cognitive 
flexibility or 
emotional 
recognition. 
Quasi-
experimental 
 
Quality = 11 
Experienced 
Emotional 
Empathy 
 QMEE 
 
Other Measures 
 IRI - PT, FS. 
 Raven’s 
Progressive 
Matracies 
 BDI 
 WCST 
 Verbal Fluency 
 Design Fluency 
 Alternative 
Uses Test 
 Torrance test of 
creative 
thinking (The 
circles 
subscale) 
 Recognition of 
Facial 
Expression 
 Recognition of 
affective 
prosody 
 Right 
parietal 
cortex 
 right and 
left 
Prefrontal 
cortex 
 The orbito-
prefrontal 
and 
medial-
prefrotal 
cortex 
(regarding 
empathy as 
whole) 
N/A Prefrontal cortex 
damage impairs 
emotional 
empathy (as well 
as cognitive 
empathy). 
 
Prefrontal damage 
and right parietal 
cortex damage 
impairs emotional 
empathy. 
Emotional 
empathy does not 
correlate with any 
other measures 
 
Emotional 
empathy and 
cognitive empathy 
correlate. 
Prefrontal 
cortex 
group 
impaired on 
cognitive 
flexibility 
and 
affective 
and facial 
expression 
recognition. 
 
Both ABI 
groups are 
impaired on 
affective 
prosody. 
 
Right 
hemisphere 
damage 
participants 
displayed 
greater 
deficit in 
emotional 
prosody 
and 
expression 
recognition 
compared 
to left 
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Reference and country 
Characteristic ABI 
group 
Characteristic 
control group Exclusion criteria Aim of Study 
Study design and 
quality Measures used 
Neurological 
areas 
implicated 
by this study 
Methodological 
procedures 
Main Findings in 
relation to  
Experienced 
Emotional Empathy 
Other 
Findings 
McDonald et al 
2011(b) 
(Australia) 
 N =21 
 ABI Type = TBI 
 Mean age 
=48.4(8.8) 
 Male:Female 
17:4 
 Mean PTA (S.D.) 
=80.1(70.9) 
 Mean GCS (S.D.) 
=N/A 
 Years Post Injury 
(S.D.) =11.9(7.8) 
 Age at Injury 
(S.D.)  =N/A 
 Years in 
Education (S.D.) = 
12.9(3.8) 
 Recruitment 
Setting = Brain 
injury units 
(Sydney) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 N =20 
 Mean age (S.D.) 
=36.2(13.2) 
 Male:Female 
12:8 
 Years in 
Education (S.D.) 
= 14.6(3.7) 
 Matched to TBI 
group on gender 
and education. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both Groups 
 Clinical levels of 
depression or 
anxiety, 
psychosis 
 inability to 
communicate 
 
ABI Group Only 
 Brain injury other 
than TBI 
 Not judged to be 
experiencing 
social problems  
 Agnosia 
 Aphasia 
 Psychiatric 
history 
 History of 
neurological 
disorder 
 Unable to 
comprehend 
and/or adhere to 
instructions 
 Pre-TBI 
neurological 
impairments 
 
Control Group 
Only 
 A neurological 
disorder or brain 
injury. 
 
Examine facial 
mimicry of happy 
and sad faces by 
people with TBI 
Quasi-
experimental 
 
Quality = 18 
Experienced 
Emotional Empathy 
 Facial EMG 
 
Other Measures 
 DASS-21 
 Emotion Matching 
N/A Static Paradigm 
 Viewed social, 
emotionally salient 
images (Facial 
expressions from 
Ekman & Friesen, 
1976) 
 Face’s were either 
happy or angry 
 Stimuli presented 
for 6000ms each 
with a 1500ms 
break 
 Facial EMG was 
recorded 
 
Dynamic Paradigm 
 Same as the passive 
paradigm 
 Stimuli created 
using 8 photos of 
the same actors used 
in the static images. 
 Faces morph from 
neutral to either 
happy or angry on a 
continuum. 
 
Emotion matching task 
 Match stimulus face 
with one of four 
expression pictures 
(using different 
actors of the same 
gender). 
TBI individuals 
displayed limited 
corrugator supercilii 
response to angry, 
static faces, 
compared with 
controls. This was 
only present in the 
early (500ms-
1000ms) stimulus 
exposure period. 
 
No difference was 
found between 
groups for happy 
faces. Although TBI 
did display a 
“muted” response, 
though not 
significant. 
 
No group difference 
was displayed 
between groups for 
dynamic images 
 
 
The group 
differences 
are not 
simply a loss 
of motor 
simulation as 
only anger 
mimicry was 
impaired. 
 
Emotional 
recognition 
was impaired 
in TBI. 
However, 
control 
performed at 
ceiling.  
 
The TBI 
group were 
more 
impaired on 
the 
recognition 
of negative 
affective 
expressions. 
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Reference and country 
Characteristic ABI 
group 
Characteristic 
control group Exclusion criteria Aim of Study 
Study design and 
quality Measures used 
Neurological 
areas 
implicated 
by this study 
Methodological 
procedures 
Main Findings in 
relation to  
Experienced 
Emotional Empathy 
Other 
Findings 
Williams & Wood 
2010 
(UK) 
 N =64 
 ABI Type = TBI 
 Mean age 
=35.84(13.33) 
 Male:Female 
53:11 
 Mean PTA (S.D.) 
=16.85(27.84) 
 Mean GCS (S.D.) 
=9.30(4.46) 
 Years Post Injury 
(S.D.) =3.19(2.58) 
 Age at Injury 
(S.D.)  
=32.77(13.32) 
 Years in 
Education (S.D.) 
=2.14(2.18) 
 Recruitment 
Setting = referred 
between 2007-
2008 to Swansea 
University Brain 
Injury Clinic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 N =64 
 Mean age (S.D.) 
=36.09(14.24) 
 Male:Female 
53:11 
 Years in 
Education (S.D.) 
= 12.98(2.775) 
 Matched to TBI 
group on gender, 
age, 
employment, 
education and 
marital status. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both Groups 
 Age<20 
 Lacking capacity 
to consent to 
participate 
 A history of 
psychiatric/ 
personality issues 
 Learning 
disability 
 Dysphasia 
 
ABI Group Only 
 Brain injury other 
than TBI 
 Pre-TBI 
neurological 
impairments 
 
Control Group 
Only 
 A neurological 
disorder or brain 
injury. 
 
Confirm 
alexthymia and 
low emotional 
empathy present 
post TBI. 
To investigate the 
link between 
alexthymia and 
emotional 
empathy. 
Quasi-
experimental 
 
Quality = 18 
Experienced 
Emotional Empathy 
 BEES 
 
Other Measures 
 TAS-20 
 WAIS-III (at least 
one subtest 
measuring each of 
the following: 
verbal ability; 
working memory; 
cognitive 
flexibility) 
N/A  All measures were 
administered as part 
of a standard 
neurological screen.  
64.4% of the TBI 
group displayed low 
emotional empathy, 
significantly higher 
than the 34.4% of 
the control group 
with low emotional 
empathy. 
 
Cognitive abilities 
were unable to 
explain varience in 
groups for BEES 
scores. 
 
The TAS-20 was 
able to explain 
BEES varience 
within groups, 
suggesting a link 
between emotional 
empathy and 
alexithymia. 
 
Negative correlation 
between emotional 
empathy and 
alexithymia. 
Severity of 
injury and 
time since 
were 
unable to 
explain 
difference 
in 
emotional 
empathy 
and 
alexithymia 
scores. 
 
A higher 
proportion 
of the TBI 
displayed 
higher 
alexthymia 
scores 
(60.9%) 
than the 
control 
group 
(10.9%) 
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Reference 
and country Characteristic ABI groups 
Characteristic 
control group 
Exclusion 
criteria Aim of Study 
Study design 
and quality Measures used 
Neurological 
areas 
implicated by 
this study 
Methodo-
logical 
procedures 
Main Findings 
in relation to  
Experienced 
Emotional 
Empathy 
Other 
Findings 
Shamay-
Tsoory et al 
2009 
(Israel) 
 N =11 
 Area Injured = 
Ventromedial 
prefrontal 
(VM) 
 ABI Type(n) = 
TBI(8), 
Meningioma 
(2), Stroke(1). 
 Mean age 
=36.45(16.2) 
 Male:Female 
9:2 
 Mean PTA 
(S.D.) =N/A 
 Mean GCS 
(S.D.) =N/A 
 Years Post 
Injury (S.D.) 
=9.36(11.85) 
 Age at Injury 
(S.D.)  =N/A 
 Years in 
Education 
(S.D.) = 
11.7(1.41) 
 Recruitment 
Setting = N/A 
 Matched to rest 
of ABI groups 
on lesion size 
 
 
 
 
 N =8 
 Area Injured = 
Inferior Frontal 
Gyrus (IFG) 
 ABI Type(n) = 
TBI(6); 
Meningioma 
(2); Stroke(0). 
 Mean age 
=32.75(15.06) 
 Male:Female 
8:0 
 Mean PTA 
(S.D.) =N/A 
 Mean GCS 
(S.D.) =N/A 
 Years Post 
Injury (S.D.) 
=7.25(6.94) 
 Age at Injury 
(S.D.)  =N/A 
 Years in 
Education 
(S.D.) 
=14.12(2.58) 
 Recruitment 
Setting = N/A 
 Matched to rest 
of ABI groups 
on lesion size 
  
 N=11 
 Area Injured = 
Posterior 
Cortex (PC) 
 ABI Type(n) = 
TBI(6); 
Meningioma 
(3); Stroke(2). 
 Mean age 
=38(14.49) 
 Male:Female 
7:4 
 Mean PTA 
(S.D.) =N/A 
 Mean GCS 
(S.D.) =N/A 
 Years Post 
Injury (S.D.) 
=7.27(5.38) 
 Age at Injury 
(S.D.)  =N/A 
 Years in 
Education 
(S.D.) 
=13.36(1.74) 
 Recruitment 
Setting = N/A 
 Matched to 
rest of ABI 
groups on 
lesion size 
 N =34 
 Mean age 
(S.D.) =N/A 
 Male:Female 
N/A 
 Years in 
Education 
(S.D.) = N/A 
 Matched to ABI 
groups N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both Groups 
N/A 
 
ABI Group 
Only 
 Tumour 
participants 
<1 year post 
surgery 
 TBI and 
stroke 
participants 
not in chronic 
phase of 
recovery (<6 
months post) 
 No post 
operative 
imaging or 
behavioural 
data 
To establish the 
neural 
substrates 
pertaining to 
emotional and 
cognitive 
empathy. 
To investigates 
the relationship 
between the 
two. 
Quasi-
experimental 
 
Quality = 17 
Experienced 
Emotional 
Empathy 
 IRI – EC, PD 
 
Other Measures 
 IRI - PT, FS. 
 Raven’s 
Progressive 
Matracies 
 BDI 
 WCST 
 Verbal Fluency 
 WAIS-R 
(Similarities 
and Digit Span) 
 Second order 
false belief task 
 Emotional 
Recognition 
Task 
 IFG 
 Superior 
Temporal 
Sulcus (STS) 
 Broadmanns 
Area (BA) 44 
 
 Measures 
administered 
in random 
order 
IFG group 
displayed 
greater deficit in 
emotional 
empathy than 
controls and PC 
group. The VM 
group was 
approaching 
significant 
difference 
(p=0.054) 
 
Emotional 
Empathy 
correlates with 
emotional 
recognition. 
However this 
was only on the 
PD sub-scale of 
the IRI. 
 
The implication 
BA44 in 
emotional 
empathy 
suggests the 
necessity of 
mirror neurons 
in the emotional 
empathy 
process 
VM 
displayed 
impairment 
in cognitive 
empathy and 
ToM 
 
The IFG 
group were 
impaired in 
emotional 
recognition 
 
Cognitive 
empathy 
correlates 
with ToM 
 
STS damage 
displayed 
impaired 
ToM 
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Reference and country 
Characteristic ABI 
group 
Characteristic 
control group Exclusion criteria Aim of Study 
Study design and 
quality Measures used 
Neurological 
areas 
implicated 
by this study 
Methodological 
procedures 
Main Findings in 
relation to  
Experienced 
Emotional Empathy 
Other 
Findings 
Hopkins, Dywan & 
Segalowitz 2002 
(Canada) 
 N =15 
 ABI Type = 
Closed head injury 
((CHI) TBI) 
 Mean age 
=29.4(5.78) 
 Male:Female 
12:3 
 Mean PTA (S.D.) 
=N/A 
 Mean days in 
coma =46(45) 
 Mean GCS (S.D.) 
=N/A 
 Years Post Injury 
(S.D.) =9.6(5.29) 
 Age at Injury 
(S.D.)  
=32.77(13.32) 
 Years in 
Education (S.D.) 
=13.4(3.07) 
 Recruitment 
Setting = 
supported 
independent 
settings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 N =15 
 Mean age (S.D.) 
=29.9(6.10) 
 Male:Female 
12:3 
 Years in 
Education (S.D.) 
= 14.1(2.5) 
 Matched to TBI 
group on gender, 
education and 
age. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both Groups 
 Any condition 
affecting central 
nervous system 
functioning 
 
ABI Group Only 
 Brain injury other 
than CHI TBI 
 Not reached 
plateau after 
lengthy rehab 
period 
 <moderate injury 
severity. 
 
Control Group 
Only 
 No neurological 
disorder or brain 
injury. 
To investigate 
whether 
expression 
identification 
deficits and 
arousal 
abnormalities are 
present in diffuse 
CHI as is the case 
in orbital and 
medial regions  of 
the prefrontal 
cortex (OMPFC) 
Quasi-
experimental 
 
Quality = 16 
Experienced 
Emotional Empathy 
 non-dominant hand 
EDA 
 
Other Measures 
 WAIS-R 
(Vocabulary 
subtest) 
 Culture Fair Test 
of non-verbal 
problem solving 
 BAFQ 
 Expression 
Identification Test 
 BRFT 
N/A Passive Paradigm 
 Viewed social, 
emotionally salient 
images (Facial 
expressions from 
Ekman & Friesen, 
1976) 
 Face’s were either 
negative (fear, 
disgust, anger), 
positive (happy) or 
neutral 
 Stimuli presented 
for 2sec. 
 There was a 15-
20sec.break post 
stimuli (to return to 
baseline) 
 The largest voltage 
response  from 1-7 
sec. of stimulus 
onset was recorded 
 
Active Paradigm  
 Same as passive 
 Participants required 
to comment on the 
stimulus observed. 
 
The test battery was 
administered after the 
physiological measure. 
There was greater 
response to stimuli 
in the active 
paradigm (29.99kΩ) 
than the passive 
(14.16 kΩ). 
 
CHI group 
responded with EDA 
equivalent to control 
participants to 
positive faces, but a 
substantially reduced 
response to negative 
stimuli. 
 
EDA did not 
correlate with the 
ability to recognise 
emotion or 
perception matching. 
 
 
 
 
The BFAQ 
revealed no 
deficit in 
empathy, 
however it is 
unclear 
whether this 
is a 
reliable/valid 
measure of 
empathy , and 
specifically 
emotional 
empathy. 
 
The CHI 
group 
displayed a 
reduced 
awareness of 
their 
difficulties. 
 
Compared to 
controls the 
CHI group 
displayed 
lower, 
intellectual 
functioning, 
flexibility, 
arousal and 
memory 
 
Perception 
deficits could 
only account 
for the 
accurate 
identification 
of sadness. 
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Reference and country 
Characteristic ABI 
group 
Characteristic 
control group Exclusion criteria Aim of Study 
Study design and 
quality Measures used 
Neurological 
areas 
implicated 
by this study 
Methodological 
procedures 
Main Findings in 
relation to  
Experienced 
Emotional Empathy 
Other 
Findings 
de Sousa et al 2010(b) 
(Australia) 
 N =20 
 ABI Type = TBI 
 Mean age (S.D.) 
=47.4(10) 
 Male:Female 
15:5 
 Mean PTA (S.D.) 
=80.9(71.5) 
 Mean GCS (S.D.) 
=N/A 
 Years Post Injury 
(S.D.) =13.4(6.9) 
 Age at Injury 
(S.D.)  =N/A 
 Years in 
Education (S.D.) = 
12.5(2.9) 
 Recruitment 
Setting = Brain 
Injury Unit’s 
(Sydney). 
 N =22 
 Mean age (S.D.) 
=36.1(12.6) 
 Male:Female 
14:8 
 Years in 
Education (S.D.) 
= 14(3.4) 
 Matched as 
closely to the 
demographics of 
the TBI group as 
possible on 
gender, and 
education. 
However control 
group 
significantly 
younger. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(N.B. same control 
used in de Sousa et 
al 2010a) 
ABI Group Only 
 Brain injury 
other than TBI 
 PTA<1 day 
 Years since 
injury<1 year 
 Agnosia 
 Aphasia 
 Lacking 
Cognitive and 
Motor capacity 
to follow 
instructions 
 Severe 
depression or 
anxiety 
 Pre-TBI 
neurological 
impairments 
 
Control Group 
Only 
 A neurological 
disorder or brain 
injury. 
 
 
 
 
To verify group 
empathy deficits 
post-TBI and 
investigate the 
impact such 
deficits have on 
emotional 
responsivity. 
To assess the 
relationship 
between empathy 
and emotional 
responsivity. 
Quasi-
experimental 
 
Quality = 19 
Experienced 
Emotional Empathy 
 IRI-EC 
 EQ-ER 
 BEES 
 
 
Other Measures 
 IRI-PT 
 EQ-CE 
 DASS-21 
 facial EMG 
 SCR 
 Valence scale 
 Arousal scale 
N/A  Viewed emotionally 
salient images 
(images from the 
International 
Affective Picture 
System (IAPS, 
Centre for the Study 
of Emotion and 
Attention, 1999) 
 Stimuli presented 
for 6000ms each 
with a 1500ms 
break 
 Facial EMG and 
skin conductance 
was recorded 
 After each stimuli 
participants rated 
their arousal and 
valence 
 Questionnaires were 
administered 
afterwards. No order 
is stated. 
Lower levels of 
emotional empathy 
were displayed by 
the TBI group (70%) 
compared against 
the control group 
(31.8%). 
 
Higher empathy 
correlated with 
higher corrugator 
supercilii response 
to emotional salient 
stimuli in the control 
group. 
Lower 
Cognitive 
empathy in 
TBI group 
 
Rating of 
arousal 
lower in the 
TBI group 
 
TBI group 
displayed a 
lower 
corrugator 
supercilii 
response to 
negative 
stimuli 
 
There was 
no 
difference 
between 
groups on 
zygomaticus 
response to 
pleasant 
stimuli 
  
There was 
no 
difference 
in ratings of 
valence 
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3.1.1 Participant samples 
3.1.1.1 Size and demographic details 
The ABI sample size used in each study varied greatly, the smallest being 14 
(McDonald et al, 2011a) and the largest being 89 (Wood & Williams, 2008). Two 
studies divided their ABI sample depending on neural damage location (Shamay-
Tsoory et al, 2004; Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009), resulting in group numbers as low as 8. 
Generally the control group‘s size exceeded the experimental group by no more than 
four participants and no less than one participant. The only exception to this was the 
study by Wood and Williams (2008) which had 89 ABI participants and 84 controls. 
The average age, years in education and the gender ratio for each group was reported 
by the majority of studies. Three studies (Wood & Williams, 2008; Shamay-Tsoory et 
al, 2009; McDonald et al, 2011a) did not supply this demographic information for their 
control group, in fact Shamay-Tsoory et al (2009) did not supply any information for 
their control group. The majority of the articles supplied further demographic 
information of the ABI group, time post injury (in years: Shamay-Tsoory, 2009; 
McDonald et al, 2011b; McDonald et al, 2011a; de Sousa et al, 2010b; de Sousa et al, 
2010a; in months: Muller et al, 2010), or both age at injury and time post injury 
(Williams & Wood, 2010; Hopkins et al 2002; Wood & Williams, 2008). 
Eight studies reported a predictor of injury severity, Post traumatic amnesia (PTA, 
Williams & Wood, 2010; McDonald et al, 2011b; McDonald et al, 2011a; de Sousa et 
al, 2010b; de Sousa et al, 2010a; Wood & Williams, 2008), Glasgow coma score (GCS, 
Muller et al 2010; Williams & Wood, 2010; Wood & Williams, 2008) and days in coma 
(Hopkins et al, 2002). The most thorough description of group demographics was given 
by Wood and Williams (2008), providing information on gender, PTA, GCS, years post 
injury, age at injury, years in education, and premorbid IQ. Whilst there is no 
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discernable relationship between quality rating and reported demographic detail, it 
should be acknowledged that Wood and Williams (2008) scored the highest in the 
rating of study quality. 
Demographic tables, outlining the demographic details, injury type, etc were 
provided by five studies (McDonald et al, 2011b; de Sousa et al, 2010b; Shamay-
Tsoory et al, 2004; Muller et al, 2010; Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009). 
 
3.1.1.2 Recruitment and group matching 
Only one article did not provide any information regarding the recruitment of ABI 
participants (Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009). It was not always clear from the articles what 
setting participants had been recruited from (i.e. inpatient, community based, etc.) This 
level of detail is important, as the type of setting from which participants are recruited 
can provide information about the severity of injury and the level of functioning at time 
of testing. 
The majority of studies attempted to match control and ABI participants as closely as 
possible on demographic details. Shamay-Tsoory et al (2004) matched ABI participants 
individually with healthy controls on age. Other studies matched participants on gender 
age and education (Muller et al 2010; Hopkins et al 2002). Four studies used 
advertisements to recruit controls matched as closely as possible on demographic 
details (McDonald et al 2011b; de Sousa et al, 2010b; de Sousa et al, 2010a; McDonald 
et al 2011a). Despite this, though groups displayed no significant differences on 
education or gender, the control group was significantly younger in all four studies. Of 
these four, two ran the same statistical analyses with age adjusted groups (control 
participants older than 23 and TBI (Traumatic Brain Injury) participants younger than 
55, de Sousa et al, 2010b; de Sousa et al, 2010a) and one included age as a covariant in 
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all statistical analyses (McDonald et al 2011a) to ensure group age differences had no 
bearing on results. McDonald et al (2011b) did not control for the statistical difference 
between groups suggesting that facial mimicry is as robust in old age as in young 
adults.  Two studies expanded on age, gender and education matching; one further 
matching groups on employment and marital status (Williams & Wood, 2010) and the 
other comparing the groups on socio-economic status and estimated intellectual ability 
(but not education, Wood & Williams, 2008). Shamay-Tsoory et al (2009) reported no 
significant difference between lesion groups on lesion size but provided no information 
on how participants were comparable to controls, or amongst lesion groups in any other 
domain. However, considering the rarity of focal lesions, conducting a study in which 
lesion groups were matched on demographic details would be near impossible. 
There was some sharing of participant samples between studies. This is most 
noticeable between studies led by de Sousa and McDonald. De Sousa et al (2010a) and 
(2010b) used the same control group and McDonald et al (2011a) reports using the 
same experimental group (with additional participants) as de Sousa et al (2010a). 
Furthermore, de Sousa et al 2010a reports using the same experimental sample as 
McDonald (2010b). This use of the same experimental sample can reduce the 
generalisability of the findings (as it may be the sample that displays a significant 
difference to controls and not the population). Therefore when interpreting any 
overlapping findings (i.e. reduced experience of emotional empathy) it must be 
acknowledged that both are using the same sample. This sample sharing is likely the 
result of both studies investigating the same population type (TBI), from the same 
settings (inpatient, neurorehabilitation units, Sydney, Australia), and collaboration 
between authors affiliated with the same university. The collaboration between the two 
authors is further demonstrated by the methodological quality ratings of their work, 
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three of which are of an equivalent standard (19) with the other scoring just one point 
lower (McDonald et al, 2011b). 
 
3.1.1.3 Exclusion criteria 
Exclusion criteria on the most basic level for all ABI groups excluded those who 
would not be able to complete testing due to cognitive or motor deficits, had no 
psychiatric history and no neurological history prior to the ABI. This was also the basic 
exclusion criteria for the control group with the addition of no neurological history. 
Two studies controlled for social immaturity (social cognitive development) by 
excluding participants younger than 20 (Williams & Wood, 2010) and 22 (Wood & 
Williams, 2008). Three studies excluded participants with ‗severe‘ anxiety or 
depression (McDonald et al, 2011b; McDonald et al, 2011a; de Sousa et al, 2010b) as a 
means of controlling for mood disorders. Three studies controlled for injury severity, 
two using PTA of less than one day as an exclusion criteria (de Sousa et al, 2010b; de 
Sousa et al, 2010a) and the other describes excluding participants below moderate 
severity but not how this was measured (Hopkins et al, 2002). Four studies controlled 
for time post injury; Shamay-Tsoory et al (2009) excluded tumour participants under 
one year post surgery and TBI and stroke participants less than six months post trauma; 
Shamay-Tsoory et al (2004) excluded participants less than 6 months post 
surgery/trauma; de Sousa et al (2010b) excluded participants less than one year post 
injury; and de Sousa et al (2010a) excluded participants less than 8 months post injury. 
Eight studies controlled for injury type by recruiting only TBI participants (Muller et al, 
2010; Williams & Wood, 2010; Wood & Williams, 2008; McDonald et al 2011b; de 
Sousa et al, 2010b; de Sousa et al, 2010a; McDonald et al 2011a) or specifically CHI 
(Closed Head Injury) TBI (Hopkins et al, 2002). Studies that did not control for injury 
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type, controlled for areas injured through neural lesion mapping and ensured all were 
focal lesions by excluding participants with diffuse axonal damage (Shamay-Tsoory et 
al 2004; Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009). This level of variation between studies for 
exclusion criteria makes comparison of their findings difficult. 
 
3.1.1.4 ABI type 
There was much homogeneity between studies regarding ABI sample injury type. 
Eight studies included only certain types of ABI, all of which were TBI and one study 
only included closed head injured TBI patients (Hopkins et al, 2002). Studies assessing 
the role of specific neuro-anatomical structures implicated in the process of emotional 
empathy included a wider variety of ABI types, including TBI, haemorrhagic and 
anoxic brain injuries (Shamay-Tsoory et al 2004; Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009). 
 
3.1.2 Aims of the studies 
There was a large variation in the studies aims. Two studies aimed to investigate 
emotional empathy after ABI (Williams & Wood, 2010; Wood & Williams, 2008), 
three studies aimed to investigate physiological response to emotional stimuli post-ABI 
(Hopkins et al, 2002; McDonald et al, 2011b; McDonald et al, 2011a) and two aimed to 
investigate both, as well as the relationships between these processes (de Sousa et al, 
2010b; de Sousa et al, 2010a). Furthermore, two studies sought to establish the neural 
structures associated with a deficit of empathy (Shamay-Tsoory et al 2004; Shamay-
Tsoory et al, 2009). One study did not aim to investigate experienced emotional 
empathy post-ABI but did wish to establish whether ToM correlated with empathy 
(Muller et al, 2010). 
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3.1.3 Definitions of empathy and emotional empathy 
Definitions of empathy and emotional empathy were present in six of the articles. Of 
these, two describe emotional empathy as a process of ―feeling what another person is 
feeling‖ (Shamay-Tsoory, 2009; Wood & Williams, 2008). Although this is an adequate 
description of emotional empathy, clearer descriptions are provided in other articles 
―...the ability to vicariously experience the emotions of others‖ (Williams & Wood, 
2010) and ―...to experience affective reactions to the emotional displays of others‖ (de 
Sousa et al 2010a). Vague, inaccurate descriptions of emotional empathy are provided 
by two articles, ―...involves the actual emotional reaction‖ (Muller et al, 2010) and 
―...the ability to share emotional experiences‖. The latter could be argued to pertain to 
an ability to feel the same as someone else for the same reason, rather than because of 
them. It should also be noted that Muller et al (2010) were not investigating the 
individual components of empathy. Of the 4 articles that did not define empathy, 3 were 
investigating physiological phenomenon related to the observation of facial expressions 
and had not proposed they were assessing a process of emotional empathy. However, de 
Sousa (2010b) investigated the relationship between emotional responsivity and both 
cognitive and emotional empathy, as such it is improper that they do not provide a 
definition of these neuropsychological phenomena.  
 
3.2 Findings of the Review 
3.2.1 Measures used to assess experienced emotional empathy 
One aim of this review was to investigate the measures being used to assess the 
ability of an ABI population to experience emotional empathy. Six of the sample 
studies used self-report measures to assess emotional empathy, three used physiological 
readings to monitor the emotional reactions to social stimuli and one study used both. 
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Of the self report measures used one study used the QMEE (Shamay-Tsoory et al, 
2004), three studies used the IRI, Personal Distress (PD) and Empathic Concern (EC) 
scales (Muller et al, 2010; Shamay-Tsoory, 2009) or just the EC (de Sousa et al, 
2010b), one study used the Empathy Quotient-Emotional Responsivity (EQ-ER; the 
first time this measure has been used in this way, de Sousa et al 2010a) and four studies 
used the BEES (Williams & Wood, 2010; de Sousa et al, 2010b; de Sousa et al, 2010a; 
Wood & Williams, 2008). Only de Sousa et al (2010b) used multiple self-report 
measures to assess emotional empathy. 
A variety of physiological measures were used, Hopkins et al (2002) used 
Electrodermal response (EDA) readings from participants ‗volar surfaces of the distal 
phalanges‘ of their non-dominant hand to establish their skin conductance response to 
the presented stimuli. Two studies took electromyography (EMG) readings from two 
facial muscles, the corrugator supercilii (associated with negative expressions) and the 
zygomaticus (associated with positive expressions) (McDonald et al 2011b; de Sousa et 
al 2010a). De Sousa et al (2010a) also monitored skin conductance response (SCR). 
McDonald et al (2011a) used multiple physiological measures including SCR, skin 
conductance levels (SCL) and evoked cardiac deceleration (ECD). EDA and SCR both 
refer to skin conductance measured as electrodermal response. SCL was differentiated 
from the former two by McDonald et al (2010b) suggesting the SCL represents the 
lasting level of electrodermal response. All stimuli used in conjunction with 
physiological measures were facial expressions taken from Ekman and Friesen (1976). 
Stimuli were presented as static frames in each study. McDonald et al (2011a) also used 
a dynamic paradigm in which the faces went from neutral to emotionally expressive. 
Furthermore, two studies adopted ‗active‘ paradigms in which participants had to 
comment on the stimulus (Hopkins et al, 2002), or select the emotion being expressed 
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by the stimulus from a list of seven emotions (McDonald et al, 2011a). This was done 
to produce active attendance to the stimuli. The majority (3) of studies using 
physiological measures used happy and angry facial stimuli as well as neutral faces. 
The only study to use additional negative emotions (disgust and fear) was Hopkins et al 
(2002). 
Although de Sousa et al (2010b) did investigate physiological responsivity to 
emotionally salient stimuli, the stimuli used were not socially salient, in the form of a 
social communication (i.e. a facial expression). Therefore, the physiological readings 
would be assessing an emotional experience, not the experience of emotional empathy. 
 
3.2.2 Neural substrates associated with experiencing emotional empathy 
Only two studies distinguished groups by focal lesions (Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2004; 
Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009). Therefore, the amount of information regarding the 
damaged neural structures underlying experienced emotional empathy is limited. 
Shamay-Tsoory et al (2004) implicated the right and left prefrontal cortex and the right 
parietal lobe in processing emotional empathy. They also suggest the role of 
orbito/medial-prefrontal cortex as having a significant role in processing empathy as a 
whole. Shamay-Tsoory et al (2009), expanded on the findings of Shamay-Tsoory et al 
(2004), implicating the IFG primarily in processing emotional empathy. Those impaired 
in emotional empathy frequently displayed damage to BA 44. The STS was also 
implicated in both emotional and cognitive empathy (Shamay-Tsoory et al 2009). De 
Sousa et al (2010a) reported that their ABI sample displayed no amygdala damage 
suggesting that amygdala damage is not necessary for an impairment of emotional 
empathy. 
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Ventral frontal damage is common after TBI due to the rostral-caudal gradient and 
acceleration-deceleration phenomenon of TBI (Lux, 2007). Four studies suggest that 
their results implicate the ventromedial cortex (de Sousa et al, 2010a; McDonald et al, 
2011a; McDonald et al, 2011b; Williams & Wood, 2010) and one implied the nearby 
orbital and medial prefrontal regions (Hopkins et al 2002) in the experience of 
emotional empathy. However this is merely hypothetical and although suggesting 
similar areas to studies using participants with focal lesions, the implications cannot be 
certain. 
 
3.2.3 Experienced emotional empathy post-ABI 
All studies included in the review were considered to be assessing the ability to 
experience emotional empathy post-ABI. Of the studies using self-report measures, six 
reported that ABI group(s) displayed a significantly lower emotional empathy score 
than controls (Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2004; Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009; Williams & 
Wood, 2010; de Sousa et al, 2010b; de Sousa et al, 2010a; Wood & Williams, 2008) 
and one study did not (Muller et al, 2010). Also, Wood and Williams (2008) reported a 
gender bias, with females displaying higher levels of emotional empathy compared with 
males. 
Of the studies using physiological measures all four reported a reduction in 
physiological responses to negative, social stimuli but a preserved response to positive, 
social stimuli (Hopkins et al, 2002; McDonald et al, 2011b; McDonald et al, 2011a;  de 
Sousa et al, 2010a). Therefore, it can be suggested that post-ABI, individuals have 
difficulty experiencing the negative emotional states of others. McDonald et al (2011b) 
described a ―muted‖ response in their TBI group to happy faces, but reported that this 
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failed to reach significance, perhaps suggesting that ability to experience positive 
emotional empathy post-ABI is slightly reduced. 
McDonald et al (2011b) found the group difference in physiological response to 
negative facial expressions was only present in the early stage of stimulus presentation 
(500-1000ms), not in the later stage, suggesting that the experience of emotional 
empathy is rapid. This supports assertions that rapid social processing is essential for 
human survival (Singer, Seymour, O‘Doherty, Kaube, Dolan & Frith, 2004). 
Interestingly, McDonald et al (2011a) found a significant difference between groups 
on SCL scores but not on ECD or SCR. SCL is able to indicate sustained arousal whilst 
SCR pertains to rapid orientation. Therefore, this finding may suggest that ABI 
individuals fail to maintain an emotional empathy state. Other evidence suggests that 
the experience of emotional empathy is rapid and impaired in ABI, using SCR (de 
Sousa et al 2010a) and facial EMG (McDonald et al, 2011b). All of which suggests the 
ability to experience emotional empathy, rapidly, or maintain it, is impaired post-ABI. 
Hopkins et al (2002) reported a greater EDA response to stimuli when participants 
were required to comment on stimuli than when they were merely observing. This 
suggests the more attentive an individual is to a phenomenon, the greater the experience 
of emotional empathy. 
Higher emotional empathy predicted greater physiological responsivity, and low 
physiological responsivity to negative faces was only established in brain injured 
participants with low emotional empathy (de Sousa et al, 2010a). Also, higher 
corrugator supercilii response to emotionally salient stimuli was associated with higher 
emotional empathy (de Sousa et al, 2010b). All of which support the notion that 
physiological responses to emotional social salient stimuli are a part of the emotional 
empathy experience. 
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3.2.4 Related findings 
The relationship between emotional empathy and emotional recognition was 
examined by four studies. Shamay-Tsoory et al (2009) found that the IFG group that 
were impaired in emotional empathy were also impaired in emotional recognition. 
McDonald et al (2011b) also found an impairment of emotional recognition in their TBI 
group but acknowledged that the control performed at ceiling. Furthermore, Williams 
and Wood (2010) found emotional empathy displayed a negative correlation with 
alexithymia, a condition characterised by, amongst other things, difficulty identifying 
and describing emotions (see Williams & Wood, 2010 for a detailed summary). 
However, McDonald et al (2011a) explained that emotional responsivity did not predict 
emotional recognition, suggesting the relationship is not as simple as a deficit in one 
predicts a deficit in the other. 
 
 
4. Discussion and Interpretation of Findings 
The purpose of the review was to investigate the nature and extent of emotional 
empathy deficits post-ABI whilst also critically appraising the measures used to assess 
such deficits, and the neurological areas implicated in the experience of emotional 
empathy. Emotional empathy was defined as the ability to vicariously experience the 
emotional states of others. In this section the results of the review will be critically 
discussed, beginning with the nature and extent of an emotional empathy deficit, 
moving onto the critical appraisal of the measures used to establish the findings, and 
lastly exploring the neurological areas implicated in the experience of emotional 
empathy. The limitations of the review and proposals for future research will then be 
discussed.  
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4.1 The nature and extent of experienced emotional empathy deficits post-ABI  
The primary focus of this review was to establish the nature and extent to which 
individuals post-ABI could experience emotional empathy, as suggested by the current 
literature. Of the 10 included studies nine found a deficit of emotional empathy in a 
brain injured sample, suggesting that a deficit in the ability to experience emotional 
empathy is common post-ABI. Only one study did not find an emotional empathy 
deficit post-ABI (Muller et al, 2010). There are several factors that may explain Muller 
et al (2010)‘s negative results. The study displayed the second lowest methodological 
quality rating of all the studies using self-report measures. The sample size was 
relatively small (15 per group) and its protocol was quite lengthy, with participants 
required to complete 11 measures. Finally, it used the IRI, which has been criticised as 
inappropriate in measuring emotional empathy, with its items pertaining to experienced 
sympathy rather than emotional empathy (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006).  
Studies utilising physiological measures provide more specific information regarding 
the physiological mechanisms affected by this experienced emotional empathy deficit. 
They suggest the presentation of positive emotional expressions (happiness) evokes a 
physiological emotional response in the ABI sample, similar to that of controls. 
However, when presented with a negative emotional expression (anger, fear, disgust), 
the ABI population displayed impaired physiological responsivity. This suggests that 
the ABI population are impaired in the ability to experience emotional empathy in 
response to the presentation of negative emotions, but not positive. This of course does 
not indicate that the ABI population are unable to experience negative emotion, just that 
they do not experience emotional empathy from the observation of these emotional 
states in others. This raises the question of why there is a deficit in the ability to 
physiologically respond to the emotional expressions of negative emotions but not 
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positive emotions? There are two potentially overlapping rationales that can address 
this question: 
The first suggests that damage to a specific area, implicated in the processing of 
negative emotions, but not positive, would explain this deficit (de Sousa et al 2010a). 
The ventrolateral frontal cortex is associated with the processing of anger, whereas the 
processing of happiness, fear and sadness are associated with the amygdala (de Sousa et 
al 2010a). Angry faces were used as negative emotional stimuli in each of the studies 
utilising physiological measures. Furthermore, each of these studies only used 
participants with TBI, which has been linked with ventral system damage (de Sousa et 
al 2010s). Therefore, damage to the ventrolateral frontal cortex would explain the 
present finding of a deficit in the ability to experience an emotionally empathy response 
from happy facial expressions, but not angry facial expressions. However, Hopkins et al 
(2002)‘s found a deficit in the ability to experience emotional empathy to the 
presentations of ‗negative faces‘ post-ABI, and this included fear and disgust as well as 
anger. Considering this, the neural area implicated would have to encompass all 
negative emotions and as fear processing has been linked with the amygdala, alongside 
happiness (de Sousa et al 2010a), it is unclear how this would occur. However, as the 
responsivity to specific emotions was not reported, merely discussing ‗negative 
emotional facial expressions‘ it is not possible to determine the extent to which each 
negative emotion was impaired post-ABI. Therefore, it is equally plausible that their 
findings were produced because of the use of angry facial stimuli and not that of fear 
and disgust. Future research should aim to replicate Hopkins et al (2002)‘s findings, 
differentiating between a variety of emotional expressions. 
An alternative of this ‗specific neural area‘ hypothesis is that the emotional empathy 
response to positive emotional faces is also impaired post-ABI, though not as prominent 
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as responsivity to negative faces due to evolutionary prioritising. Essentially this 
perspective would suggest that negative facial stimuli demand a higher level of 
attention and produce a greater arousal than positive facial stimuli, and are thus 
noticeable when compared against controls. Negative emotional expressions are a 
means of communicating danger (Bradley & Lang, 2000) and therefore associated with 
survival dependent heightened attentional awareness. Also, humans would require a 
higher level of arousal to negative faces to facilitate the urgency of the fight or flight 
response and increase chances of survival. It can therefore be postulated that a deficit in 
arousal to positive stimuli may go unnoticed on physiological recordings, as control 
group arousal to the stimuli is generally low compared to negative stimuli. This may 
explain why McDonald et al (2011b) and Hopkins et al (2002) displayed a ‗muted 
response‘ to happy facial stimuli; not impaired, but lessened. Graphical data from the 
majority of studies using physiological measures suggests that higher arousal was 
achieved in the control group for unpleasant stimuli, emphasising the ‗normal‘ arousal 
differentiation between positive and negative stimuli (de Sousa, et al, 2011b; McDonald 
et al, 2011a; de Sousa et al, 2010a; Hopkins et al, 2002). Therefore, it is possible to 
suggest that the ability to physiologically respond to all emotional faces is impaired 
post-ABI, but due to negative stimuli demanding higher levels of arousal, the 
impairment is more prominent. 
Building upon the evolutionary hypothesis discussed above, McDonald et al (2011a) 
found that this ABI impairment to physiologically respond to negative emotional facial 
stimuli disappeared when individuals were required to actively attend to the stimulus. 
However, one other study (Hopkins et al 2002) used an ‗active paradigm‘ and found no 
difference between their active and passive (just observing stimuli) paradigms. It is 
possible that this difference in findings results from the form of ‗active‘ paradigm used. 
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McDonald et al (2010a) required participants to name the emotion being observed, 
whereas Hopkins et al (2002) merely required participants to comment on the picture. It 
can be postulated that by requiring participants to name the emotion, McDonald et al 
(2010a) were encouraging participants to bypass an emotional empathy impairment via 
cognitive processes. The need to cognitively understand the emotion being observed is 
likely the cause of the physiological response associated with that emotion. This 
supports the work of simulation theorists, who hypothesise that to recognise the 
emotional state of others it must be experienced (Preston & de Waal, 2002). This 
therefore suggests that the ability to automatically experience emotional empathy to the 
presentation of facial stimuli is impaired post-ABI and as a result the heightened 
arousal is unachievable unless bypassed via cognitive processes. It is unclear from this 
whether an impairment in the initial automatic appraisal of the stimuli (see fig. 1) or the 
automatic ability to experience emotional empathy from the stimulus (see fig. 1) is the 
cause of this observable deficit. Further investigation is required before it is possible to 
determine the extent of this emotional empathy deficit, be it in the ability to appraise the 
stimuli as being socially emotionally salient or the ability to experience the presented 
emotion from the stimulus. 
A further finding regarding the nature of experienced emotional empathy deficits 
post-ABI refers to the duration of an observable group difference. When comparing the 
physiological recoding of ABI group facial EMG to that of controls, McDonald et al 
(2011b) established an impairment in the ability of the ABI group to experience 
emotional empathy in the first 500-1000ms of stimulus presentation but not over the 
entire 6000ms of stimulus presentation. As stated above this was only present when 
angry facial expressions where used. Whilst this may seem to suggest that the ABI 
group are not impaired, just slowed, in their experience of emotional empathy, 
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graphical data suggests that the control group response to emotional facial stimuli 
decreases over the 6000ms each stimulus was presented. Therefore, the presence of an 
experienced emotional empathy deficit in the early stages of stimulus presentation is not 
the result of slowed processing speed, but rather the presence of a physiological 
regulatory action, performed by the control group. This supports the notion that the 
experience of emotional empathy occurs rapidly and then subsides over time (Singer, 
Seymour, O‘Doherty, Kaube, Dolan & Frith, 2004). This reduction in arousal is 
possibly the mediation response of cognitive empathy mitigating the emotional 
experience i.e. ―It‘s just a picture of an angry face, therefore there is no need for 
concern‖, and thereby reducing arousal. This supports the model presented in fig. 1 as 
well as authors who refer to emotional processing as having a regulatory component 
(Sonnby-Borgstrom et al, 2003; Phillip et al, 2003). The concept that cognitive empathy 
acts as mitigating force in the experience of emotional empathy should be the focus of 
future research. 
 
4.2 A critical appraisal of experienced emotional empathy measures 
This review also evaluated the current measures being used to assess experienced 
emotional empathy within the ABI population. It is important to consider the validity of 
the measures used, as this will clearly impact upon the validity of the results. As the 
validity of each measure is to be critically appraised, it is useful to define different types 
of validity. ‗Concurrent validity‘ refers to the correlation between measures of the same 
phenomenon (Rust & Golombok, 1989). This of course is a weak criterion as measures 
may correlate but neither may measure the proposed phenomenon. This leads onto 
‗construct validity‘, which refers to the ability of a test to assess the phenomena 
predicted by the theory, a more robust form of validity and the primary mode of 
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validation of psychometric measures (Rust & Golombok, 1989). Two types of measure 
were commonly used, self-report and physiological readings. The merits and limitations 
of each are explored. 
 
4.2.1 Self-report measures 
The use of self-report measures was more common than physiological readings and 
four different measures were used, the IRI-EC/PD, the QMEE, the BEES and the EQ-
ER.  
The IRI was used as a measure of emotional empathy in three studies (de Sousa et al 
2010b; Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009; Muller et al, 2010). The IRI is a measure of both 
cognitive and emotional empathy consisting of four 7-item scales. Two of these scales, 
the EC and PD, are designed to measure emotional empathy. However, the construct 
validity of the IRI-EC has been criticised, suggesting it is measuring concern for others 
and experienced sympathy rather than the ability to feel what another is feeling 
(emotional empathy, Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006). Furthermore, the IRI-PD has been 
suggested to lack construct validity making it less psychometrically valid (de Sousa, 
2010b). Shamay-Tsoory et al (2009, pp.620) describe the IRI-EC as measuring ‗the 
respondents feelings of warmth, compassion and concern for others‘ whilst the IRI-PD 
assesses the ‗self oriented feelings of anxiety and discomfort resulting from tense 
interpersonal settings‘. Neither of these statements is in line with the Wood and 
Williams (2008) ‗feels what another is feeling‘ definition of emotional empathy. 
Therefore, the results of the studies solely using the IRI to assess emotional empathy 
(Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009; Muller et al, 2010) should be interpreted with caution.  
The QMEE was used by Shamay-Tsoory et al (2004) to assess emotional empathy. 
Similarly to the IRI, the construct validity of the QMEE‘s has been questioned and it 
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has been suggested to incorrectly equate sympathy with empathy (Jolliffe & Farrington, 
2006). Despite the scales apt description of emotional empathy ‗vicarious emotional 
response to the perceived emotions of others‘, it fails to adhere to this, with items 
relating to emotional concern and sympathy (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006). Furthermore, 
Shamay-Tsoory et al (2004) found that a deficit in emotional empathy as reported by 
the QMEE coincided with the neuroanotomical region associated with sympathy, which 
may suggest that the QMEE to some degree measures sympathy rather than emotional 
empathy. The sensitivity of the QMEE was also queried by Shamay-Tsoory et al (2004) 
as it was less able to demonstrate significant results than measures of cognitive 
empathy, perhaps suggesting a weaker validity. Therefore, like the IRI, the results of 
Shamay-Tsoory et al (2004), should be considered with caution as the QMEE‘s ability 
to assess emotional empathy is questionable. 
The BEES was the most commonly used self-report measure in the sample, being 
utilised in four studies (de Sousa et al, 2010b; de Sousa et al, 2010a; Williams & Wood, 
2010; Wood & Williams, 2008). The BEES was developed from the QMEE as a broad 
measure of emotional empathy (Harrison, Morgan & Critchley, 2010) and is considered 
a reliable and valid measure of emotional empathy (Mehrabian, 2000). The BEES has 
been suggested to be a more reliable and valid self-report measure of emotional 
empathy than the IRI-EC and EQ-ER with a higher number of items and higher 
reliability coefficient (de Sousa et al, 2010b). Furthermore, studies using the BEES 
produced quality scores higher than those using other self-report measures. However, 
the BEES displayed concurrent validity with the IRI-EC (de Sousa et al 2010b) and the 
QMEE (Mehrabian, 2000), suggesting that it may be victim to similar limitations.  For 
example some of the BEES items can be suggested to assess sympathy rather than 
emotional empathy (e.g. ‗I cannot feel much sorrow for those who are responsible for 
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their own misery‘). Further investigation is warranted to establish the ability of the 
BEES to assess emotional empathy. Again these concerns should be considered when 
interpreting the results of studies using the BEES.   
De Sousa et al (2010a) produced the only study using the EQ-ER and to the authors 
knowledge is the first to divide and use the EQ in this way. As a result, little is known 
about the scale apart from that reported by de Sousa et al (2010a). The EQ-ER is 
suggested to measure emotional reactivity and displayed a concurrent validity with the 
IRI-EC and the BEES, suggesting they are measuring a similar construct (de Sousa et 
al, 2010a). Considering the uncertainty of whether these measures are assessing 
sympathy or emotional empathy, the EQ-ER should also be interpreted with caution. 
The construct validity of all of the self report measures used to assess emotional 
empathy is highly questionable as all appear to use items associated with the process of 
sympathy rather than emotional empathy. Sympathy is defined as a construct separate 
from empathy (Joliffe & Farrington, 2006) concerned chiefly with the appraisal of how 
one feels about another‘s emotional state. As outlined in figure 1, sympathy can be 
considered the self-generated emotional state produced following cognitive empathy, 
replacing the emotional state produced by emotional empathy and motivating us to 
action. Joliffe and Farrington (2006) appear to agree with this appraisal, stating that in 
emotional empathy the experienced emotion is the same as that displayed by the target 
other, but in sympathy the experienced emotion may differ due to the addition of 
cognitive appraisal. It can therefore be suggested that the self-report measures used to 
assess emotional empathy post-ABI are actually assessing sympathy. If this is the case, 
it is not possible from the self-report results to suggest that an emotional empathy 
deficit is present post-ABI but that a deficit in sympathy is. A deficit in emotional 
empathy may be the cause of the observed sympathy deficit, however future research 
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using emotional empathy measures with higher construct validity will be required 
before the emotional empathy deficits suggested post-ABI by these studies can be 
confirmed. 
It must be acknowledged that the adequacy of each self-report measure as an 
accurate measure of emotional empathy (rather than sympathy) is not distinguishable 
within the limits of this review. Again, further research is required to confirm the 
orientation of these self-report measures to the constructs of either emotional empathy 
or sympathy. 
An additional flaw of emotional empathy self-report measures is that they require a 
great deal of self reflection over an abstract concept. Therefore the results on such 
measures, within an ABI population, may be susceptible to a lack of insight (Hart, 
2003; Parson, Carpenter-Hyland, Burright & Donovick, 1995). It remains unclear to 
what extent participant‘s post-ABI may lack insight but it will be important for future 
research to control for potential insight and awareness deficits that may influence have 
influenced the current results.  
 
4.2.2 Physiological reading measures 
Four studies used physiological measures to assess experienced emotional empathy. 
The most common physiological measures used were facial EMG (McDonald et al 
2011b; de Sousa et al, 2010a) and skin conductance (Hopkins et al, 2002; McDonald et 
al, 2011a; de Sousa et al, 2010a). Heart deceleration (ECD) was also used in one study 
(McDonald et al, 2011a). All these measures have been suggested to assess 
physiological responsivity to the presentation of social communications of emotion, a 
social, emotionally salient stimulus (i.e. a facial expression of emotion). The 
physiological response recorded is considered the physiological experience of 
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emotional empathy, the physiological experience of a shared emotional state (Preston & 
de Waal‘s, 2002). This is supported by McDonald et al (2010b) suggesting that a motor 
mimicry response deficit cannot account for the present findings. Should motor 
mimicry be impaired post-ABI it would be present in both facial mimicry of negative 
and positive facial expressions. However, the preserved zygomaticus response to 
positive facial stimuli suggests that there is an emotional simulation deficit in which the 
ABI-samples are unable to experience the observed emotion through emotional 
empathy. In this way the physiological measures could be said to have high construct 
validity as the processes measured pertain to the theoretical definition of emotional 
empathy. 
There are of course difficulties in measuring the experienced emotional empathy 
using physiological recordings. The main issue being that it is difficult to suggest that 
the physiological readings correspond to the exact emotion being presented. The benefit 
of using facial EMG is that unlike skin conductance and ECD, it is possible to assess 
whether the emotion being experienced is positive or negative, due to activation of the 
corrugator or zygomaticus. This can then be compared against the emotional orientation 
of the presented stimulus for confirmation of a shared emotional experience. Skin 
conductance indicates an arousal has occurred but not the emotional orientation. 
Therefore, of the two, the facial EMG would be the better method for measuring 
experienced emotional empathy. However, facial EMG, may be limited by the 
association between corrugator supercilii activation and thinking (McDonald et al, 
2011b). Therefore, the combined use of facial EMG and skin conductance would be 
recommended for future research investigating the ability to experience emotional 
empathy post ABI.  
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In assessing emotional empathy using physiological readings, the selection of 
appropriate stimuli is as important as using an appropriate physiological measure. This 
is because the use of social, emotionally salient stimuli (i.e. a social communication of 
emotion such as facial expression) will assess experienced emotional empathy whilst 
stimuli that are just emotionally salient (an image that would evoke an emotion within 
us, not originally produced by someone else i.e. a snake) would not. This difference was 
demonstrated by de Sousa et al (2010b) who, using emotionally salient stimuli from the 
IAPS, found their ABI group‘s facial responsivity did not correlate with its emotional 
empathy. Conversely, de Sousa et al (2010a) established a negative correlation between 
ABI groups facial EMG and their emotional empathy when using stimuli that were both 
social and emotionally salient (emotional facial expressions). De Sousa et al (2010b) 
attribute this inconsistency to the differing stimuli, with facial expressions having a 
greater ‗intrinsic biological significance‘ than the IAPS images which are less social in 
nature. Therefore, future research should ensure that stimuli used to assess the 
experience of emotional empathy are social and emotionally salient. 
It can be suggested that the use of physiological measures alone will never provide 
substantial evidence to confirm an emotional empathy deficit as they only assess the 
physiological mechanisms that underlie the experience of emotional empathy. 
According to Rust and Golombok (1989), construct validity is never complete and due 
to its positivist, hypothetico-deductive origins, future research using alternative 
methodological standpoints to assess the observable mechanisms of experienced 
emotional empathy is required before the concept that ABI commonly produces a 
experienced emotional deficit can be accepted. 
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4.2.3 Self-report measures versus physiological readings 
De Sousa et al (2011a) were the only authors to utilise both physiological readings 
and self-report measures when assessing experienced emotional empathy. They found a 
moderate, positive correlational relationship between facial EMG responsivity and 
scores of emotional empathy from the BEES. Whilst it is not possible to suggest from 
this that both are measures of experienced emotional empathy, it lends support to 
previous literature suggesting emotional responsivity and emotional empathy are 
interlinked processes (Sonnby-Borgstrom et al, 2003; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Phillip 
et al, 2003; Nummenmaa et al, 2008; Dimberg, et al, 2011). Whilst this finding seems 
to suggest concurrent validity, because the correlation was moderate it is more likely 
that both are measuring related constructs, but not the same specific phenomenon. Due 
to the overlapping nature of empathy components, sympathy and physiological arousal, 
it is difficult to separate subtle semantic constructs such as emotional empathy. It can be 
assumed that the BEES and facial EMG are measuring related processes but to suggest 
both are assessing emotional empathy would be premature. Given the evidence 
presented above and the ‗moderate‘ correlation it is likely that both are assessing a 
feeling state, but not necessarily that both are assessing emotional empathy. 
As established above, both types of measure have strengths and weaknesses. These 
should be taken into consideration when interpreting the primary finding of the review, 
that there is a deficit in the ability to experience emotional empathy post-ABI 
(particularly from angry faces), and when selecting measures of emotional empathy for 
future research. From the strengths and weaknesses presented above, it is suggestible 
that physiological measures are the most appropriate choice in assessing experienced 
emotional empathy. This is due largely to the self-report measures construct validity 
appearing to be quite poor. Physiological measures are of course not able to measure 
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emotional empathy directly but are able to assess a mechanism of emotional empathy 
within the theoretical framework of emotional empathy (the ability to vicariously 
experience the emotional state of another). Therefore, future research will be required, 
assessing other mechanisms that adhere to this definition of emotional empathy, to 
establish an all encompassing perspective of emotional empathy post-ABI. This could 
potentially be done using self-report measures of emotional empathy that do not merge 
into the assessment of sympathy. 
The limitations of the measures may weaken the validity of the findings of each 
study, and therefore the findings of the review. It is beyond the limits of this review to 
say whether self report or physiological ratings would be most appropriate in the 
assessment of experienced emotional empathy; however, it is currently not possible to 
confirm a deficit in emotional empathy post-ABI, considering the weaknesses of the 
current self report measures being utilised. The physiological measures indicate a 
deficit in the physiological responsivity associated with emotional empathy specifically 
responding to negative emotions via emotional empathy, but further research is required 
to confirm this, especially considering the different levels of arousal demanded by 
positive and negative stimuli.  
 
4.2.4 Neurological areas involved in the experience of emotional empathy 
In exploring the nature of an experienced emotional empathy deficit post-ABI it was 
important to assess the neuroanatomical structures underlying such a deficit. The review 
revealed only two studies (Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2004; Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009) 
investigating emotional empathy in focal lesion groups. As a result, what can be 
inferred is limited. The right parietal lobe and prefrontal cortex, and more specifically, 
the IFG were implicated in the processing of emotional empathy. Particularly, 
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individuals with damage to Broadmanns area 44 of the IFG (an area associated with the 
MNS) scored significantly lower on measures of emotional empathy (Shamay-Tsoory et 
al, 2009). Due to the implicated BA 44, Shamay-Tsoory et al (2009) argued the MNS as 
essential in the experience of emotional empathy. This claim supports the suggestions 
of authors who would argue that the ability to experience emotional empathy is 
dependent on the ability to simulate the emotion being presented by another in oneself 
(Davies & Stone, 1995; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Phillip et al, 2003; Nummenmaa et 
al, 2008; Dimberg, et al, 2011; Sonnby-Borgstrom et al, 2003). However, as suggested 
by Decety (2011), further, more robust investigation into the impact of the MNS on 
emotional empathy is required before the role of the MNS in emotional empathy can be 
accepted.   
The IFG and BA 44 have been implicated as key components in the process of 
emotional empathy in a recent review by Shamay-Tsoory (2011). Therefore, the present 
review was unable to expand upon the neural areas currently believed responsible for 
the process of emotional empathy, due to the lack of focal lesion studies investigating 
the ability to experience emotional empathy. Despite this the review was able to 
critically asses the evidence upon which the implicated neural structures was based. 
Both studies used self-report measures of emotional empathy, the QMEE (Shamay-
Tsoory et al, 2004) and the IRI-EC/PD (Shamay-Tsoory, 2009), the construct validity 
of which have been questioned (see 4.2.1). Considering this, it is possible that 
emotional empathy may not have been assessed and therefore neuraoanatomical 
findings may be inaccurate. Therefore, the suggestions of Shamay-Tsoory et al (2004) 
and Shamay-Tsoory et al (2009), that an emotional empathy deficit is observable 
following right parietal, prefrontal cortex, and/or IFG damage,  should be considered 
with care.  
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Future research should aim to replicate the work of Shamay-Tsoory et al (2004) and 
Shamay-Tsoory et al (2009), using measures of emotional empathy with higher validity. 
At the current time the BEES appears to be the most accurate self-report measure in 
assessing emotional empathy. However, given the possibility that this is in parts 
assessing sympathy, the most valid measure to use would be facial EMG. It would be 
possible to use facial EMG alongside social, emotionally salient stimuli (i.e. emotional 
faces) to assess the ability of specific lesion groups to experience emotional empathy 
physiologically. Until self-report measures with higher construct validity are developed, 
research in this area is dependent upon physiological measures, which are of course not 
without their flaws (see 4.2.2). 
Furthermore, as the current review only found two studies investigating emotional 
empathy with lesion samples, it is evident that a great deal of further research with focal 
lesion patients is required before  any confirmation of the neuro anatomy related to an 
emotional empathy deficit can be made. 
 
4.2.5 Limitations 
The present review is subject to several limitations. Firstly, the development of a 
hypothetical model (fig. 1) of emotional and cognitive empathy was not the aim of the 
review. Despite this, the current literature regarding the process of empathy (Preston & 
de Waal, 2002) and emotional perception (Phillips et al, 2003; Levanthal, 1984; 
Ohman, 1993) was felt to be lacking in its ability to explain the emotional empathy 
experience. It was therefore necessary to provide a framework within which this could 
be understood. The development of such a model would likely be the focus of an entire 
review utilising a greater amount of literature. Therefore, the presented model is not 
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intended as an all encompassing model for empathy, merely a framework on which 
future research and reviews can build upon. 
Although the review aimed to investigate the impact of ABI on the experience of 
emotional empathy, a second limitation is that all studies reviewed used a TBI sample 
and only two included other types of ABI. Therefore, the review is less able to 
generalise the present findings to the ABI population. This trend could not be foreseen 
and emphasises the necessity of studies investigating the effects of other types of brain 
injuries on the experience of emotional empathy. 
Thirdly, the inability of the study to expand on the present concensus of damaged 
neural structures producing emotional empathy deficits is disappointing. However, the 
review did highlight the lack of literature examining emotional empathy in focal lesion 
participants. 
The review is only able to report the lack of a deficit in experiencing emotional 
empathy from negative expressions within a brain injured population. It is not able to 
establish whether an earlier stage in the emotional empathy process is the cause of the 
deficit, i.e. the appraisal of the negative emotional expressions as socially 
important/something that should be reacted to. Whilst research assessing emotional 
recognition post-ABI appears to be assessing the appraisal of a socially emotionally 
charged stimulus (fig. 1) they commonly rely upon participants choosing an emotional 
state. This decision making process could be described as cognitive in nature, as a 
function of cognitive labelling (Tyson, 1998). Therefore, the ability to produce an 
accurate account of the emotion presented in the stimulus would represent a deficit at 
any point in the process of empathy, not just in the stimulus appraisal stage. 
The review is also limited by the limitations of the sum of its parts, i.e. the studies. 
For example, all studies using physiological measures employed Ekman and Friesen‘s 
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(1976) faces as stimuli. These greyscale faces are criticised for their extreme 
presentation of emotional expressions and may lack ecological validity for this reason 
(McDonald, et al 2011b). Furthermore, the use of self report measures on a group with 
‗poor insight‘ makes the findings questionable (de Sousa et al, 2010a). 
 
4.2.6 Future Research 
Considering that the present literature review only yielded 10 articles, it is evident 
that more research investigating the ability to experience emotional empathy post ABI 
is needed in order to form a robust understanding of the process and methods of 
rehabilitation. A focus should be paid to brain injury type‘s alternative to TBI. Research 
should also attempt to produce focal lesion studies utilising various measures of 
experienced emotional empathy, to provide a greater understanding to the neural 
anatomy implicated in clinical presentations of emotional empathy deficits. 
The suggestions of Hopkins et al (2002) require further investigation. It will be 
useful to establish whether a deficit in the ability to experience emotional empathy in 
response to negative emotional expressions, or just expressions of anger, is present 
post-ABI. 
Future studies should also aim to establish the construct validity of the presented 
measures as measures of experienced emotional empathy and develop alternative 
measures that assess mechanisms within the theoretical frame of emotional empathy, 
possibly utilising auditory stimuli, startle probe modulation and construct valid self-
report measures. 
Also, future researchers should expand on the model presented in the current review. 
The model should be seen as a framework incorporating empathy processing and 
emotional perception ideology. A literature review to identify further relevant literature 
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would be ideal to develop the model further. A theoretical model of empathy that 
incorporates its cognitive and emotional underpinnings and the underpinnings of both 
of these constructs is essential to aid in the progressive understanding of human social 
interaction. 
 
4.2.7 Conclusion and Implications 
The purpose of this review was to investigate the extent to which individuals, post-
ABI, could experience emotional empathy and the nature of such a deficit. The findings 
of the review suggest that the experience of emotional empathy is frequently impaired 
following ABI. Furthermore, physiological measures suggest this is related to the 
inability to experience the emotions produced by negative facial stimuli. The ability to 
experience emotional empathy from positive affective states (happiness) appears to be 
preserved. The IFG and BA 44 were also implicated by the review and support the 
perspective that the MNS is crucial for emotional empathy. 
However, both self-report and physiological measures have limitations that may 
impact the findings of the current review. This is especially relevant regarding self-
report measures, the construct validity of which is highly questionable. Therefore, the 
findings of the review should be considered critically. Despite this it still remains 
(largely through the findings of studies utilising physiological measures) that there is an 
abnormality in the ability to experience emotional empathy post-ABI pertaining to 
negative facial stimuli. Furthermore, this deficit is negligible when ABI suffers are 
required to attend to the presented stimuli. Therefore, the experienced emotional 
empathy deficits may pertain to an inability to automatically appraise a stimulus as 
being socially, emotionally salient. Further investigation is required to confirm an 
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emotional empathy deficit post-ABI and establish whether it is the result of a specific 
deficit in automatic stimulus appraisal.   
Further research should seek to expand on the current measures of emotional 
empathy ensuring they are constructed within the theoretical perspective of emotional 
empathy. Also future research should aim to recreate the neurological findings 
highlighted by the review, using more valid measures of emotional empathy. Future 
research should also seek to develop the field of emotional empathy post-ABI by 
utilising ABI types other than TBI, establishing which specific emotional expressions 
are associated with experienced emotional empathy and expanding on the model 
presented in this review.  
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Abstract 
 
Behavioural problems are common after acquired brain injury (ABI). Of these, 
aggression and agitation are reported as the most problematic with 70% of ABI 
sufferers displaying aggressive tendencies at some point in their recovery. It has been 
suggested that deficits in social cognition may contribute to behavioural problems post-
ABI. The current study aimed to investigate whether the social cognitive processes of 
empathy and theory of mind (ToM) varied within brain injured populations with and 
without aggression. It was hypothesised specifically that a deficit in one component of 
empathy, emotional empathy, would lead to heightened aggression. Therefore, the 
components of ToM and empathy were assessed individually. 35 participants with a 
diagnosis of ABI were recruited from neurobehavioural sites across the UK. 
Participants were divided into high aggression (n=19) and low aggression (n=15) 
groups determined by requirement for specialist intervention specifically for aggressive 
behaviour. Participants completed a battery of measures assessing components of ToM 
and empathy, as well as measures of mood and intellectual functioning. There was no 
difference found between the high and low aggression groups on any of the measures. It 
was therefore concluded that social cognitive deficits are not sufficient to explain 
aggression post-ABI. The implications of these results and recommendations for future 
research are discussed. 
 
Key Words: ‗THEORY OF MIND‘, ‗EMPATHY‘, ‗COMPONENTS‘, 
‗AGGRESSION, ‗BRAIN INJURY‘ 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Incidence of brain injury in the UK and common problems 
Acquired brain injury (ABI) is an umbrella term incorporating traumatic (TBI), 
haemorrhagic, vascular, anoxic (and metabolic), and infective brain injuries. 
Advancements in life saving medical procedures and technologies have resulted in an 
increase in survival rates following ABI (Lux, 2007). It is estimated that the annual UK 
prevalence lies between 40 and 600 per 100 000 (British Society of Rehabilitation 
Medicine (BSRM), 2003; Kay & Teasdale, 2001; Neurological Alliance, 2003; 
Thornhill, Teasdale, Murray, McEwen, Roy & Penny, 2000; Yates, Williams, Harris, 
Round & Jenkins, 2006). 
Approximately 135,000 individuals in the UK live with long term problems 
following brain injury (Neurological Alliance, 2003) with ABI sufferers commonly 
experiencing physical, cognitive, emotional, behavioural and psychosocial difficulties 
(Fleminger, 2005). Although 65-85 % of ABI patients make a good physical recovery, 
other disabilities can remain (BSRM, 2003). Whilst there is an inverse correlation 
between injury severity and a ―good‖ recovery, disability is common at one year follow 
up regardless of brain injury severity (Thornhill, et al 2000). 
 
1.2 Aggression following ABI 
Behavioural difficulties following ABI are frequently reported by families as the 
most difficult to manage (Kinsella, Packer & Olver, 1991). Problematic behaviours 
post-ABI can be both positive (sexual disinhibition, aggression, agitation) and negative 
(lethargy, apathy) (Manchester, Hodgkinson, & Casey, 1997). 
Aggression and agitation are reported as the most problematic (Fleminger, 
Greenwood and Oliver, 2003), with 70% of ABI sufferers likely to display aggressive 
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tendencies at some point in their recovery (McKinlay, Brooks, Bond, Martinage & 
Marshall, 1981). Relatives report aggression as a problem to a greater extent than ABI 
sufferers (Hart et al, 2003), suggesting incomplete insight into behaviour. 
This lack of self-awareness can lead to frustration in ABI sufferers who do not 
understand why they are labelled as aggressive by their partner and family. Due to the 
burden placed on partners and families it is common to see relationships breakdown 
following ABI (Parsons, Carpenter-Hyland, Burright & Donovick, 1995). 
Research into the mediators of aggression following ABI has been hindered by the 
use of global measures of psychopathology, and measures of behaviours considered 
aggressive (i.e. stubbornness) producing inconsistent results (Dooley, Anderson, 
Hemphill & Ohan, 2008). Research applying measures based on theoretical frameworks 
of aggression have revealed a tendency for higher levels of anger, verbal aggression and 
maladaptive behaviours in ABI individuals when compared with non-brain injured 
comparison groups (Dyer, Bell, McCain & Rauch, 2006; Andrews, Rose & Johnson, 
1998; Baguley, Cooper & Flemingham, 2006). 
Aggression post-ABI has been postulated to result from an inability to inhibit 
aggressive impulses, as part of a dysexecutive syndrome (Golden, Jackson, Peterson-
Rohne, & Gontkovsky, 1996; Grafman, Schwab, Warden, Pridgen, Brown & Salazar, 
1996; Greve, Love, Sherwin, Stanford, Mathias & Houston, 2002; Hawkins & Trobst, 
2000). Executive functioning is the process by which humans are able to plan, initiate, 
sequence, inhibit and switch between behaviours pertaining to a goal (Burges & 
Alderman, 2004; Wood, 2001). However, measures of cognitive functioning fail to 
reliably correlate with levels of behavioural deficits and/or self-awareness deficits 
(often attributed to be a factor in behavioural difficulties following ABI) (Blair & 
Cipolotti, 2000; Lanham, Weissenburger, Schwab & Rosner, 2005; McKinlay & 
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Brooks, 1984; Prigatano & Altman, 1990). Recent research has suggested that executive 
function problems are insufficient to explain behavioural problems such as aggression 
post ABI, and that the role of metacognitive processes must be considered (Bach & 
David, 2006; Lee, Farrow, Spence & Woodruff, 2004; Lezak, 1995; Stuss and Levine, 
2002). 
 
1.3 The rationale for Social Cognition as a mediator of aggression 
Flavell (1976) defines metacognition as ―one‘s knowledge concerning one‘s own 
cognitive processes or anything related to them‖ (p.232). The social cognitive domain is 
said to comprise of multiple metacognitive and cognitive processes (Bjorkqvist & 
Osterman, 2000), which enable us to understand and relate to the thoughts, feelings, 
beliefs and behaviours of other people (Beer & Ochsner, 2006; Bjorkqvist, & Osterman, 
2000; Singer, 2006). 
Bjorkqvist, Osterman and Kaukiainen, (1992), suggest that as humans develop we 
utilise aggression in an increasing socially intellectual manner. Physical aggression pre-
exists language skills. As language and social skills develop, we come to rely more on 
verbal and indirect aggression. Indirect aggression puts great demand on learned social 
intelligence, enabling humans to socially manipulate individuals and inflict 
psychological harm with reduced likelihood of direct repercussions. Bjorkqvist and 
Osterman (2000), imply that a deficit in social cognition would diminish indirect 
aggressive strategies, forcing the recipient to rely on verbal and physical aggression 
which, due to their overt and socially unacceptable nature, often results in greater 
consequences. 
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Two social cognitive processes which have been associated with increased levels of 
aggression are Theory of Mind (Harvey, Fletcher & French, 2001; Renouf et al, 2010) 
and empathy (Bjorkqvist & Osterman, 2000; Kaukiainen et al, 1999). 
1.4 The complexity of Theory of Mind and its role in aggression post-ABI 
Social cognition research in brain-injured populations has largely focused on Theory 
of Mind (ToM) (Muller et al, 2010). Baron-Cohen (2000) defines ToM as the ability to 
reflect on and understand the thoughts of oneself and another, enabling navigation 
through social situations. ToM is considered to be a key process of social cognition and 
poor TOM has been shown to result in an inability to effectively navigate the social 
world (Martin-Rodriguez & Leon-Carrion, 2010). Social cognitive deficits following an 
ABI may underlie self-awareness deficits (Beer & Ochsner, 2006) which may, in turn, 
play a role in aggression (Bach & David, 2006; Bjorkqvist, & Osterman, 2000; Hart et 
al, 2003).  Bibby and McDonald (2005), emphasise that many of the sequelae of brain 
injury such as poor insight, inappropriate affect and poor social judgement overlap 
considerably with ToM deficits, explaining behavioural problems and suggesting that 
ToM problems may be a common occurrence after brain injury. 
Research investigating ToM deficits post-ABI has produced inconsistent results 
(Martin-Rodriguez & Leon-Carrion, 2010). Bibby and McDonald, (2005) found that 
control participants performed better than traumatic brain injured participants on a 
range of story and cartoon measures of ToM. Henry, Phillips, Crawford, Ietwaart and 
Summers (2006), assessed the ability to infer affective mental states using the reading 
the mind in the eyes task (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997), which 
found a deficit in ToM ability following TBI. They also found the TBI group displayed 
a greater deficit in emotional recognition.  
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Bach, Happe, Fleminger and Powell (2000) were unable to explain social 
dysfunction post-ABI using a ToM deficit as a rationale. Milders, Ietswaart, Crawford 
and Currie (2008), found no significant association between measures of ToM and 
ratings of behaviour, indicating an intact ToM. Bach and David (2006) also found intact 
ToM despite participants displaying behavioural difficulties. However, they suggested 
that the ToM measures may not have been sensitive enough, with most participants 
performing at ceiling.  
ToM has frequently been studied as a unitary construct however ToM is a 
metacognitive process which utilises many separate cognitive domains (memory, 
attention, executive functioning, etc.).  Given ToM comprises of a variety of complex 
processes, this somewhat reductionist view of ToM has the potential to effect research 
findings. Stone, Baron-Cohen, Calder, Keane & Young (2003) distinguish ToM as 
being the combination of three components; Attribution of epistemic mental states 
(those referring to something in the world, i.e. knowledge, attention or belief); 
Attribution of intention (understanding whether an act was intentional or accidental); 
Attribution of affective mental states (e.g. desire, fear/anger, etc). The Bach and David 
(2006) paper previously mentioned for example appeared only to investigate the ability 
to infer epistemic mental states 
Muller et al (2010) explored all three components of Stone et al (2003) finding a 
deficit of intention and possibly a deficit of affective mental state inference, with intact 
ability to infer epistemic mental state (Stone et al, 2003). However, it was not the 
intention of Muller et al (2010) to investigate these specific components proposed by 
Stone et al (2003), thus what we can infer from their results is limited. 
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1.5 Empathy as a mitigating factor in aggression and empathy deficits post-ABI 
Empathy, like ToM, is a complex metacognitive process, able to be considered as the 
collection of component processes rather than a unitary phenomenon. Wood and 
Williams (2008), identify three components pertaining to the phenomenon of empathy. 
These are; cognitive empathy, the ability to understand what another is feeling; 
compassionate empathy, the ability to respond compassionately to another‘s distress; 
and emotional empathy, the ability to feel what another person is feeling (Wood & 
Williams, 2008). 
Although considered part of emotional empathy (de Sousa, McDonald, Rushby, Li, 
Dimoska & James, 2010a; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004), compassionate 
empathy can be distinguished as responding to another‘s emotional state rather than 
emotional empathy, the production of feelings resulting from another's emotional state 
(de Sousa; McDonald; Rushby; Li; Dimoska & James, 2010b; Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-
Peretz & Perry, 2009). Difficulty separating out these two processes is potentially the 
reason research into compassionate empathy is scarce. Furthermore, there appears to be 
no identifiable research investigating compassionate empathy following an ABI. Due to 
the lack of a concise definition and appropriate measures, the current study will focus 
on the remaining two components of empathy. 
Research investigating empathy following ABI is scarce, although those that have 
suggest a deficit. Whilst cognitive empathy is the recipient of the majority of study 
(Grattan, Bloomer, Archambault & Eslinger, 1994; Knox & Douglas, 2009; Wells, 
Dywan & Dumas, 2005), more recent studies attempt to explore deficits of emotional 
empathy (Williams & Wood, 2010; Wood & Williams, 2008). Despite the expected 
dissociation between the neural pathways of each process (Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009; 
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Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), deficits have been found in both emotional and cognitive 
empathy post-ABI (de Sousa et al, 2010a). 
Levels of empathy in ABI sufferers have been suggested to have an adverse impact 
on carers‘ ratings of life satisfaction (Wells, et al 2005). Despite this, research focusing 
on identification of the neuroanatomical locality of the empathy process has become the 
norm (Nummenmaa, Hirvonen, Parkkola & Hietanen, 2008; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, 
Berger & Aharon-Peretz, 2003; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Goldsher, Berger & Aharon-
Peretz, 2004; Shamay-Tsoory et al 2009), with little research investigating the links 
between empathy and socio-behavioural deficits following ABI.  
Rumble, Van Lange and Parks (2010), suggest that empathy may sustain cooperation 
in social dilemmas, whilst Kaukiainen et al (1999), propose that empathy mitigates 
aggression. One could therefore assume that aggression following ABI is the result of 
an empathy deficit (Bjorkqvist, & Osterman, 2000). It remains unclear whether 
behavioural changes are a result of an inability to accurately recognise emotional 
stimuli occurring naturally in the environment (facial expressions, etc.) or whether an 
inability to accurately recognise emotional states in another (i.e. anger/disgust), leads to 
an inability to respond within the expectations of others (Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2003). 
Furthermore, it is likely that an empathy deficit may prevent accurate interpretation of 
one‘s own emotional state (Beer & Ochsner, 2006). 
Knox and Douglas (2009), suggest the social inappropriateness and breakdown in 
relationships, both common following ABI, result from an inability to accurately 
recognise facial expressions, an important facet of empathy (Cheung, Lee, Yip, King & 
Li, 2006; Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009). Shamay-Tsoory et al (2004), discovered a deficit 
of emotional and cognitive empathy in individuals who had suffered a brain injury to 
the prefrontal cortex, specifically the orbital and medial regions, suggesting that they 
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mediate empathy. Damage to these areas has also been associated with altered social 
interaction and ‗acquired sociopathy‘ (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). Blair and Cipolotti 
(2000), report on the case of J.S. who displayed severe behavioural problems following 
an ABI. His ToM remained intact however his ability to empathise was severely 
inhibited. It can therefore be suggested empathy has an important role in mediating 
social interaction and mitigating aggression.  
It is probable that a deficit to each of the components of empathy would result in 
different behavioural sequelae (Wood & Williams, 2008). Emotional empathy mitigates 
aggression through the production of emotions that will negatively reinforce future 
aggressive behaviour, i.e. through the sharing of distress from victim to aggressor 
(Beven, O‘Brien-Malone & Hall, 2004). Therefore, an emotional empathy deficit would 
present itself in an egocentric way and thus a higher inclination to take action without 
being sensitive to the emotional impact on others would result. Cognitive empathy is a 
process of understanding, and can provide insight into what another is feeling, but not 
produce an affective reinforcer, the ability to know but not care (Kaukiainen et al, 
1999). Therefore, a cognitive empathy deficit is likely to present as insensitivity to the 
emotional needs of others, and inability to adhere to the subtleties of social discretion. 
Considering these descriptions, it is likely that individuals displaying aggressive 
tendencies are more likely suffering from an emotional empathy deficit, whilst 
individuals suffering a cognitive empathy deficit are more likely to be considered rude 
but less aggressive as they will experience behavioural reinforcers through emotional 
empathy. 
De Sousa et al (2010a; 2010b), demonstrated that impaired emotional responsivity is 
related to damage to two distinct, dissociated (cognitive and emotional) empathy 
pathways (Shamay-Tsoory et al 2009), with the latter emphasising a deficit to the 
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emotional empathy pathways. Furthermore, Mehrabian (1997) found a negative 
correlation between emotional empathy and levels of aggression and hostility. It is 
therefore possible that cognitive and emotional empathy deficits may play a role in the 
aggression post-ABI, however, evidence appears to indicate emotional empathy as the 
predominant factor. 
 
1.7 The Present Study 
The present study investigated the link between aggression and social cognition, 
specifically ToM and empathy. The vast majority of former research has specifically 
investigated deficits in ABI samples compared with normal/non-brain injured controls. 
The majority postulate that demonstrated deficits could explain problematic behaviours 
post-ABI. However, as the majority of studies compare an ABI sample to a ―normal‖ 
population, they fail to consider the differences within an ABI population in terms of 
aggressive behaviour. 
The current study compares an ABI sample which displays highly aggressive 
behaviour, requiring specialist input, with an ABI sample that does not show levels of 
aggression requiring specific clinical input. It is expected that participants would 
display a deficit in ToM and empathy comparatively against a ―normal‖ population. 
However, this study is primarily concerned with the differences within the ABI 
populations. 
The following hypotheses were tested:  
First, consistent with the notion that empathy would serve to mitigate aggressive 
behaviour (Bjorkqvist, & Osterman, 2000) and the position that an emotional empathy 
deficit would be more likely to lead to aggression (Wood and Williams, 2008)  the 
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―high aggression group‖ would display a greater deficit in emotional empathy than the 
―low aggression group‖.  
Second, considering the findings of Bach and David (2006) and Muller et al (2010), 
there would be no significant difference between the high and low aggression groups 
ability to attribute epistemic mental state.  
Third, as suggested with Milders et al (2008), there would be no significant 
difference between the groups‘ ability to attribute intention or attribute affective mental 
states.  
Finally, the cognitive empathy levels for both groups will yield no significant 
difference, as suggested by Milders et al (2008) and the notion that cognitive empathy 
would cause someone to lack social discretion rather than display aggression (Wood & 
Williams, 2008). 
 
2. Method 
The following study was approved by the Leeds (West) NHS Research Ethics 
Committee (REC) and ethics committee of each participating rehabilitation unit. 
2.1 Participants 
All individuals participating in the study had a brain injury severe enough to warrant 
specialist neurorehabilitation on an inpatient unit. It was deemed necessary to perform a 
power calculation to establish the required sample size for the present study. A power 
calculation using the effect sizes from the New Test of Theory of Mind (Martin, 2008), 
suggested that by using a significance level of 0.0083 the study would have an 80% 
power to detect the Martin (2008) effect sizes with a sample size of 14 in each group. 
As the effect sizes for other measures were not available it was not possible to more 
accurately determine a required sample size. Through reviewing previous literature 
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investigating social cognition post-ABI and using the results of this power analysis, it 
was felt that a sample of 15 in each group would be an appropriate sample size for use 
in the present study. This included the assumption that statistical methods used to 
reduce type I error would also be implemented (i.e. Bonferroni Correction). 
2.1.1 Group Allocation 
Two groups of individuals with ABI were required for the present study, one 
consisting of individuals who display high levels of aggression following ABI and one 
who display low. Self report and other rater measures were considered too subjective to 
act as an accurate group allocation device. Aggression and agitation behavioural data 
(recorded by neurorehabilitation sites) was also dismissed for two reasons. Firstly, 
measures were not consistent across neurorehabilitation organisations preventing 
accurate comparison. Secondly, the behavioural data was considered to provide 
information into the aggression and agitation levels of ABI individuals as they resided 
on the neurobehavioural unit. As these units are highly controlled and designed to limit 
episodes of aggression it was believed that the behavioural data would not provide a 
‗true‘ picture of participant aggression, instead demonstrating aggressive tendencies 
affected by the contrived clinical environment of the unit. 
There is a clear divide between neurorehabilitation sites, those that are able to admit 
individuals who display overtly challenging behaviours and those that cannot. As 
aggression can be considered an overtly challenging behaviour, it was deemed 
appropriate to divide groups by type of neurorehabilitation site. Therefore the high 
aggression group consisted of participants residing on neurorehabilitation sites 
specialising in the rehabilitation of individuals who show challenging behaviours post-
ABI and the low aggression group consisted of individuals residing on 
neurorehabilitation sites that are not equipped to rehabilitate individuals who display 
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high levels of overtly challenging behaviours post-ABI. Furthermore, it was important 
to establish that participants being selected for the high aggression group displayed high 
levels of aggression rather than other forms of overtly challenging behaviour, i.e. sexual 
disinhibition, etc. Therefore the clinical neuropsychology lead of the high aggression 
unit was consulted to ensure the selection of ABI individuals displaying high levels of 
aggression. Table 1 depicts the participant group allocation criteria. 
Table 1. 
Participant Group Allocation Criteria 
 High Aggression Group Low Aggression Group 
Neurorehabilitation 
site type 
Specialising in rehabilitation for 
individuals displaying overtly 
challenging behaviours post-ABI 
Not specialising in rehabilitation for 
individuals displaying overtly 
challenging behaviours post-ABI 
Consultation from 
clinical 
neuropsychology lead 
Selection of participants displaying 
high levels of aggression 
 
 
2.1.2 High aggression group 
19 individuals who showed high levels of aggressive behaviour post-ABI, (13 male, 
6 female) were recruited from two neurorehabilitation sites in the UK, York House 
(Brain Injury Rehabilitation Trust (BIRT)) and the Kemsley Unit (St Andrews 
Healthcare). Both sites specialise in the rehabilitation of individuals who show 
challenging behaviour following brain injury. All participants met the following 
criteria: (a) all were aged between 16 and 65, (b) all had suffered a brain injury, (c) each 
displayed or was known to have displayed a clinically significant level of aggressive 
behaviour requiring specialist input at a behavioural disorder unit, suggested by the 
clinical neuropsychology lead, (d) all were residing on an inpatient unit for the 
treatment of behavioural problems, (e) deemed to have capacity to consent to 
participation in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act (2005), (f) all had no severe 
physical disabilities that would prohibit the completion of the measures, e.g. blindness, 
tetraplegia, (g) all were able to adequately understand verbal explanations or written 
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information given in English and had no special communication needs that would 
prohibit administration of measures, (h) none had a history of aggression at the level of 
criminal offence prior to injury. 
All participants gave informed consent to partake in the study. At the time of testing, 
the participants were aged between 19 and 64 (M age = 39.33 years SD = 12.57). 
Insufficient post traumatic amnesia data was available to report. Cohort years post-
injury ranged from 4 to 23 years (M years = 13.94 years SD = 6.015). Participants age 
at injury ranged from 8 to 53 years (M age=25.53 years SD=15.36). Brain injuries were 
sustained by the cohort as result of trauma (n=10), anoxia (n=3), infection (n=2) and 
haemorrhage (n=1); information regarding the type of injury was unavailable for 3 
members of the cohort. The education level of the cohort varied to include postgraduate 
(n=1), undergraduate (n=1), A-level/college (or equivalent) (n=2), GSCE/O-Levels 
(n=2) and no formal qualifications (n=11). Information regarding education level was 
unavailable for 2 participants. 
 
2.1.3 Low aggression group 
16 individuals with ABI displaying clinically insignificant levels of aggression (8 
male, 8 female) were recruited from three neurobehavioural sites across the UK, 
Thomas Edwards Milton House (BIRT), Goole Neuro Rehabilitation Centre (BIRT and 
NHS) and Daniel Yorath House (BIRT). All sites specialised in rehabilitation following 
ABI and would not accept clients who displayed overtly aggressive tendencies. All 
participants met the following criteria: (a) all were aged between 16 and 65, (b) all 
suffered a brain injury  (c) none displayed a clinically significant level of aggressive 
behaviour requiring specialist input at a behavioural disorder unit,  (d) deemed to have 
capacity to consent to participation in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act (2005), 
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(e) all had no severe physical disabilities that would prohibit the completion of the 
measures, e.g. blindness, tetraplegia, (f) all were able to adequately understand verbal 
explanations or written information given in English and required no special 
communication needs that would prohibit administration of measures, (g) all had no 
past history of aggression at the level of criminal offence. 
All participants gave informed consent to partake in the study. The participants were 
aged between 21 and 61 (M age = 36.88 years SD = 14.315). Insufficient post traumatic 
amnesia data was available to report. Cohort years post injury ranged from 0 to 18 years 
(M years = 2.75 years SD = 4.655). Participants injury age ranged from 8 to 60 years 
(M age=34.12 years SD=15.73). Brain injuries were sustained by the cohort as result of 
trauma (n=8), anoxia (n=2), infection (n=2) and haemorrhage (n=4). The education 
level of the cohort varied to include undergraduate (n=4), A-level/college (or 
equivalent) (n=5), GSCE/O-Levels (n=4) and no formal qualifications (n=1). 
Information regarding education level was unavailable for 2 participants. 
 
2.1.4 Group comparisons 
Pearson‘s Chi Square analysis indicated that there were no significant differences 
between the groups for gender distribution (χ
2
 = 1.23, p = .317) or injury type (χ
2
 = 
2.22, p = .634). There was a significant difference between groups for education level (χ
 
2
 = 12.06, p = .009), with the low aggression group displaying a higher level of 
education. This difference is likely the result of 8 participants in the high aggression 
group sustaining their injury during childhood (pre-16 years old) therefore effecting 
their attainment of academic qualification. There was only one childhood brain injured 
participant in the low aggression group. A post-hoc Pearson‘s Chi Square was 
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performed to confirm a significant difference (χ
 2
 = 5.48, p = .039) between groups in 
childhood brain injuries. 
T-test analysis revealed that the high aggression group displayed a larger number of 
years post injury (M=13.94, SD=6.02) than the low aggression group (M=2.75, 
SD=4.66) to a significant degree (t(31) = 5.95, p = .000). This difference is the result of 
individuals displaying high levels of aggression requiring longer term rehabilitation 
than those displaying little to no aggression. The T-test analysis revealed no significant 
differences in age at testing (t(32) = 0.53, p =.598) or age at injury (t(31) = -1.59, p = 
.122). The lack of significant difference between groups at age of injury is interesting 
considering the 8:1 ratio between groups of participants who suffered a childhood ABI. 
This is possibly due to a large variation within the groups for age of injury, with the 
high aggression group ranging between age 8-53 and the low aggression group age at 
injury ranging between ages 8-60.  
 
2.2 Questionnaires and Measures 
All measures were completed by participants in private on the rehabilitation units 
under the supervision of the chief investigator. The total test battery took approximately 
90-120 minutes per participant. 
 
2.2.1 Psychometric measure of intelligence 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI, Wechsler, 1999): A measure of 
intelligence was necessary in the current study to ensure that IQ was not a confounding 
variable, affecting performance on other measures. The WASI is a brief intelligence 
measure developed from subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III (WAIS-
III, Wechsler, 1997). The selected subtests demonstrate high loading on general 
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intelligence and have exceptionally high reliability (Wechsler, 1999). Equivalency data 
between the WASI and the WAIS-IIII, endorse the validity of the WASI as a measure 
of general intelligence. 
 
2.2.2 Measure of anxiety and depression 
Hospital anxiety and depression scale (HADS, Zigmond & Snaith, 1983): The 
HADS is a screening device for measuring the severity of anxiety and depression 
separately. It is appropriately normed to be used in hospital settings and was originally 
applied to stroke patients. A measure of anxiety and depression was necessary to ensure 
mood factors did not confound results. 
2.2.3 Questionnaires measuring aggression 
Whilst assignment to group was based on the rehabilitation setting participants 
resided in a measure of subjective levels of aggression displayed by each participant 
and an ‗other‘ who had substantial interaction with a participant were also taken. 
Aggression Questionnaire (AQ, Buss & Perry, 1992): The AQ is a 29 item 
questionnaire. It required participants to rate how characteristic each statement was of 
them generally. It measures total aggression and in four subcategories: affective 
(anger), cognitive (hostility) and behavioural (physical and verbal). The AQ displays 
internal consistency between all four subscales and total score (coefficient α = 0.72-
0.89, Buss & Perry, 1992). Furthermore, test-retest data suggests the reliability of the 
measure over time (Buss & Perry, 1992). The AQ also displays adequate construct 
validity established from comparison of the completed AQ‘s with ratings from 
knowledgeable informants (Buss & Perry, 1992). The AQ has been used to assess 
aggression levels in previous studies involving brain injury participants (Dyer, et al, 
2006; Greve, et al 2002). A paper by Dooley et al (2008) merits the AQ for its 
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theoretical groundings acknowledging that global measures of psychopathology do not 
permit detailed analysis of specific behaviours such as aggression. 
Aggression Questionnaire – Partner Version (AQ-P, O‘Conner; Archer, Fredrick & 
Wu, 2001): The AQ-P, developed from the AQ (Buss & Perry, 1992) is a 29 item 
‗other-rater‘ questionnaire, designed as a peer rating measure comparable with the AQ. 
O‘Conner et al (2001) report the intercorrelations of the four subcategories to be within 
acceptable (moderate-high) boundaries, suggesting the reliability of the AQ-P as an 
‗other-rater‘. Furthermore, the congruent validity can be derived from the moderately 
high correlation of the AQ scales and AQ-P scales (O‘Conner et al 2001). Vanderploeg, 
Belanger, Duchnick and Curtiss (2007), found the self rater reports of individuals with 
brain injury to be less reliable than those of professionals or peers. Therefore it was 
considered necessary to gain an ‗other-rating‘ of participants‘ aggression. As 
participants are inpatients it was felt that key workers would be in the best position to 
comment on participants levels of aggression. All participants and their key workers 
agreed to the completion of the AQ-P before it was administered. 
 
2.2.4 Video measure of ToM 
The new test of ToM (NTTM, Martin, 2008): The New Test of ToM was developed 
due to dissatisfaction with available measures of ToM in use with ABI patients. It 
adopts the definition of ToM proposed by Stone et al (2003), discussed in the 
introduction). It assesses each of these three ToM components, providing content 
validity. Inter-rater reliability was established through administration of the test to a 
volunteer and two neuropsychologists. Its convergent validity has been established 
through its correlation (coefficient α = 0.59) with the ―Faux Pas Task‖ (Stone, Baron-
Cohen & Knight, 1998) a widely used measure of ToM which is suggested to measure 
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multiple components (attribution of intention and affective mental state). Furthermore, 
this video measure maintains ecologically validity and does not rely on verbal ability. 
Although construct validity cannot be established due to a lack of empirical use,  
considering it is the only ToM measure known to the authors normed on an ABI 
population and assessing the three components outlined by Stone et al (2003), the other 
forms of validity and reliability would be sufficient. 
 
2.2.5 Measures assessing Empathy 
Empathy Quotient (EQ, Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004): The EQ is a 60 item 
scale consisting of 40 empathy items and 20 filler items. According to Baron-Cohen 
and Wheelwright (2004), the EQ measures both cognitive and emotional empathy, as 
well as social skills. However, further investigation has suggested that the 40 item EQ 
can be reduced into 28 items measuring three factors, cognitive empathy, emotional 
reactivity and social skills (Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen & David, 2004). 
Therefore, this study will not be using the EQ as a measure of emotional empathy as it 
appears to assess processes involved with emotional empathy and not emotional 
empathy as a whole. Furthermore, the cognitive empathy subscales of the EQ (EQ-CE) 
has been shown to demonstrate adequate validity (Cronbach‘s α = 0.84) (Muncer & 
Ling, 2006). De Sousa et al (2010a) have used the EQ in this way when investigating 
empathy deficits in TBI patients. They reported no correlation between the EQ-CE and 
the ‗perspective taking‘ subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI-PC) (Davis 
1980), although both are suggested to assess cognitive empathy. They attribute this to 
the IRI-PC tapping into attributions of epistemic mental state rather than cognitive 
empathy and affective ToM. This further suggests that the EQ-CE is appropriate to 
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assess cognitive empathy. In this current study the entire EQ was administered. EQ-CE 
scores were calculated from this.  
Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES, Mehrabian, 2000): The BEES is a 30 
item scale designed to reduce ―acquiescence bias" (i.e. the tendency of some people to 
agree with most statements put to them and the tendency of others to generally disagree 
with any statement). It allow for the assessment of an individuals ability to vicariously 
experience another persons experience through shared emotion (Mehrabian, 2000). The 
BEES is internally consistent (coefficient α = .87, Mehrabian, 1997) and displays 
satisfactory test-retest reliability (coefficient α = .79). The BEES high positive 
correlation with the Emotional Empathy Tendency Scale (EETS, Mehrabian & Epstein, 
1972) suggest its strong convergent validity. Furthermore, the BEES has displayed a 
high construct validity, being used successfully to investigate emotional empathy in the 
‗normal‘ population (Shaprio, Morrison & Boker, 2004; Singer, Seymour, O‘Doherty, 
Kaube, Dolan, and Frith, 2004; Van Hasselt, Baker, Romano, Sellers, Nosner & Smith, 
2005) and an ABI population (de Sousa et al, 2010a; Wood & Williams, 2008). Perhaps 
most importantly, the BEES has negatively correlated with aggression and violence at a 
significant level (p<0.01, Mehrabian, 1997) indicating its appropriateness as a measure 
of emotional empathy. 
 
2.3 Procedure 
At each site, potential participants were identified and initially approached by a 
member of the clinical team and consent to meet with a researcher to discuss the project 
was obtained. The chief investigator met with potential participants, in private on the 
unit to discuss the project and answer questions. Participants had 24 hours to consider 
participation (in line with NHS REC protocol), after which they were contacted by chief 
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investigator in person or via telephone to confirm their participation. An appointment 
was arranged to complete the test battery at the neurorehabilitation site. Prior to the 
commencing of testing, participants were given chance to answer any further questions 
and complete the consent forms. The testing was completed in private on site and lasted 
approximately 90-120 minutes. The tests were completed in the following order with 
each participant: HADS, BEES, AQ, NTTM, EQ, WASI. For the HADS, BEES, AQ, & 
EQ, the participants were given the measure, the instructions (on the top of each 
measure) were read to them and participants filled in the scale. The NTTM required 
participants to watch a series of scenes on a laptop computer and answer questions 
about the scene after each. The questions were read aloud by the examiner but were also 
presented on the screen. The WASI was administered as to adhere with standardisation 
(Weschler, 1999). If the participant was unable to read or write the questions were read 
to them, and verbal answers written down by the researcher.   
The HADS was scored whilst the participant completes the New Test of Theory of 
Mind. Any scores above 10 (above borderline)  for anxiety or depression were 
discussed with the client at the end of testing with the prospect of feeding the HADS 
information to the clinical team if it was what the client desired or an issue of risk arose. 
The participants were then thanked for their participation and given opportunity to ask 
any questions. 
Once an appointment was arranged with participants it was possible to approach 
their key workers. The information sheet was discussed with the key worker and they 
were given chance to ask any questions. They were then given 24 hours to consider 
their participation after which they were contacted and an appointment was arranged to 
complete the AQ-P. The key worker filled in the AQ-P. This was done in private and 
lasted approximately 5 minutes. To respect the key workers high work load, the 
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researcher was flexible in allowing them to take the AQ-P away to fill in when they had 
time. They were informed that should they have any further questions they should 
locate the researcher before proceeding. Key workers were then debriefed and thanked 
for their participation.  
 
2.4 Data analysis 
A Pearson‘s Chi Square and Independent T-tests were used to compare the 
demographic details of participants and establish any significant differences between 
groups. 
All results were analysed using SPSS for Windows, version 18.0 (SPSS Inc). All 
measures of social cognition in the test battery were subject to a univariate analysis 
using independent t-tests or Mann-Whitney U‘s to compare the performance of both 
groups on each subscale. 
A correlation analysis comparing the measures of social cognition with measures of 
aggression was used to assess the relationship between the two constructs. 
The self and other aggression rater scores for each group underwent an intraclass 
correlation analysis to establish the level of agreement between participants and their 
key workers. Further, graphical analysis was performed to establish any trends in 
participants over or under rating their aggressive behaviour compared to their key 
workers. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Missing Data 
Participant disengagement and unavailable information resulted in incomplete data 
sets in the high aggression group (n=4) and low aggression group (n=2). 
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3.2. Data Screening 
Participants were required to complete the HADS and WASI to determine any group 
differences in mood or intellectual functioning that may affect results. The mean scores 
are summarised in table 1. A test of normality was conducted to determine the use of a 
parametric measure or nonparametric measures. 
3.2.1. Mood 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of Normality indicated significant within group 
distribution in the low aggression group depression scores (K-S = .23, p=.023) and total 
HADS scores (K-S = .24 p=.014), implying the requirement for nonparametric analysis 
for these measures. To allow comparison, nonparametric measures were used for all 
mood subtests. A Mann-Whitney U nonparametric measure revealed no significant 
differences between groups for anxiety (U=118.5, N1=19 N2=16, p=.265), depression 
(U=144, N1=19 N2=16, p=.790) and total HADS score (U=139, N1=19 N2=16, 
p=.666). As the alpha scores do not fall within the statistically significant range there is 
no indication that anxiety or depression are confounding variables. 
3.2.2. Intellectual Functioning 
The group IQ scores are compared in Fig.1. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of 
Normality indicated no significant distribution within groups, therefore indicating the 
appropriate use of parametric measures. An independent t-test was performed. The 
Levene‘s test of Equality was significant for performance IQ (W=7.6, p=.010) 
indicating that the variance within the performance IQ sample was not equal. Therefore, 
the equality of variance was not assumed for PIQ. The independent t-test revealed no 
significant differences between groups for verbal IQ (t(30) = -2, p=.057), performance 
IQ (t(21.32) = -1.3, p=.209) or full scale IQ (t(30) = -1.94, p=.062). Therefore there was 
no reason to believe that intellectual functioning confounded group differences. 
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Table 2 
The mean and standard deviation scores for high aggression, low aggression groups on measures of intellectual 
functioning and mood. 
      Mood   Intelligence (WTAR) 
        Anxiety 
 
Depression   
Total 
HADS 
 
Verbal 
IQ   
Performance 
IQ 
Full 
Scale IQ 
High Aggression Group 
  
    
         n 
   
19 
 
19 
 
19 
 
17 
 
17 
 
17 
 Mean 
   
6.89 
 
6.26 
 
13.16 
 
76.71 
 
79.88 
 
76.35 
 S.D. 
   
3.57 
 
4.03 
 
5.167 
 
11.94 
 
13.64 
 
11.37 
 
                Low Aggression Group 
             n 
   
16 
 
16 
 
16 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 Mean 
   
6.25 
 
6.56 
 
12.81 
 
85.87 
 
89.13 
 
86.47 
 S.D.       6.03   5.6   10.55   14.24   24.5   17.76   
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1 
Boxplot representation of verbal IQ (VIQ), performance IQ (PIQ) and full scale IQ (FSIQ) scores for both high 
aggression and low aggression groups. 
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3.3. Aggression grouping 
The mean group self and other rated aggression scores can be found in table 2. A 
Levene‘s test of equality was significant for other ratings of anger (W=10.15, p=.003) 
and total aggression (W=4.82, p=.036), therefore the equality of their variance is not 
assumed. Independent T-tests revealed no significant group difference for self ratings of 
hostility (t(33) = 1.11, p = .277) and verbal aggression (t(33) = 1.27, p = .213) as well 
as other ratings of hostility (t(31) = .87, p = .391), verbal aggression (t(31) = 1.10, p = 
.281) and total aggression (t(23.2) = 2.04, p = .053), though the latter is approaching 
significance. Independent T-tests revealed significant differences between other ratings 
of physical aggression (t(31) = 3.09, p = .004)  and anger (t(20.63) = 2.09, p = .049) as 
well as self ratings of anger (t(33) = 2.89, p = .007), physical aggression (t(33) = 2.61, p 
= .014) and total aggression (t(33) = 2.88, p = .007). These results suggest that the high 
aggression group displays a higher level of overall aggression, attributable to higher 
levels of physical aggression and anger. 
 
Table 3 
The mean and standard deviation scores for high aggression, low aggression groups on self and other ratings of 
aggression. 
        Self rated Aggression   Other rated Aggression 
   
  Physical Verbal Hostility Anger Total 
 
Physical Verbal Hostility Anger Total 
High Aggression 
Group 
 
    
    
    
  
n 
   
19 19 19 19 19 
 
18 18 18 18 18 
Mean 
   
27.26 17.74 25.26 22.89 93.16 
 
26.05 16.28 20.22 22 84.89 
S.D 
   
7.82 5.02 8.03 5.07 17.93 
 
7.07 4.23 7.98 4.6 19.07 
               Low Aggression 
Group 
           
n 
   
16 16 16 16 16 
 
15 15 15 15 15 
Mean 
   
19.88 15.5 22.13 16.94 73.19 
 
17.93 14.33 17.8 16.87 66.93 
S.D       8.97 5.38 8.76 7.11 23.13   8.87 5.92 7.96 8.52 29.39 
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3.4. Social Cognition 
Mean BEES, EQ-CE and NTTM (epistemic, affective and intention) scores were 
calculated for both groups. These scores are summarised in table 3. Normality tests 
were completed to determine the use of parametric or nonparametric tests. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov reported no significance difference within the groups on the 
BEES, the NTTM or the EQ-CE. Therefore, parametric analysis was appropriate for all 
social cognition measures. 
3.4.1. Cognitive and Emotional Empathy 
Two independent t-test revealed no significant difference between the groups in 
levels of cognitive empathy (EQ-EC: t(32) = -.29, p = .772) and emotional empathy 
(BEES: t(33) = .538, p = .594), suggesting that groups did not differ in cognitive or 
emotional empathy levels. 
3.4.2 Epistemic, Intention, and Affective ToM 
Two independent t-tests demonstrated no significant difference between groups for 
levels of affective ToM (NTTM affective: t(32) = -1.30, p = .202) or epistemic ToM 
(NTTM epistemic: t(32) = -.41, p = .681). The Levene‘s test of Equality was significant 
for intention ToM (W= 4.73, p= .037) indicating that there was not equal variance 
within the intention ToM sample. A Bonferroni Correction was performed to adjust for 
multiple concepts being compared (epistemic ToM, intention ToM, affective ToM). 
This reduced the value at which a difference would be considered statistically 
significant from 0.05 to 0.017, meaning only p values less than 0.017 would be deemed 
statistically significant. An independent t-test, not assuming equal variance, revealed no 
significant difference between groups on scores of intention ToM (NTTM intention: 
t(27.61) = -2.27, p = .031). This indicates a lack of difference between groups on all 
components of ToM.  
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Table 4 
Mean and standard deviation scores for high aggression, low aggression groups on measures of social cognition, 
incorporating normative values. 
        Empathy   Theory of mind (NTTM)   
        BEES   EQ-CE   Epistemic   Intention   Affective   
High Aggression 
Group 
           
n 
   
19 
 
18 
 
18 
 
18 
 
18 
 
Mean 
   
32.26 
 
12.61 
 
33.56
 b
 
 
30.19
 a, b
 
 
85.51
 b
 
 
S.D 
   
35.59 
 
5.7 
 
11.06 
 
15.17 
 
36.54 
 
              Low Aggression 
Group 
           
n 
   
16 
 
16 
 
16 
 
16 
 
16 
 
Mean 
   
26.81
 b
 
 
13.13 
 
34.97
 b
 
 
39.69
 a, b
 
 
99.52
 b
 
 
S.D 
   
21.05 
 
4.37 
 
8.46 
 
8.69 
 
23.96 
 
              
Normative data 
           
Mean 
   
45 
 
13.18 
 
43.44 
 
50.11 
 
129.89 
 
S.D       24   4.02   4.9   8.52   19.7   
Note: Normative data obtained from: BEES (Mehrabian, 2000); EQ-CE (De Sousa et al, 2010a (control group)); 
NTTM (Martin, 2008 (control group)) 
a  Significant (p<0.05) difference between high aggression and low aggression groups. However, not significant at 
the Bonferonni corrected (p<0.017). 
b   Significant (p<0.01) difference between group and normative sample. 
 
 
3.5 Comparison of Sample to Normative Data 
Comparison of the current sample and normative data derived from a ‗normal‘ 
population were analysed using one sample t-tests. In the absence of available norm 
data, control group data was used to establish a normative comparison and analysed 
with independent t-tests. There was a significant difference between the normative 
sample and the current sample for epistemic ToM (high aggression group t(25) =2.54, p 
=.001; low aggression group t(23) =2.74, p =.001; total ABI sample t(41) =2.72, p 
=.000), affective ToM (high aggression group t(25) =3.38, p =.000; low aggression 
group t(23) =3.23, p =.000; total ABI sample t(41) =3.40, p =.000), intention ToM (high 
aggression group t(25) =3.64, p =.000; low aggression group t(23) =2.90, p =.000; total 
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ABI sample t(41) =3.30, p =.000). This suggests that both groups (assessed separately 
and together) displayed deficit in all components of theory of mind processing. 
There was no significant difference between the normative sample and the current 
sample for cognitive empathy (high aggression group t(38) =-.37, p =.713; low 
aggression group t(36) =-.04, p =.971; total ABI sample t(54) =-.26, p =.797), 
indicating that neither group displayed a cognitive empathy deficit. 
A significant difference in emotional empathy between the current sample and 
normative sample was present in the low aggression group (t(15) = -3.46, p =.004) and 
total ABI sample (t(34) = -3.05, p =.004) but not in the high aggression group (t(19) = -
1.56, p =.136), suggesting the low aggression group and total sample displayed a deficit 
in emotional empathy whilst the high aggression displayed intact emotional empathy. 
 
3.6. Aggression, Self vs Other Ratings  
To establish aggression rating levels of agreement between participants and key 
workers for each group, 10 intraclass correlation coefficients were carried out. There 
were no strong levels of agreement between participant (AQ) and key worker (AQ-P) 
ratings of anger (high aggression group: ICC = -.19, p =.804; low aggression group: 
ICC =.01, p =.477 ); physical aggression (high aggression group: ICC =.39, p =.044; 
low aggression group: ICC =.34, p =.095); verbal aggression (high aggression group: 
ICC =-.11, p =.670; low aggression group: ICC =-.08, p =.610); hostility (high 
aggression group: ICC = -.21, p =.655; low aggression group: ICC =.05, p =.424) and 
total aggression (high aggression group: ICC =-.003, p=.504; low aggression group: 
ICC =.13, p =.314). This data suggests that participants and key workers disagreed on 
interpretations of participant aggression across most types of aggression for both 
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groups. The only exception being the low aggression groups ratings of physical 
aggression. 
The differences between participant and key worker ratings and the average of the 
two were compared for each type of aggression and the total score. These comparisons 
are represented as scatterplots (fig. 2) and were used to identify any trends in key 
worker reports of aggression, i.e. under reported or over reported aggression, when 
compared with participant ratings. Review of the scatterplots suggests that participants 
in the high aggression group generally (12:6) rated their total levels of aggression 
higher than their key worker. Furthermore, in the low aggression group, the majority of 
participants (10:5) rate their hostility levels higher than their key workers rate their 
hostility. No other obvious trends of rating differences were present. 
 
Fig. 2 
Scatter Plots depicting the difference between the participant and key worker rating of different types of aggression 
(e.g. Self rated anger – Other rated anger) plotted against the average for the two ratings (e.g. (Self rater anger + 
Other rater anger)/2). The horizontal line represents agreement. Scores above the line indicate a higher participant 
rating and below indicate a lower participant rating. 
 High Aggression Group   Low Aggression Group 
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3.7. Correlation of Social Cognition Measures 
A Pearson‘s correlation analysis (Table 4) revealed a significant moderate 
correlation between the measures of empathy (EQ-CE and BEES: r(32) =.62, p =.000). 
A significant moderate correlation was also present between epistemic ToM and 
intention ToM (NTTM epistemic and NTTM intention: r(32) =.46, p =.007) and 
intention ToM and affective ToM (NTTM intention and NTTM affective: r(32) =.54, p 
=.001). Measures of affective ToM did not correlate significantly with epistemic ToM 
(r(32) = .296, p =.090). No significant correlations between the empathy and ToM 
measures were revealed. This suggests a moderate relationship between emotional and 
cognitive empathy, affective and intentional ToM and intentional and epistemic ToM. 
 
Table 5 
A table depicting the results of a Pearson‘s correlation coefficient analysing the correlation between measures of 
social cognition. 
Correlations 
 
EQ-CE BEES Raw 
NTTM 
Epistemic 
NTTM 
Intention 
NTTM 
Affective 
EQ-CE Pearson Correlation 1 .618
**
 .067 .158 .035 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .707 .372 .846 
N 34 34 34 34 34 
BEES Raw Pearson Correlation .618
**
 1 .098 .129 .285 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .582 .469 .103 
N 34 35 34 34 34 
NTTM Epistemic Pearson Correlation .067 .098 1 .457
**
 .296 
Sig. (2-tailed) .707 .582  .007 .090 
N 34 34 34 34 34 
NTTM Intention Pearson Correlation .158 .129 .457
**
 1 .544
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .372 .469 .007  .001 
N 34 34 34 34 34 
NTTM Affective Pearson Correlation .035 .285 .296 .544
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .846 .103 .090 .001  
N 34 34 34 34 34 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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3.8. Correlation of Social Cognition Measures and Aggression Measures 
A Pearson‘s correlation was performed to identify whether the measures of 
aggression (self and other) correlated with the measures of social cognition (BEES, EC, 
NTTM Intention, NTTM epistemic and NTTM affective). Of these there was no 
significant relationship between any of the ‗other rated‘ types of aggression and any of 
the measures of social cognition. This indicates a lack of relationship between 
aggression as rated by key workers and social cognition. Furthermore, there was no 
significant difference between any type of ‗self rated‘ aggression and the BEES, EQ-EC 
or NTTM epistemic, suggesting a lack of relationship between self rated aggression and 
emotional empathy, cognitive empathy and epistemic ToM. Following a Bonferroni 
Correction reducing the level of statistical significance  to p<.017 (accounting for the 
NTTM, AQ and Pearson‘s correlation), there was a significant, negative, moderate, 
correlation between NTTM intention and self rate physical aggression (r(34) =-.45, p 
=.007), and total aggression (r(34) =-.44, p =.010). Self rated hostility was approaching 
significance (r(34) =-.38, p =.023). Furthermore, using the same Bonferroni Correction, 
there was a significant, negative, moderate correlation between NTTM affective and 
self rated physical aggression (r(34) =-.5, p =.002) and total aggression (r(34) =-.44, p 
=.010). Self rated verbal aggression was approaching significance (r(34) =-.38, p 
=.027). This indicates that intention ToM and affective ToM both moderately diverge 
from self rated physical and total aggression. This relationship is depicted in 
scatterplots in figure 3. 
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Fig. 3 
Scatter Plots depicting the divergent relationship between self ratings of physical and total aggression and intentional 
ToM and affective ToM. Each scatterplot contains a linear line of best fit. 
Note: AQ PA = physical aggression; AQ T = total aggression; NTTM affective = affective ToM; NTTM intention = 
intention ToM. 
   
   
 
 
4. Discussion 
The current study was designed to investigate the hypothesised link between 
aggression post-ABI and social cognitive processes, specifically the components of 
ToM and empathy. It was hoped that the establishment of such a link would inform 
rehabilitation units specialising in brain injured individuals displaying aggressive 
behaviour. This was actualised through the administration of measures of both empathy 
and ToM to two brain injured populations, one displaying high levels of aggression and 
one displaying low levels.  
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As expected there were no statistically significant differences between high and low 
aggression groups on the three components of ToM; attribution of epistemic mental 
state, attribution of affective mental state and attribution of intention. This finding 
suggests that ToM deficits are not a reliable factor influencing differences in aggression 
within the ABI population. This supports previous research assessing ToM in a 
behaviourally disordered brain injured population (Bach & David, 2006; Bach et al 
2000; Milders et al, 2008). However, it should be acknowledged that Intention ToM 
was approaching significance. 
As hypothesised, there was no significant difference between the high and low 
aggression group‘s cognitive empathy scores. Cognitive empathy therefore does not 
explain differences in levels of aggression post-ABI, supporting notions broached in 
previous studies (Milders et al 2008; Wood & Williams, 2008). 
In contrast to the hypothesis, there was no difference in levels of emotional empathy 
between the high aggression and low aggression group, suggesting that levels of 
emotional empathy are not a substantial explanation of the differences in levels of 
aggression displayed within an ABI population. This finding contests the proposal of 
Bjorkqvist and Osterman (2000) that empathy would mitigate aggressive behaviour and 
the suggestion that a lack of emotional empathy would produce aggressive tendencies 
(Wood & Williams, 2008). The primary finding of this study is that social cognitive 
processes of ToM and empathy are unable to account for differences in aggressive 
behaviours within the ABI population. If indeed there is a unifying deficit that explains 
an increment in aggression post-ABI it appears to be something other than ToM or 
empathy. Therefore, the present study would dissuade the introduction of social 
cognition rehabilitation programs into neurorehabilitation settings as a means to reduce 
aggressive behaviour.  
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The use of such stringent significance level (p<.017) for analysis of the NTTM may 
have produced a type II error, specifically regarding the NTTM intention, which prior 
to the Bonferroni correction was significant. Bonferroni corrections are used within 
statistical analysis to avoid type I error. Whilst this level of experimental rigor is 
important to ensure results are accurate there is the concern that being overly rigorous 
may produce type II error. The use of a Bonferroni correction is not an exact science, 
with different schools of thought favouring the use of different criteria, i.e. dividing the 
significance level by the number of measures used, dividing the significance level by 
the number of concepts measured, etc. As such there is no clear definition of how 
rigorous one should be in using a Bonferroni correction 
A particularly rigorous stance was taken on the statistical analysis of the NTTM, 
dividing the significance level by the number of components being assessed. The 
NTTM is an unpublished measure, developed at the level of doctoral dissertation. Due 
to its lack of empirical use its construct validity has not been established and it was 
therefore necessary to impose strict significance criteria (a Bonferroni Correction) in 
line with responsible statistical analysis. 
Furthermore, the power analysis used to determine the number of participants 
required for the present study relied upon the NTTM. The results of this analysis 
suggested that the use of 14 participants in each group provided an 80% power to detect 
a significant effect, providing the level at which a p value would be statistically 
significant was set below 0.0083. Therefore, the use of stringent significance levels is in 
keeping with the requirements of using the NTTM with a sample of this size. It will be 
important for future research to investigate the role of intention ToM in aggression to 
provide clarity to this issue. The current paper however is unable to suggest a deficit in 
intention ToM produces aggressive behaviour post-ABI.  
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Comparison of the current ABI sample to normative data revealed a deficit in all 
components of ToM within each group and total ABI sample. This expected finding 
lends support to those who would propose a ToM deficit post-ABI (Bibby and 
McDonald, 2005; Henry et al, 2006). The current sample (high aggression, low 
aggression and total ABI sample) displayed preserved cognitive empathy in comparison 
with the normative group. This contests previous findings of cognitive empathy deficits 
in an ABI population (de Sousa et al 2010a, Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2004). Furthermore, 
when compared with the normative sample the low aggression group displayed a deficit 
in emotional empathy inconsistent with the high aggression group. This result is 
unexpected and emphasises the null hypothesis that emotional empathy deficits fail to 
explain aggressive behaviour post-ABI. Despite this inconsistency, the total ABI 
sample displayed a deficit in emotional empathy when compared with the normative 
group, supporting previous research (de Sousa et al 2010a; Williams & Wood, 2009; 
Wood & Williams, 2008). 
The high aggression group displayed significantly higher scores than the low 
aggression group on self ratings of anger, physical and total aggression, whilst also 
significantly differing on other ratings of anger and physical aggression, with total 
aggression approaching significance (p=0.053). In an ABI population heightened anger 
is likely to lead to physical outbursts and produce a great difficulty in management of 
behaviours. This will most likely require specialist input at a neurorehabilitation site 
specialising in the management of such overt aggressive behaviour. Therefore, it is 
logical that the groups displayed the differences they did. The fact that hostility and 
verbal aggression did not produce group difference is understandable considering the 
management of verbal aggression, though unpleasant, is not as difficult to manage as 
physical outbursts and therefore both groups are equally likely to display it. Hostility is 
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considered to be a form of indirect aggression requiring a social cognition and reducing 
risks (Bjorkqvist et al, 1992). As no group difference were found for social cognition 
measures, it is understandable that no group differences should be displayed in hostility, 
supporting the notions of Bjorkqvist et al (1992). 
There was a moderate correlation between empathy and ToM measures suggesting 
the neuropsychological processes being measured are similar, but not the same. This 
lends support to the concept of emotional and cognitive empathy as different processes 
unified under the construct of empathy (Shamay-Tsoory et al 2009; Shamay-Tsoory, 
2011; Wood & Williams, 2008). The study also revealed a moderate correlation 
between epistemic ToM and intention ToM, and between intention ToM and affective 
ToM. This suggests a connection between these components of ToM, but emphasises 
their value as separate constructs, supporting the assertions of Stone et al (2003). 
Interestingly epistemic ToM and affective ToM did not correlate. Attribution of an 
epistemic mental state and attribution of affective mental states are quite polarised 
concepts, the prior pertaining to something in the world and the latter representing an 
abstract phenomenon (Stone et al, 2003). It is conceivable that the failure of the two 
components to correlate is an indication of their separateness on a processing level; it is 
not necessary to understand what someone is thinking to understand what they are 
feeling. Furthermore, correlation of each with an ability to infer intent accounts for a 
plausible mediation between the two, a process which relies on attribution of affective 
and/or epistemic mental sates to infer intentions. Therefore, this finding lends support to 
Stone et al (2003) and builds on their component model of ToM, expressing the 
unifying factor between them as the ability to infer intention. Furthermore, these 
findings emphasise the importance of assessing components of ToM and empathy 
rather than considering them to be unitary constructs. 
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The comparison of participants ratings of aggression and ratings provided by their 
key worker suggest a disagreement across all forms of aggression (verbal, physical, 
hostility and anger), regardless of group. There was no indication that participants rated 
their aggressive behaviour consistently higher or lower than their key workers rated it. 
Previous literature (Hart, 2003; Parson et al, 1995) has suggested that following an ABI 
individuals have a reduced insight into their behaviour indicated by lower scores on 
‗self‘ ratings of behaviour compared against ‗other‘ ratings.  The current study does not 
share this finding, instead suggesting that brain injured individuals in most cases rated 
their aggression ‗differently‘ to their keyworker rather than lower. Where trends did 
occur, participants rated their aggression higher than rated by their key workers, not 
lower. This is possibly due to the use of key workers rather than family members as in 
previous studies. The key workers professional role in a neurorehabilitation setting 
results in their experience of multiple individual‘s post-ABI, differing in levels of 
aggression.  As a result staff may become desensitised to aggression and therefore 
underreport it. Furthermore, family members have a premorbid experience of the 
individual and often an emotional investment in the situation, both of which may skew 
their ratings of aggression. Finally, the participant may rate their aggression levels as 
high if they have retained enough insight to compare themselves to their premorbid self. 
It is clear that multiple factors may influence the comparison of aggression from self 
and other ratings, therefore interpretations should be made with caution. 
Comparison of social cognitive scores against self and other ratings of aggression 
post-ABI indicated a divergent relationship between intention and affective ToM with 
self rated, physical and total aggression. This suggests that as affective and intentional 
ToM decline ABI sufferers are likely to rate themselves as more physically aggressive, 
likely producing higher total aggression scores. It is possible that an inability to 
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accurately understand the intentions of others may lead to aggressive outbursts, e.g. not 
understanding that staff cannot let you smoke at this time as it is session time. As the 
correlation is moderate further research is required to understand the implications of 
this relationship, although explanations must be considered. Furthermore, an inability to 
understand the affective mental state of another could also lead to aggressive behaviour, 
e.g. not understanding that someone is ignoring you because they are upset. As 
demonstrated these ToM components correlate and it is likely that they compensate for 
one another i.e. being able to understand the intentions of another would perhaps allow 
for an inability to understand what they are feeling and vice versa. 
Interestingly, the ‗other‘ ratings of aggression did not correlate with any social 
cognitive constructs. One could suggest that participants lacked insight (Hart, 2003; 
Parson et al, 1995) and therefore their ratings are inaccurate, however, it is equally 
plausible that key worker ratings of participant aggression are inaccurate, considering 
their opinion is subjective and no doubt skewed by the context within which they work. 
Key workers working in a high aggression setting are likely to have a higher threshold 
for what they consider aggressive, whilst those in low aggression settings are likely to 
have a lower threshold. This further highlights the difficult of using self and other 
ratings to account for awareness deficits. For these reasons the groups were 
distinguished by rehabilitation setting and reason for referral. Neurorehabilitation units 
offering specialist behavioural input, are generally more expensive than units that do 
not. Therefore when patients no longer need this input they are moved elsewhere. 
Therefore, individuals with ABI in the specialist behavioural units can be suggested to 
be actively displaying high levels of aggression, supporting the group selection criteria 
used in this study. 
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4.1 Limitations of the Study 
Firstly, the use of self report measures to assess levels of emotional empathy, 
aggression and cognitive empathy may have led to participants reporting a less than 
accurate, subjective view of themselves. Considering the societal weight placed on 
caring behaviour as ‗good‘, participant awareness that agreeing/disagreeing with certain 
statements may depict an unfavourable view of them may have produced inaccurate 
responses. Furthermore, the differing levels of insight often displayed post-ABI suggest 
the possibility that a proportion of the sample was unable to accurately reflect on 
complex abstract concepts such as empathy. In addition, use of self report measures 
assessing emotional and cognitive empathy in ABI populations is commonplace 
throughout the literature (de Sousa et al 2010a; Williams & Wood, 2010; Wood & 
Williams, 2008). 
Secondly, considering the noncompliance associated with highly aggressive ABI 
patients, it is worth considering whether the ABI sample was a true representation of 
individuals who are highly aggressive post-ABI. Between the right to opt out of 
participation and the lack of capacity to consent exclusion criteria, it is possible that the 
high aggression group used in this sample did not incorporate those individuals 
displaying the highest levels of aggression. This was controlled for by separating 
groups according to neurorehabilitation site and reason for referral. However, it is worth 
considering that the ABI clients displaying the highest levels of aggression were 
possibly unable to participate. It could be considered that an objective measure (i.e. 
participant‘s unit aggression records) would be better able to provide group 
differentiation. However, this too has limitations as different organisations use different 
scales and participants may display with lower/higher levels of aggression due to the 
structured context of the unit, and not because they have low/high social cognition.  
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Furthermore, due to the diverse injury type and lack of neurological data, it was not 
possible to implicate any neural structures in the current findings. This information 
would be beneficial allowing indication of specific neurological structures involved 
with social cognition and aggression. 
Additionally, although a rationale for the statistical group differences of ‗years post 
injury‘ and ‗years of education‘ was established (see section 2.1.3), these differences 
were not controlled for within the statistical analysis of the data. Whilst it can be 
deemed unlikely that the result were affected by these differences, without statistical 
analysis controlling for these difference it is not possible to be sure. Therefore, a 
limitation of the study is its failure to account for these differences using a statistical 
analysis such as a regression analysis or an analysis of covariance. 
Finally, due to population type it was not possible to control for medication or the 
effects this may have on awareness and social cognitive processes. The vast majority of 
participants were on some form of medication, the side effects of which possibly varied 
greatly and idiosyncratically. The only form of control available was that any side 
effects did not prevented participants from completing the test battery. 
 
4.2 Recommendations for future research 
The findings of the current study suggest researchers should shift their focus from 
social cognition onto other explanations of aggressive behaviour post ABI. This would 
involve considering the variety of factors contributing to aggressive behaviour and 
investigating the possibility of a multiple factor explanation. Research should 
investigate the moderate divergent relationship between physical aggression and both 
intention and affective ToM to establish whether they play a role in mitigating physical 
aggression. 
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Future research assessing social cognitive processes should endeavour to assess the 
components of ToM and empathy instead of their unitary construct. This will enable 
researchers to establish which components attribute to specific deficits and provide a 
better understanding of the social cognition. Also research should strive to use more 
objective measures of aggression, controlling as best as possible for subjective 
limitations. 
Although the use of self-report and verbal measures as a means of assessing high 
order cognitive processes has been a standard, it is possible that the use of such 
measures is not appropriate with this population (and perhaps any population) to obtain 
an accurate and reliable report of empathy. Recent research (de Sousa et al, 2010a; de 
Sousa et al, 2010b; McDonald et al, 2011 in press) investigating empathy processes in 
an ABI population has utilised physiological measures (skin conductance levels, facial 
electromyography) as means of measuring emotional empathy responses. Future 
research should consider the use of these alternative methodologies alongside, or as 
opposed to, self report measures. 
Over the last decade there has been an abundance of research attempting to 
understand the neuropsychological processes that, if damaged, would result in a poor 
socio-behavioural outcome. Despite this, the vast majority of research relies on 
comparisons of a brain injured population against a ‗normal‘ sample. Rarely do studies 
investigate these processes within an ABI population. Whilst comparison with a 
‗normal‘ population is vital to our understanding of the consequences of ABI, it does 
little to illuminate the reasons behind socio-behavioural differences commonly 
displayed within the brain injury population itself. In order to gain a greater 
understanding of social and behavioural problems post-ABI, future research should 
focus on comparing behavioural and social differences within the ABI population, 
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regardless of the proposed causality (neurological, neuropsychological, premorbid 
personality, genetic, systemic, etc). It is possible that there are multiple causes of 
aggression post-ABI, however they will not be established through comparison of ABI 
and ‗normal‘ populations alone. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
Although deficits in social processes may be commonplace post-ABI, their causal 
role in aggressive behaviour is at present unsupported. Therefore, research should begin 
to additionally investigate other, possibly multi-factorial, explanations of aggression 
post-ABI. Research looking to form links between socio-behavioural difficulties post-
ABI and neuropsychological concepts is invaluable. It is necessary to inform 
neurorehabilitation settings of community integration strategies for this complex 
idiosyncratic client group. Such information will provide a better socio-behavioural 
outcome in the form of a reduced strain on family systems and a lower re-referral rate. 
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Appendix A – Reflective statement 
The following is a reflective account of my experience of the thesis production 
process. This statement will evaluate the lessons learnt along the way and those learnt 
from the process as a whole. I have attempted to keep the statement concise by having a 
continual narrative of ‗lessons‘ running throughout. However, I am aware that my 
reflection style can be somewhat jumbled and as such I apologise in advance if my 
reflections appear unclear at points.  
There were a few stumbling blocks on the road to completion of my thesis. 
Compared to other trainee‘s in my year group I had no problems that I would consider 
major (i.e. Research Ethic Committee rejection, etc) and thus I use the term stumbling 
blocks. However, these stumbling blocks were troublesome and some were larger than 
others but all have provided lessons that should be reflected upon.  
In hindsight (the powerful tool that it is) I feel I should have spent a greater 
proportion of time establishing the effectiveness of the measures I used. The measures 
were selected according to their use in previous studies and their apparent ability to 
assess the social cognitive components being measured. However, as discussed in part 
one and two, although the face validity of a measure appears strong, the construct 
validity may not be as strong. I do not think it is fair to suggest that I was careless with 
my selection of measures as a great deal of though led to the inclusion of these specific 
measures. However, I do feel that a great influence behind the selection of my measures 
was that the uniqueness of the concepts I intended to measure, which left few available 
tools. This made the selection of measures difficult, especially regarding the use of the 
new test of ToM. Though unpublished it was the only measure available that clearly 
defined and assessed each component of ToM and was therefore the most appropriate 
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measure available. Furthermore, I feel that I may have been overly accepting that 
because another researcher had used a measure to assess ‗x‘ that I was able to use it to 
assess ‗x‘ as well. On reflection perhaps a more critical assessment of the measures was 
required. In fact, I would step beyond this and suggest that it is important to be critical 
of our ability as researchers to measure such abstract processes such as ToM and 
empathy accurately. 
This brings me onto my next stumbling block, the aquisition of a social 
constructionist perspective. Over the course of my training I came across the social 
constructionist perspective and became quite interested in it. This perspective can be 
said to boast a critical stance on ‗taken for granted knowledge‘, disputing that what we 
know of the world is gained from its unbiased, objective observation. In this way it 
opposes empiricism and positivism. Gaining this perspective half way through the 
completion of my thesis was quite the conundrum. It caused me to question, not only 
whether we are able to measure neuropsychological processes, but whether they exist in 
the first place. Where my thesis was concerned, this was (as you can imagine) quite an 
undermining consideration. It suggested that all I can be said to be investigating is a 
socially constructed concept, relevant within this culture at this point in time and not a 
neuropsychological process underlying human nature, as I had originally believed. I 
recall initially finding it difficult to accept that the project was actually investigating 
anything and admittedly lost some faith in it for a time. However, on reflection I would 
have been lucky to have this perspective at the beginning of my thesis journey. What 
originally appeared to be a second-guessing burden was actually a critical perspective 
that has allowed me to break down my project on a level above that of the pros and cons 
of the research but rather on the pros and cons of how we understand and accept 
processes like empathy, aggression, theory of mind, brain injury. Had I had this 
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perspective at the early stages of the project it could have allowed me to be more 
critical of that which I was investigating. Whilst I feel this perspective has been evident 
within my thesis to quite a low extent, it has allowed me to critically view the work I 
am producing and how it may add to ‗taken for granted knowledge‘. 
Moving onto a less abstract stumbling block, the process of recruiting was possibly 
the most difficult stage of the project. This was not so much regarding individual 
participants but rather arranging recruitment with the brain injury rehabilitation sites. 
On reflection now and at the time, I recognise that these are very busy work 
environments and the clinical neuropsychologists whom I hounded, were in high 
demand and had more important things to focus on than the project of some clinical 
psychology trainee. Despite this, I recall feeling a deep seated frustration at being 
unable to move forward with the project because my emails were not being replied to. 
At the time, I believed this frustration was because my project progress had been 
hindered, and this was possibly true to an extent. However on reflection, I feel that this 
frustration may have been because these sites were putting me in a situation that 
brought up a personal discomfort for me. Whilst reflecting on what was frustrating 
about this situation I realised that part of it regarded having to email them asking if they 
had received my previous emails. I came to the conclusion that I did not feel 
comfortable troubling people who were clearly very busy or were uninterested. Whether 
this concerned their seniority or an underlying desire on my part not to burden them is 
unclear and possibly a combination of the two. What was clear was that the idea of 
badgering the clinical head of a neurorehabilitation unit felt very uncomfortable indeed. 
I shared this with my supervisor who encouraged me to be firmer in my pursuit of 
replies to my emails, and I was. On reflection, I feel that this consideration of the 
appropriateness of my requests combined with this firm, persistent attitude resulted in 
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the seemingly good relationship I feel was established with all sites. This experience not 
only gave me an insight into myself, but taught me that to establish an effective 
research relationship with recruitment sites one must be not only considerately patient 
but also persistently firm. 
Throughout this process lessons have been learnt, not only from the stumbling 
blocks but also from the areas that have enhanced my project. Of the positive 
experiences I have encountered during the completion of my thesis, the ones I am most 
grateful for and feel most reflective about are the people I have met. By investigating 
the ‗ABI‘ population I feel that I may have, erroneously grouped people into one 
category and thus, lost the uniqueness of their individuality, brain injury and 
experience. This notion has built over the course of meeting individuals who have had 
similar injuries and are yet very different from one another in presentation. Through 
reflection, I wonder whether the quantitative interpretation of these individuals has 
possibly led to an inaccurate representation of individuals‘ post-ABI and I wonder 
whether qualitative research would be in a better position to address the experiences of 
people after a brain injury. Despite being on placement in a neurorehabilitation unit 
during my data collection period, my experience of this field was substantially 
broadened by visiting these different sites and meeting these individuals. I was moved 
by the stories of each participant and felt privileged to have had the opportunity to gain 
a broader understanding of what life is like for individuals following a brain injury. I 
will undoubtedly carry this experience into my future work, be it research or clinical. 
Though deviating from the previous topic, I would like to reflect for a moment on 
the rationale behind my selection of the journals I plan to submit to. As I am 
investigating the effect damaged neuropsychological processes may have on behaviour, 
my first choice of journal for the empirical paper was ‗Neuropsychologia'. However, I 
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was concerned that because of my paper did not investigate the neurological structures 
underlying hypothesised social cognitive deficit I would not meet their criteria, a 
concern that was later confirmed by the journal‘s editor. ‗Brain and Cognition‘ 
displayed very similar interests to ‗Neuropsychologia', but did not chiefly, concern 
itself with neurological investigation and therefore it felt like an appropriate choice. 
‗Health Psychology Review‘ was selected for the systematic literature review, largely 
because of its interest in review articles, but also for its ability to reach clinicians who 
work within health settings. I felt it important to publish to a clinical audience as they 
would be the people working with individuals‘ post-ABI, and inevitably be influencing 
service strategy and delivery. These are the first papers I have written for publication, as 
such I expect my understanding of the journal selection process will develop as I gain a 
greater experience of submitting to different journals. 
Throughout this statement I have reflected on my experience of going through the 
process of producing a thesis project. I now would like to reflect on what I have learnt 
about the process itself. An obvious statement though it may be, I feel that research 
should not be taken lightly and that this is an easy and common mistake. I recall, during 
my undergraduate, wondering how the limitation sections of articles were so long, and 
feeling that they could and should have avoided these limitations. The idea that you can 
avoid all limitations is of course absurd and leads me to the perspective that research 
will always have flaws, regardless of how much one controls for variable, inevitably it 
will stumble at points. An important lesson I feel I have taken away regarding the 
process of research is the importance of getting each stage underway as quickly as 
possible. I am aware that at times I idly let time pass by, considering I had plenty. 
However, unexpected time consumers (chasing sites, gaining ethical approval, scoring) 
delayed my research project and ultimately led to panic. I feel that these unexpected 
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time consumers are a natural part of the research process and thus staying ahead is 
important. On reflection, the main thing that I will take away about the production of 
research is that it is doable. In the beginning the thesis seemed like a gargantuan 
behemoth, one which was insurmountable. However, by breaking it down into sections 
and a series of manageable deadlines the beast can be overcome. 
Finally, I would like to reflect upon how this process has altered/confirmed my 
approach to research. I feel that my approach to research has shifted from a purely 
quantitative perspective to one which is beginning to see the merits of a qualitative 
approach. I cannot be certain whether this is due to this research process alone or 
whether external contributors have influenced this shift. It is not that I don‘t see the 
merit of quantitative research but rather I see its limitations more clearly. I felt a 
discomfort towards my project towards the end and this was perhaps the result of my 
loss of confidence in the ability of quantitative measures to display a true picture. I am 
however aware that I have much still to learn about both types of research and I have no 
doubt that my future research endeavours will lead me to utilise both. 
The production of this thesis has confirmed the importance of, and encouraged me 
to, pursue future research projects. Research findings are the core driver of health 
service development. As researchers we are seen as experts and as such our findings 
can often be considered fact. It is therefore crucial that accurate, accountable research is 
being produced. It will be important therefore, to critically appraise the findings of 
research that influence the development of service strategy. I feel that I would very 
much like to be part of this process, both the development and critique of future 
research and service development. 
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Appendix D – Emails Sent to Researchers to 
Identify Articles for Review 
 
Email conversation with Prof McDonald 
Dear Prof McDonald, 
My name is Paul Walton, I'm a Trainee Clinical Psychologist in my final year of study at the 
University of Hull. As part of my doctoral thesis, I am currently conducting a systematic 
literature review exploring the effects of brain injury on experienced emotional empathy. I 
understand that you have done a substantial amount of research into physiological arousal and 
emotional mimicry in adults with traumatic brain injury. I am emailing you to  ask whether you 
have any 'in press' articles, or any documents that are not in the public domain that you might be 
willing to share, for the purpose of my review? 
 
Thank you very much for your time and help. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Paul Walton, 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
 
 
Dear Paul, 
Thankyou for your email.   I am not sure which articles you have but two recent ones are 
attached 
Best wishes 
Skye 
 
Email conversation with Prof Wood 
Dear Prof Wood,  
My name is Paul Walton, I'm a Trainee Clinical Psychologist in my final year of study at the 
University of Hull. As part of my doctoral thesis, I am currently conducting a systematic 
literature review exploring the effects of brain injury on experienced emotional empathy. I 
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understand that you have done a substantial amount of research into emotional empathy deficits 
in adults with traumatic brain injury. I am emailing you to  ask whether you have any 'in press' 
articles, or any documents that are not in the public domain that you might be willing to share, 
for the purpose of my review? 
 
Thank you very much for your time and help. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Paul Walton, 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
 
Paul 
Here are some papers which might help. I will ask Claire Williams to send you a pdf of the JCEP paper, 
which I don‘t have.  
Good luck 
  
Rodger Ll. Wood 
 
Email conversation with Dr Shamay-Tsoory 
Dear Dr Shamay-Tsoory,  
My name is Paul Walton, I'm a Trainee Clinical Psychologist in my final year of study at the 
University of Hull. As part of my doctoral thesis, I am currently conducting a systematic 
literature review exploring the effects of brain injury on experienced emotional empathy. I 
understand that you have done a substantial amount of research into the neurological basis of 
cognitive and emotional empathy. I am emailing you to  ask whether you have any 'in press' 
articles, or any documents that are not in the public domain that you might be willing to share, 
for the purpose of my review? 
 
Thank you very much for your time and help. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
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Paul Walton, 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
 
Dear Paul, 
Thank you for your interest in my work. I don‘t have anything in press right now. 
Good luck with the review. 
Best 
simone 
 
Other emails that did not receive a reply: 
Dear Arielle de Sousa, 
My name is Paul Walton, I'm a Trainee Clinical Psychologist in my final year of study at the University 
of Hull. As part of my doctoral thesis, I am currently conducting a systematic literature review exploring 
the effects of brain injury on experienced emotional empathy. I understand that you have done a 
substantial amount of research into empathy deficits in adults with traumatic brain injury. I am emailing 
you to  ask whether you have any 'in press' articles, or any documents that are not in the public domain 
that you might be willing to share, for the purpose of my review? 
 
Thank you very much for your time and help. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Paul Walton, 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
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Appendix E – Data Extraction Sheet 
Date of data extraction: 
Identifying features of the study: 
 Author: 
 Article Titles: 
 Source (Journal/Year/Vol/Pages/Country of Origin): 
 Institutional Affiliation (first Author) and/or contact address: 
 
Identification of the reviewer: Paul Walton 
 
Epistemological Quality 
Definition of Empathy/Emotional Empathy: 
 
Aim of study: 
 
 
 
Group characteristics:     Experimental   Control 
1. Target population (ABI type) 
2. Inclusion Criteria 
 
 
3. Exclusion Criteria 
 
 
4. Recruitment procedure 
 
5. Number in group 
6. Mean participant information 
a. Age 
b. Ethnicity 
c. PTA 
d. GCS 
e. Years since injury 
f. Age at injury 
g. gender 
h. Employment history 
i. Education history 
j. medication 
k. setting (care/rehab/community) 
l. geographical region 
m. Neurological damage data provided? 
7. Dropout rate: 
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8. Were ABI group and control group comparable?      
 
Methodological quality: 
 Design of study (Khan et al 2001): 
 Methodological procedures (e.g. quali./qunati. , opportunity sample): 
 Test setting:  
 Control for medication?: 
 Confounding variables: 
 Brief procedural description: 
 
 
 
 
Measures: 
 Measure(s) of experienced emotional empathy (Physiological(P) or Self rater(S)): 
 
 
 Measures not assessing experienced emotional empathy: 
 
 
 
 Stimulus used to evoke emotion (If applicable): 
 Examples of questions for self rater: 
 
 Justification for measures used: 
 
 
 
 Description of measures used (Y/N): 
 
Statistical Analysis:  
 Statistical techniques used: 
 
 Does this adjust for confounding? (i.e. Multiple measures): 
 
 Missing data stated?: 
 Length of time until follow up: 
 
Results:    EEE 1  EEE2  EEE3  EEE4 
 Control group mean (S.D.) 
 ABI group mean (S.D.) 
 Other group 1 mean (S.D.) 
 Other group 2 mean (S.D.) 
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Findings: 
 Experienced emotional empathy related (Stat Sig?): 
 
 
 Other findings: 
 
 
 
Neurological data:  
 Areas Implicated in experienced emotional empathy from results: 
 
 
 Methods of neurological differentiation between samples (i.e. amygdala damage): 
 
 
 Range of damaged brain regions in ABI group: 
 
 
 
Limitations: 
Highlighted limitations: 
 
 
 
Observed limitations: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
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Appendix F – Quality Checklist: Items and 
Guidance 
Question 
number 
Question Further Info 
1 Is the hypothesis/aim/objective of the 
study clearly described? 
 
2 Is there a structured summary of 
experimental design, methods, results 
and conclusions in the abstract? 
 
3 Is there a scientific background and 
explanation of the rationale? 
 
4 Are the main outcomes to be measured 
clearly described in the Introduction or 
Methods section? 
If the main outcomes are first mentioned in the Results 
section, the question should be answered no. 
5 Are the characteristics of the patients 
included in the study clearly 
described? 
In cohort studies and trials, inclusion and/or exclusion 
criteria should be given. In case-control studies, a case-
definition and the source for controls should be given. 
6 Is the design and procedure clearly 
explained to a degree that would allow 
its repetition? 
 
7 Are the independent and dependent 
variables of interest clearly described? 
Treatments and placebo (where relevant) that are to be 
compared should be clearly described. 
8 Are the distributions of confounding 
variables in each group of subjects to 
be compared clearly described? 
A list of principal confounders is provided. 
9 Are the main findings of the study 
clearly described? 
Simple outcome data (including denominators and 
numerators) should be reported for all major findings so 
that the reader can check the major analyses and 
conclusions. (This question does not cover statistical 
tests which are considered below). 
10 Does the study provide estimates of the 
random variability in the data for the 
main outcomes? 
In non normally distributed data the inter-quartile range 
of results should be reported. In normally distributed 
data the standard error, standard deviation or confidence 
intervals should be reported. If the distribution of the 
data is not described, it must be assumed that the 
estimates used were appropriate and the question should 
be answered yes. 
11 Have actual probability values been 
reported ( 
e.g. 0.035 rather than <0.05) for the 
main outcomes except where the 
probability value is less than 0.001? 
 
12 Were those subjects who participated 
in the study representative of the entire 
population from which they were 
recruited? 
The study must identify the source population for 
patients and describe how the patients were selected. 
Patients would be representative if they comprised the 
entire source population, an unselected sample of 
consecutive patients, or a random sample. Random 
sampling is only feasible where a list of all members of 
the relevant population exists. Where a study does not 
report the proportion of the source population from 
which the patients are derived, the question should be 
answered as unable to determine. 
13 Were inclusion and exclusion criteria 
for all participants clearly defined and 
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adhered too? 
14 Did the study report the setting in 
which data was collected? 
 
15 Are the limitations of the study 
critically discussed? 
 
16 Were the measures used ecologically 
valid? 
Did the measures administered require participants to 
perform tasks they would come across in day to day life? 
17 Was an attempt made to blind study 
subjects to the purpose of the study? 
For studies where the patients would have no way of 
knowing which intervention they received, this should be 
answered yes. 
18 If any of the results of the study were 
based on “data dredging”, was this 
made clear? 
Any analyses that had not been planned at the outset of 
the study should be clearly indicated. If no retrospective 
unplanned subgroup analyses were reported, then answer 
yes. 
19 Were the statistical tests used to assess 
the main outcomes appropriate? 
The statistical techniques used must be appropriate to the 
data. For example nonparametric methods should be 
used for small sample sizes. Where little statistical 
analysis has been undertaken but where there is no 
evidence of bias, the question should be answered yes. If 
the distribution of the data (normal or not) is not 
described it must be assumed that the estimates used 
were appropriate and the question should be answered 
yes. 
20 Were the main outcome measures used 
accurate (valid and reliable)? 
For studies where the outcome measures are clearly 
described, the question should be answered yes. For 
studies which refer to other work or that demonstrates 
the outcome measures are accurate, the question should 
be answered as yes. 
21 Was there adequate adjustment for 
confounding variables in the analyses 
from which the main findings were 
drawn? 
This question should be answered no for trials if: the 
distribution of known confounders in the different 
treatment groups was not described; or the distribution of 
known confounders differed between the treatment 
groups but was not taken into account in the analyses. In 
nonrandomised studies if the effect of the main 
confounders was not investigated or confounding was 
demonstrated but no adjustment was made in the final 
analyses the question should be answered as no. 
22 Did the study recruit enough 
participants to have sufficient power to 
detect a statistically important effect? 
 
Is the number of participants required reported and if so 
is it matched or exceeded? 
 
  
~ 162 ~ 
 
Appendix G – Quality Checklist Scores 
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Appendix G – Quality Checklist Scores 
   
Quality Checklist Item Number 
              
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Total 
de Sousa et al, 2010a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 19 
Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2009 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 17 
Williams & Wood, 2010 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 18 
Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2004 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 11 
McDonald et al, 2011b 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 18 
McDonald et al, 2011a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 19 
Muller et al, 2009 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 15 
Wood & Williams, 2008 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 20 
Hopkins et al, 2002 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 16 
de Sousa et al, 2010b 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 19 
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Appendix H – Measures of experienced 
emotional empathy (from part one) 
The descriptions of the measures have been obtained from the article that featured them 
in the review. References are linked to part one reference section 
Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale 
(BEES, Mehrabian, 2000) 
A measure of emotional empathy, the 
ability to experience the feelings of 
another. It consists of 15 negatively 
worded questions and 15 positively 
worded questions and utilises a 9 point 
liker scale, ranging from -4 to +4. 
Ekman & Friesen (1976) emotional facial 
expression stimuli 
Greyscale pictures of faces depicting the 
expression of various emotions. Pictures 
use male and female actors and emotions 
are expressed to varying degrees 
Electrodermal response (EDA) and Skin 
Conductance Response (SCR) 
A physiological measure of electrical skin 
conductance often recording the largest 
voltage produced over a specified time 
period. Used in conjunction with 
presentation of stimuli. 
Empathy Quotient (EQ, Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004)  
Emotional Reactivity Subscale – A 22 
item measure of emotional empathy 
adapted from the EQ. 
Evoked Cardiac Deceleration (ECD) A physiological measure assessing the 
reduction in heart rate associated with the 
end of heightened sensory intake, post 
evoked cardiac response. Used in 
conjunction with presentation of stimuli. 
Facial Electromyography (EMG) A physiological measure used to record 
changes in facial muscle activity. Used in 
conjunction with presentation of stimuli. 
Interpersonal Reactivity Scale (IRI, Davis, 
1980) 
Empathic Concern – A 7 item scale 
assessing the how frequently an individual 
feels empathy for others.  
Personal Distress – A 7 item scale 
assessing the feelings of discomfort 
resulting from tense interpersonal settings. 
Questionnaire Measure of Emotional 
Empathy (QMEE, Mehrabian & Epstein, 
1972) 
The QMEE was designed to assess the 
chronic tendency to react emotionally to 
emotional to the emotional experiences of 
others. Scores range from -132 to +132. 
Skin Conductance Level (SCL) A physiological measure of longer lasting 
levels of electrodermal reactivity 
associated with tonic levels of arousal. 
Used in conjunction with presentation of 
stimuli. 
~ 164 ~ 
 
Appendix I – Other measures (from part 
one) 
The descriptions of the measures have been obtained from the article that featured them 
in the review. References are linked to part one reference section 
Alternate Uses Test (Lezak, 1995) A measure of cognitive flexibility 
The Arousal Scale (de Sousa et al 2010b) A self rating index of arousal from calm 
(1) to very excited (9) 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI, 
Beck, 1987) 
A measure of depression 
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, 
Epstein, Brown & Steer, 1988) 
A measure of anxiety 
Benton Face Recognition Test (BFRT; 
Benton, Hamsher & Varney, 1983) 
A measure of the ability to match faces 
based on their features 
The Brixton Test (Burgess & Shallice, 
1997) 
A measure of rule detection 
Brock Adaptive Functioning 
Questionnaire (BAFQ, Dywan, Roden & 
Murphy, 1995; Dywan & Segalowitz, 
1996) 
A measure consisting of 12 scale 
assessing: Planning, Initiation, Flexibility, 
Compulsiveness, Attention, Memory, 
Arousal, Emotionality, Impulse Control, 
Aggressiveness, Social Monitoring and 
Empathy. It is also able ot measure self- 
awareness. 
California Verbal Learning Task (CVLT; 
Delis, Freeland, Kramer & Kaplan, 1988) 
A measure of verbal memory 
Character Intention Task (Brunet, Sarfati, 
Hardy-Bayle & Decety, 2000). 
A ToM task assessing th ability to 
understand intention of others 
The Culture Fair Test (CFT; Cattell & 
Cattell, 1960). 
Used to assess general non-verbal problem 
solving abilities 
Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale 
(DASS (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) 
A measure of depression, anxiety and 
stress 
Design Fluency (Jones-Gotman & Milner, 
1977) 
A measure of cognitive flexibility  
Emotiona Matching Task (used faces 
from Ekman & Friesen, 1976) 
A measure of the ability to identify 
emotional expressions presented by face 
from four other emotionally expressive 
faces 
Emotional Recognition Task (used 
content from Ekman & Friesen, 1976; 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hil, Raste & 
Plumb, 2001) 
A task to assess the ability to recognise 
emotional expressions in a series of faces. 
Expression Identification Test (used faces 
from Ekman & Friesen, 1976) 
A measure of the ability to identify 
emotional expressions presented by face. 
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The maximum score was 60. 
Faux Pas Test (8 items from the Adult 
version of the Faux Pas Recognition Test 
(Stone et al, 1998) 
A ToM measure assessing the ability to 
recognise a faux pas.  
First-order and Second-order False Belief 
Task (Frith & Corcoran, 1996; Bach, 
Happe, Fleminger & Powell, 1998; Rowe, 
Bullock, Polkey & Morris, 2001) 
A ToM measure designed to assess the 
ability to understand the first and second 
order beliefs of others 
The Hayling Test (Burgess & Shallice, 
1997) 
A measure of response initiation speed and 
response suppression 
The International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS; Centre for the Study of 
Emotion and Attention, 1999) 
A catalogue of pleasant, unpleasant and 
neutral visual images demonstrated to 
evoke physiological arousal. 
Interpersonal Reactivity Scale (IRI, Davis, 
1980) 
Perspective Taking – A 7 item subscale 
measuring the ability to adopt the 
psychological view point of another. The 
score ranges from 
Fantasy Scale – A 7 item subscale 
measures the ability to transpose oneself 
into fictional situations using ones 
imagination. The score ranges from 
Interpretation of Indirect Speech Act Task 
(Joanette, Ska & Cote, 2004) 
Part of the Montreal Evaluation of 
Communication Protocol that assesses how 
people identify indirect speech. 
National Adult Reading Test (NART-2; 
No author is provided by Wood & 
Williams, 2008) 
A measure of premorbid intellectual 
functioning 
Ravens Progressive Matrices (Beaumont 
& Davidoff, 1992) 
Assess reasoning and provides an estimate 
of general intellectual functioning 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes (Baron-
Cohen et al, 2001)  
A ToM task used to assess the ability to 
someone‘s mental state from their eyes   
Recognition of Affective Prosody - 
Hebrew Version (Lapidot, Most, Pik & 
Schnider, 1998) 
A measure of emotion identification 
adapted from original (Ross, Thompson & 
Yenkosky, 1997) into Hebrew. Participants 
listen to a recorded sentence and are to 
identify the emotion present in the voice  
Recognition of Facial Expression (used 
Ekman & Friesen, 1976) 
A measure of emotion identification 
consisting of 35 pictures depicting 1 of 7 
emotional states (anger, neural, sadness, 
disgust, happiness, surprise, and fear) 
Semantic and Formal Lexical Evocation 
(Adapted from Cardebat, Doyon, Puel, 
Goulet & Joanette, 1990) 
A measure of verbal fluency 
Second-order ToM Task (No Author 
provided by Shamay-Tsoory et al 2009) 
A ToM task assessing the ability to 
understand what someone else thinks about 
what someone else thinks 
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Stroop Color Word Test (Stroop, 1935) A measure of response 
inhibition/interference 
Toronto Alexthymia Scale (TAS-20; 
Bagby Parker & Taylor, 1994) 
A 20 item measure used in the diagnosis of 
alexthymia 
Torrance Test of Creative Thinking (The 
circles sub-scale) (Torrance, 1974) 
A measure of cognitive flexibility 
Trail Making Test A and B (Reitan & 
Wolfson, 1993) 
A measure of mental flexibility 
The Valence Scale (de Sousa et al 2010b) A self rating index of mood from negative 
(1) to positive (9) 
Verbal Fluency (Author not provided by 
Shamay-Tsoory et al 2004) 
A measure of cognitive flexibility 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – 
Revised (WAIS-R, Wechsler, 1987) 
A measure of intelligence and working 
memory. 
Vocabulary Subtest – An assessment of 
general verbal intelligence 
Digit Span Subtest – An assessment of 
attention span 
Similarities Subtest – An assessment of 
verbal reasoning 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Third 
Edition (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997) 
Vocabulary, Similarities and 
Comprehension – Subtests assessing 
verbal ability 
Digit Span, Letter-Number Sequencing and 
Spatial Span – Subtests assessing working 
memory 
Block Design, Matrix Reasoning, Letter-
Number Sequencing and Picture 
Arrangement – Subtests measuring 
cognitive flexibility 
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; 
Heaton, Chelune & Talley, 1993)  
A measure of cognitive flexibility 
The Zoo Map Test (Wilson, Alderman, 
Burgess, Emslie & Evans, 1996) 
A measure of planning ability from the 
behavioural assessment of dysexecutive 
syndrome. 
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Appendix J – Research Ethics Committee 
Approval 
 
 
Leeds (West) Research Ethics Committee 
First Floor 
Millside 
Mill Pond Lane 
Leeds 
LS6 4EP 
 
 Telephone: 0113 3050122  
Facsimile:  
17 August 2010 
 
 
Mr Paul Walton 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Department of Clinical Psychology and Psychological Therapies 
Hertford Building 
The University of Hull 
Cottingham Road 
Hull 
HU6 7RX 
 
 
Dear Mr Walton 
 
Study Title: Social Cognition in Brain Injury: The Role of Theory of 
Mind and Empathy in Behavioural Disorders 
REC reference number: 10/H1307/88 
 
Thank you for your letter of 15 July 2010, responding to the Committee’s request for 
further information on the above research and submitting revised documentation. 
 
The further information has been considered on behalf of the Committee by the Chair.  
 
Confirmation of ethical opinion 
 
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for 
the above research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and 
supporting documentation as revised, subject to the conditions specified below. 
 
Ethical review of research sites 
 
The favourable opinion applies to all NHS sites taking part in the study, subject to 
management permission being obtained from the NHS/HSC R&D office prior to the 
start of the study (see “Conditions of the favourable opinion” below). 
 
Conditions of the favourable opinion 
 
The favourable opinion is subject to the following conditions being met prior to the start 
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of the study. 
Management permission or approval must be obtained from each host organisation 
prior to the start of the study at the site concerned. 
 
For NHS research sites only, management permission for research (“R&D approval”) 
should be obtained from the relevant care organisation(s) in accordance with NHS 
research governance arrangements.  Guidance on applying for NHS permission for 
research is available in the Integrated Research Application System or at 
http://www.rdforum.nhs.uk. 
 
Where the only involvement of the NHS organisation is as a Participant Identification 
Centre (PIC), management permission for research is not required but the R&D office 
should be notified of the study and agree to the organisation’s involvement. Guidance 
on procedures for PICs is available in IRAS. Further advice should be sought from the 
R&D office where necessary. 
 
Sponsors are not required to notify the Committee of approvals from host 
organisations. 
 
It is the responsibility of the sponsor to ensure that all the conditions are 
complied with before the start of the study or its initiation at a particular site (as 
applicable). 
 
Approved documents 
 
The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as follows: 
  
Document    Version    Date    
  
Investigator CV    29 April 2010    
Protocol  3  18 December 2009    
Protocol  4  15 July 2010    
REC application    07 May 2010    
Covering Letter    05 May 2010    
Participant Information Sheet: Key worker  1  15 July 2010    
Response to Request for Further Information    15 July 2010    
Participant Information Sheet  3  15 July 2010    
Participant Consent Form: Key worker  1  15 July 2010    
Participant Consent Form  2  05 May 2010    
CV - Catherine Derbyshire         
Referees or other scientific critique report    08 January 2010    
 
Statement of compliance 
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The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard 
Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 
After ethical review 
 
Now that you have completed the application process please visit the National 
Research Ethics Service website > After Review 
 
You are invited to give your view of the service that you have received from the 
National Research Ethics Service and the application procedure.  If you wish to make 
your views known please use the feedback form available on the website. 
 
The attached document “After ethical review – guidance for researchers” gives detailed 
guidance on reporting requirements for studies with a favourable opinion, including: 
 
 Notifying substantial amendments 
 Adding new sites and investigators 
 Progress and safety reports 
 Notifying the end of the study 
 
The NRES website also provides guidance on these topics, which is updated in the 
light of changes in reporting requirements or procedures. 
 
We would also like to inform you that we consult regularly with stakeholders to improve 
our service. If you would like to join our Reference Group please email 
referencegroup@nres.npsa.nhs.uk.  
 
10/H1307/88 Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
 
Dr Rhona Bratt 
Chair 
 
Email: Elaine.hazell@leedsth.nhs.uk 
 
Enclosures: “After ethical review – guidance for researchers”  
 
Copy to: Mr Stephen Walker 
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Appendix K – Brain Injury Rehabilitation 
Trust Ethics Approval 
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Appendix L – Northern Lincolnshire and 
Goole Hospitals R&D Ethics Approval 
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Appendix M – St Andrew’s Healthcare 
Honorary Contract
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Appendix N – Participant Information Sheet 
(Version 3) 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Study Title 
The impact of brain injury on social cognition and aggression  
 
We would like to invite you to take part in our research study. Before you 
decide we would like you to understand why the research is being done and what it 
would involve for you. Please take time to read the following information carefully. 
Talk to other people about the study if you wish. One of our team will also go through 
the information sheet with you and answer any questions you have. 
 
Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will happen to you if you take part.  
 
Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study. 
 
Ask us if there is anything that is not clear, or if you have any questions. Please take 
your time in deciding if you would like to take part.  
 
 
PART 1 
What is the Purpose of the Study? 
The purpose of the research is to investigate the effect that brain injury can 
have on social thinking, and whether difficulties with social thinking can lead to 
aggression. By ‘social thinking’, or ‘social cognition’ we mean the ways people can 
understand someone else’s point of view and how the other person reached it. Some 
people who have experienced a brain injury find it difficult to control aggressive 
outbursts. We are interested in investigating suspected links between this and social 
cognition. 
  
It is hoped that by doing this research we may gain greater understanding into 
the consequences of brain injury, its impact on social cognition and whether it can 
cause aggressive behaviour. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
You have been invited to take part in the study as we are looking at how 
people like yourself, who have suffered a brain injury, are at social thinking.  We will 
be involving people who experience difficulties regarding aggression and those who do 
not. This will allow us to determine any links between social cognition and aggression. 
The care manager of the home was contacted by us and we asked him/her whether 
there was anyone in their care who might be appropriate to invite. He/She told us that 
you might be appropriate and that we could invite you. 
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Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide to join the study. We will describe the study and go 
through this information sheet. If you agree to take part, we will then ask you to sign a 
consent form. You are free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. This 
would not affect the standard of care you receive. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you agree to take part you will be asked to complete 7 questionnaires which 
together will take about 1 ½ hours. The questionnaires will look at social thinking, 
mood and problem solving and would be done in private. The questionnaires are 
designed to look at people’s strengths and weaknesses, so you may find some parts 
easy and some parts more difficult. We would only meet once and complete all the 
questionnaires during this visit. Breaks would be available during this visit whenever 
you feel they were needed. At the end of the questionnaires you will be given an 
opportunity to ask any questions and discuss any concerns you may have.  
As well as this we would need to look in your case file to find out the type of 
brain injury you suffered and learn which areas of your brain were injured. 
Finally I’ll ask your key worker to participate in the study and fill in one 
questionnaire similar to those that you have been doing. 
 
Here is a brief outline of the questionnaires you will be asked to complete: 
 
 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS)  
The HADS is a 14 item questionnaire for measuring levels of anxiety and depression. It 
takes roughly 2-5 minutes to complete. Each question will have 4 answers to choose 
from. You should pick the one that feels most relevant to you.  
 
 Aggression Questionnaire (AQ) 
This 29 items questionnaire will require you to rate each statement depending on how 
characteristic it is of you.  
 
 Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) 
The WASI is a brief measure of intelligence taking approximately 30 minutes to 
complete. It will require you to perform some problem solving tasks, some of which 
will be timed. 
 
 The new test of Theory of Mind 
This task will require you to watch a video of several situations and tell me if someone 
has said or done something they shouldn’t have 
 
 Empathy Quotient (EQ) 
This empathy questionnaire consists of 60 statements and will ask you to say how 
much you agree with each one  
 
 Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES) 
The BEES is an emotional empathy questionnaire consisting of 30 statements. You will 
be required to say how much you agree with each.  
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What are the disadvantages of taking part? 
Some people may find it difficult to concentrate for long periods of time. We 
are able to take breaks to help if you find this is the case.  It is also important to 
remember that everyone will find some parts easier than others, and the researcher 
will be with you throughout to answer any questions. 
 
We will allow some time at the end to talk through any concerns you have and 
to answer any questions. We will also give you contact information in case you have 
any other questions later on.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
We cannot promise the study will help you but the information we get from 
this study will help improve the understanding of brain injury and therefore improve 
treatment of people who have suffered a brain injury. 
 
What happens when the research study stops? 
Once the all the participants have been seen and the research has been 
completed we will write to you with a summary of the results. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any 
possible harm you might suffer will be addressed. The detailed information on this is 
given in Part 2. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes. We will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will 
be handled in confidence. The details are included in Part 2. 
 
 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering participation, 
please read the additional information in Part 2 before making any decision. 
 
 
PART 2 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry out the study? 
You are free to withdraw from the study at any point. This will not affect the 
care you receive in any way. If you  withdraw from the study we will ask you whether 
you would like the information collected up till that point to be included in the study, 
or if you would like it to be destroyed.  
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak to 
the researcher who will do their best to answer your questions [see contact details for 
Paul Walton]. You can also contact the supervisor of the study (Paul Walton) or talk to 
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a member of your care team. If you remain unhappy you can complain formally, the 
researcher is obliged to provide these details when requested. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All information which is collected during the course of the research will be kept 
strictly confidential. Your information will be seen by the researcher only. All 
documentation will be kept in a locked filing cabinet. The information you provide will 
be identified by number so everything will remain anonymous and completely 
confidential. Your data will be held for up to 5 years after the study has ended and 
then destroyed. All data will be managed in line with the Data Protection Act. 
 
There are occasions when confidentiality must be broken. If you disclose 
information indicating that you or others are at risk of harm it will be necessary to 
inform the appropriate authorities. 
 
Data will be collated in a computer database using codes to identify individuals. 
All files will be password protected. 
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
We intend to publish the results of this study. You will not be identified in any 
publication.  
Once the all the participants have been seen and the research has been 
completed we will write to you with a summary of the results. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This study is being organised by The University of Hull and funded by the 
Humber NHS Foundation Trust. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The research is being supervised and monitored by the Dept of Clinical 
Psychology and Psychological Therapies at the University of Hull. In addition all 
research in healthcare settings are looked at by an independent group of people, 
called a Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been 
reviewed and given favourable opinion by Leeds (West) Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Further information 
I am able to provide further information should you require it. I can be contacted via 
the following:  
  
Address:  Mr Paul Walton 
Department of Clinical Psychology and Psychological Therapies 
  Hertford Building 
  University of Hull 
  Cottingham Road 
  Hull 
  HU6 7RX 
Telephone: 01482 464 106 
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Appendix O – Participant Information Sheet 
(Key Worker, Version 1) 
Participant Information Sheet (Key Worker) 
 
Study Title 
The impact of brain injury on social cognition and aggression  
 
We would like to invite you to take part in our research study. Before you 
decide we would like you to understand why the research is being done and what it 
would involve for you. Please take time to read the following information carefully. 
Talk to other people about the study if you wish. One of our team will also go through 
the information sheet with you and answer any questions you have. 
 
Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will happen to you if you take part.  
 
Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study. 
 
Ask us if there is anything that is not clear, or if you have any questions. Please take 
your time in deciding if you would like to take part.  
 
 
PART 1 
What is the Purpose of the Study? 
The purpose of the research is to investigate the effect that brain injury can 
have on social thinking, and whether difficulties with social thinking can lead to 
aggression. By ‘social thinking’, or ‘social cognition’ we mean the ways people can 
understand someone else’s point of view and how the other person reached it. Some 
people who have experienced a brain injury find it difficult to control aggressive 
outbursts. We are interested in investigating suspected links between this and social 
cognition. 
  
It is hoped that by doing this research we may gain greater understanding into 
the consequences of brain injury, its impact on social cognition and whether it can 
cause aggression. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
You have been invited to take part in the study as we are looking at how 
people, who have suffered a brain injury, are at social thinking. A client who you are 
the key worker for has agreed to participate in this study. As part of this study we 
require information regarding their behaviour from you, their key worker. We will be 
involving people who experience difficulties regarding aggression and those who do 
not. Therefore your client may or may not display aggressive behaviour. Your client 
has permitted us to contact you to request your participation in the study and 
consented to you revealing information about them.  
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Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide to join the study. We will describe the study and go 
through this information sheet. If you agree to take part, we will then ask you to sign a 
consent form. You are free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. This 
would not affect your status as a professional. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you agree to take part you will be asked to complete one questionnaire 
which will take about 5 minutes. The questionnaire will be done in private. It will 
provide statements (e.g. Sometimes my client flies off the handle for no good reason) 
and ask you to rate how applicable each statement is to client. We would only meet 
once to complete the questionnaire. At the end of the questionnaire you will be given 
an opportunity to ask any questions and discuss any concerns you may have.  
Here is a brief outline of the questionnaire you will be asked to complete: 
 
 Partner Aggression Questionnaire (AQ-P) 
This 29 items questionnaire will require you to rate each statement depending on how 
characteristic it is of your client. The term “partner” will be substituted with the term 
“client” throughout.  
 
What are the disadvantages of taking part? 
 
 It can sometimes be difficult to reveal information about a client if you fear it 
will portray them in what could be considered a negative way. The researcher will be 
available whilst you are completing the questionnaire to answer any questions and 
discuss any concerns you have about the information you are providing. 
We will also provide you our contact information in case you have any further 
questions.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
We cannot promise the study will help you or your client but the information 
we get from this study will help improve the understanding of brain injury and 
therefore improve treatment of people who have suffered a brain injury. 
 
What happens when the research study stops? 
Once the all the participants have been seen and the research has been 
completed we will write to you with a summary of the results. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any 
possible harm you might suffer will be addressed. The detailed information on this is 
given in Part 2. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes. We will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you and 
your client will be handled in confidence. The details are included in Part 2. 
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If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering participation, 
please read the additional information in Part 2 before making any decision. 
 
 
PART 2 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry out the study? 
You are free to withdraw from the study at any point. This will not affect your 
professional status in any way. If you withdraw from the study we will ask you whether 
you would like the information collected up till that point to be included in the study, 
or if you would like it to be destroyed. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak to 
the researcher who will do their best to answer your questions [see contact details for 
Paul Walton]. You can also contact the supervisor of the study (Paul Walton) or talk to 
your site manager. If you remain unhappy you can complain formally, the researcher is 
obliged to provide these details when requested. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All information which is collected during the course of the research will be kept 
strictly confidential. Your information will be seen by the researcher only. All 
documentation will be kept in a locked filing cabinet. The information you provide will 
be identified by number so everything will remain anonymous and completely 
confidential. Your data will be held for up to 5 years after the study has ended and 
then destroyed. All data will be managed in line with the Data Protection Act. 
 
There are occasions when confidentiality must be broken. If you disclose 
information indicating that you or others are at risk of harm it will be necessary to 
inform the appropriate authorities. 
 
Data will be collated in a computer database using codes to identify individuals. 
All files will be password protected. 
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
We intend to publish the results of this study. You will not be identified in any 
publication.  
Once the all the participants have been seen and the research has been 
completed we will write to you with a summary of the results. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This study is being organised by The University of Hull and funded by the 
Humber NHS Foundation Trust. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
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The research is being supervised and monitored by the Dept of Clinical 
Psychology at the University of Hull. In addition all research in healthcare settings are 
looked at by an independent group of people, called a Research Ethics Committee, to 
protect your interests. This study has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by 
Leeds (West) Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Further information 
I am able to provide further information should you require it. I can be contacted via 
the following:  
  
Address:  Mr Paul Walton 
Department of Clinical Psychology and Psychological Therapies 
  Hertford Building 
  University of Hull 
  Cottingham Road 
  Hull 
  HU6 7RX 
 
Telephone: 01482 464 106 
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Appendix P – Participant Consent Form 
(Version 1) 
Centre Number: 
Study Number:  
Participant Identification Number:  
 
CONSENT FORM 
Title of Project: 
Name of Researcher: 
 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated.................... 
(version............) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time without giving any reason, without my health care or legal rights being 
affected. 
 
3. I understand that relevant sections of my case notes need to be accessed by 
researchers as part of my participation in this study and hereby authorise their 
access to such material. 
 
4. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
            
Name of Participant     Date     Signature 
 
            
Name of Person Taking Consent   Date     Signature 
 
 
  
Please initial 
box 
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Appendix Q – Key Worker Consent Form 
(Version 1) 
Centre Number: 
Study Number:  
Participant Identification Number:  
 
CONSENT FORM (Key Worker) 
Title of Project: 
Name of Researcher: 
 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated.................... 
(version............) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time without giving any reason, without my health care or legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
            
Name of Participant     Date     Signature 
 
            
Name of Person Taking Consent    Date     Signature 
 
 
  
Please initial 
box 
~ 186 ~ 
 
Appendix R – Portfolio Thesis Word Count 
 
Part One Word Count – 12,802 (excludes abstract, tables, figures, references, 
appendices and main heading) 
 
Part Two Word Count – 10,398 (excludes abstract, tables, figures, references, 
appendices and main heading) 
 
Appendix A (Reflective Statement) Word Count – 2,010 
 
Total Portfolio Thesis Word Count – 32,585 (excludes: tables, figures, references and 
Appendices B, C, G, K, L and M) 
 
 
 
